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This dissertation offers three essays addressing critical topics in supply chains for specialty crops: 
1) impacts of initiatives to control CO2 emissions; 2) vertical price transmission behavioral 
changes after elimination of an export cartel; and 3) influence of market power on cost pass-
through.   
 Chapter 1 investigates the impact of alternative CO2 emission reduction policies, namely 
a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system, on the U.S. apple supply chain. The potential benefits 
accruing to farm-level CO2 sequestration options are also considered. A temporally- and 
spatially-disaggregated price equilibrium model is constructed to evaluate the relationship 
between CO2 emissions reduction and region- and sector-wide economic performance. The 
results indicate that all CO2 emission policies examined lead to modest decreases in CO2 
emissions from the apple supply chain, with implied carbon prices ranging between $25 and 
$200 per metric ton of CO2. The results also suggest that a cap-and-trade system may be more 
cost-effective in reducing CO2 emissions than a carbon tax, regardless of the CO2 sequestration 
options utilized.    
  
  
 Chapter 2 examines the impact of terminating the coffee export quota system (EQS) on 
international-to-retail price transmissions in France, Germany and the United States. A threshold 
error correction model (TECM) is developed to measure price transmission behaviors, taking 
into account long-run threshold effects and short-run price transmission asymmetries (PTA). The 
results suggest that retail prices become more responsive to changes in international prices after 
the EQS elimination. The evidence suggests the presence of short-run PTAs, with significant 
differences across countries. We discuss these differences in terms of market structure.   
 Chapter 3 investigates links between exertion of market power and cost pass-through 
patterns in roasted coffee markets in the U.S. and Germany. A structural supply-demand model 
is developed to evaluate the degree of market power exerted by the roasting industry. 
Subsequently, a TECM is used to test the impacts of market power on cost pass-through 
behaviors. The results indicate that market power drives the existence of a "rockets and feathers" 
phenomenon in both countries. That is, market power causes retail prices to rise faster than they 
fall in response to changes in international prices.  
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CHAPTER 1 
IMPACT OF CO2 EMISSION POLICIES ON FOOD SUPPLY CHAINS: AN APPLICATION 
TO THE U.S. APPLE SECTOR 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we investigate the impact of two alternative CO2 emission reduction policies, 
namely a carbon tax scheme and a cap-and-trade mechanism, on the economic performance of 
food supply chains. We also evaluate the potential impact of farm-level CO2 sequestration 
incentive programs on supply chain performance. For this purpose, we develop an optimization 
model for the U.S. fresh apple supply chain employing a spatially- and temporally-disaggregated 
price equilibrium approach. Our results suggest that, if carbon prices range between $25 and 
$200 per metric ton of CO2, all CO2 emission policies examined here lead to slight decreases in 
total CO2 emissions along the fresh apple supply chain. These results are primarily driven by 
decreases in apple production in supply regions. Specifically, we find that, given regional 
differences in price elasticities of supply, production costs and sequestration rates, California 
may experience the largest decreases in apple production with the introduction of CO2 emission 
reduction policies. The costs of CO2 emission policies affect primarily fresh apple consumers in 
the non-harvest season due to changes in apple storage usage. Farm-level carbon sequestration 
incentives seem to contribute modestly to CO2 emissions reduction, relative to policies without 
carbon sequestration incentives. We find that a cap-and-trade system may be more cost-efficient 
for CO2 emissions mitigation in the fresh apple supply chain than a carbon tax scheme, 
regardless of the presence of sequestration incentive programs.    
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Tradeoffs between environmental quality improvement and economic performance have been 
widely addressed in the environmental economics literature. There is consensus that improving 
environmental quality entails substantial economic and social costs, but the social benefits 
obtained from pollution reductions often overwhelm these costs. A better understanding of these 
linkages is relevant for the design of cost-effective policies targeting environmental quality 
improvement.  
 Since the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, many countries have introduced 
policy instruments that target reductions of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, a primary 
contributor to greenhouse gas (GHG) concentration. CO2 emissions are mostly generated by 
sectors where fossil fuels are heavily used, including electricity generation, transportation and 
industrial activities. These sectors have the largest share of CO2 emissions, accounting for 30 
percent, 23 percent and 19 percent, respectively (US EPA 2011). In this regard, most policy 
instruments designed to reduce CO2 emissions have been implemented and discussed in the 
context of these three sectors.1
                                                 
1 For instance, the European Union's Emission Trading System (EU ETS), which is the largest international cap-and-
trade program currently operating, has been applied to power stations, combustion plants, oil refineries and iron and 
steel works, as well as factories making cement, glass, lime, bricks, ceramics, pulp, paper and broad. In the United 
States, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in which seven U.S. states in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic 
region participate, is a regional mandatory cap-and-trade program to control CO2 emissions from fossil fuel-fired 
electric generation.  
 We argue that efforts to regulate CO2 emissions can be extended 
to the food supply chain. The food supply chain consists of a variety of stakeholders including 
producers, processors, distributors and consumers, whose activities can influence the level of 
CO2 emissions at multiple segments.  
 3 
 
 The food supply chain accounts for a relatively small portion of CO2 emissions in the 
overall U.S. economy.2
 The apple supply chain is an interesting and relevant one to examine the links between 
CO2 emissions reduction and economic performance. Table 1.1 presents selected characteristics 
of the U.S. apple sector. First, apples are one of the most popular fruits produced domestically, 
together with oranges and grapes. Specifically, apples are the most popular domestically 
produced fruit in fresh form and second to oranges in total fruit consumption. Second, the U.S. 
 Nevertheless, there are many private- and public-led sector-specific 
initiatives to reduce CO2 emissions. Many industries are setting goals to reduce their carbon 
footprints to respond to increased consumer demand for sustainability attributed from food 
supply chain (Brenton, Edwards-Jones and Jensen 2010; Bockel et al. 2011). Therefore, from a 
sector-specific point of view, it is important for supply chain practitioners and policy makers to 
identify 1) the extent to which CO2 emission policies can contribute to emission reductions at 
each segment of the chain; 2) the extent to which the economic burden brought about by CO2 
emission control policies is concentrated on particular segments of the chain; and 3) the extent to 
which CO2 emissions are offset by compensation for social costs. At the same time, particularly 
in food supply chains, it is also important for supply chain practitioners as well as policy makers 
to evaluate the potential economic impact of farm-level CO2 sequestration initiatives and their 
implications for long-term strategies to reduce CO2 emissions. In this study, we shed light on 
these issues by developing a spatially-disaggregated model for fresh apples in the United States 
and by evaluating the potential economic impacts of alternative CO2 emission reduction policies 
with and without carbon sequestration options. 
                                                 
2 The estimated food-related energy use which is closely related to CO2 emissions was estimated about 15.7 percent 
in the national energy budget in 2007 (Canning et al. 2010).   
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apple supply chain exhibits different consumption and production patterns spatially and 
temporally. According to the Continuing Survey of Food Intake by Individuals (USDA AMS 
2011), among the four Census divisions, consumers in the West region have the highest 
consumption of fresh apples, whereas Northeast region consumers tend to eat more processed 
apples. In terms of total utilization, per capita apple consumption is highest in the Northeast and 
lowest in the South (Perez et al. 2001). Geographical differences in apple consumption may be 
related to the location of apple production regions. The six largest producer states (Washington, 
New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, California and Virginia) account for approximately 90 
percent of the country's total apple production (USDA NASS 2011). Particularly, Washington 
accounts for about 58 percent of total apple production in the country. The relatively high 
concentration of production in a few states and the dispersed pattern of apple consumption 
require the operation of multiple distribution networks in the apple supply chain. These 
characteristics provide meaningful insights on policy application for those who are interested in 
the relationship between supply chain performance and CO2 emissions reduction, in terms of 1) 
the extent of policy impact on each supply region; 2) the extent of policy impact on each chain 
segment; 3) the extent of policy impact on the distribution channel; 4) the extent of policy impact 
on consumers; and 5) the extent of policy impact on CO2 emission reductions and social welfare 
losses. 
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Table 1.1 Selected characteristics of the U.S. fresh apple sector 
 Total Fresh Processed 
Utilizationa, b                                    pounds 
   Oranges 65.2  7.5 57.7 
   Apples 49.9 16.4 33.5 
   Grapes 21.4 8.9 13.1 
Demandc                                     % 
   Northeast 29.1 24.7 30.9 
   Midwest 24.2 24.2 24.4 
   South 19.6 18.9 19.8 
   West 27.1 32.2 24.9 
Supplyd                                     % 
   Northeast 15.6 31.7 21.1 
   Midwest 8.8 20.7 12.9 
   South 2.2 10.2 5.0 
   West 73.5 37.5 61.1 
a. Source: Food availability per capita, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research 
Service. 
b. Fresh equivalent, pound. 
c. Source: Per capita apple consumption, CSFII 1994-1996 (1998), Perez et al. (2001). 
d. Source: Noncitrus Fruits and Nuts 2010, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic 
Research Service. 
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 Various approaches have been employed to measure environmental impacts associated 
with activities along the food supply chain. A common one is the Food Miles approach which 
measures total distances traveled by food from the farm gate to end consumers (Coley et al. 2009; 
Weber and Matthews 2009). The Food Miles concept is simple and easy to communicate to the 
public. That is, the longer food travels, the more energy is consumed through transport, so more 
GHGs are discharged to the atmosphere. However, the Food Miles approach does not consider 
economic and environmental impacts incurred by production, storage and processing activities, 
which account for the largest portion of CO2 emissions generated by a typical food supply chain 
(Nicholson, Gómez and Gao 2011). An alternative, and commonly used approach, is the Life 
Cycle Assessment (LCA) which covers a broader range of issues than the Food Miles approach. 
The LCA is a technique designed to evaluate environmental effects during the life span of 
products based on energy balance accounting. This approach was originally applied to 
manufactured products (Loss and Evans 2002). Several studies have extended LCA to food 
supply chains (Heller and Keoleian 2003; Andersson and Ohlsson 1999; Moller et al. 1996). 
However, LCA is a descriptive accounting approach that yields little or no insight into the 
potential impacts of CO2 emissions reduction on social costs and benefits as well as on the 
structure of the food supply chain. Consequently, a rigorous model showing the relationship 
between economic performance and CO2 emissions reduction in apple supply chain is required 
to identify appropriate policy instruments that may minimize the negative impacts of regulating 
CO2 emissions.  
 The objective of this study is to develop an optimization model of the U.S. apple supply 
chain to examine the impacts of alternative CO2 emission policies on social welfare and supply 
chain structure. We focus on two widely discussed policy instruments: a carbon tax scheme and a 
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cap-and-trade program. For the purposes of this study, we employ a spatially- and temporally-
disaggregated price equilibrium model, developed initially by Enke (1951) and Samuelson 
(1952), and later extended by Takayama and Judge (1964). Spatial price equilibrium models 
have been widely employed for the analysis of inter-regional competition of agricultural 
commodities (Guajardo and Elizondo 2003). These studies have refined the food supply chain 
model and examined how external factors such as supply shocks (Fuchs, Farris and Bohall 1974), 
transportation costs (Dunn and Garafola 1986), production costs (Chien and Epperson 1990), and 
policy changes (Yavuz et al. 1996; Guajardo and Elizondo 2003) influence supply chain 
structure and inter-regional competitiveness of commodities.  
 We make two key contributions to this extensive literature. First, we develop a spatially- 
and temporally-disaggregated model to examine the sector- and region-specific impacts of CO2 
emission policies on the structure and performance of a food supply chain. This model provides 
specific insights that previous models were unable to find for both supply chain practitioners and 
policy makers interested in reducing CO2 emissions. Second, we extend the model by 
incorporating farm-level CO2 sequestration potential-a unique characteristic in agricultural 
product supply chain- and subsequently examine their potential impact on the food supply chain 
structure and their contribution to CO2 emission mitigation.  
 The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the U.S. apple 
supply chain and discusses the scope of the proposed model. In section 3, we develop an 
optimization model of the U.S. fresh apple supply chain employing a spatial price equilibrium 
framework. In this section, we econometrically estimate price elasticities of supply and demand, 
calculate costs associated to supply chain activities, and calculate the CO2 emissions occurring at 
each segment of supply chain. Here, we also calibrate the model using 2006 data, which is used 
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as a benchmark for comparison in the subsequent analysis. In section 4, we discuss CO2 
emission policies and their application to our apple supply chain model. We also discuss the 
incorporation of farm-level carbon sequestration incentives in this section. Subsequently, we 
present four scenarios designed to examine the economic impacts and the effectiveness of 
alternative CO2 emission reduction policies on the fresh apple supply chain. In section 5, we 
discuss our simulation results. Our conclusions are elaborated upon in section 6.   
 
1.2 The U.S. apple supply chain 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the U.S. apple supply chain. Generally, apple orchards start the annual 
production cycle in early spring and apples are harvested in the fall. After harvest, apples enter 
either the fresh or the processed supply chain. Growers typically transport apples from the 
orchard to packing-shipping facilities, where apples are sorted for fresh or processed utilization 
and, subsequently, stored or shipped to processing facilities. Alternatively, some growers 
specialized in processed apples ship directly from the orchard to processing plants. Apples 
moved directly into the fresh supply chain are hand-picked and transported from the orchard to 
packing-shipping facilities. Apples are placed into one of two possible storage types. Apples for 
sales during harvest season (September to December) are put into regular (cold air) storage, 
whereas controlled atmosphere (CA) storage is used for fruit distributed during the non-harvest 
season (January to August). In both periods, fresh market apples are transported in trailer-trucks 
from packing sheds to retail distribution centers, which are generally located near consumption 
locations. Fresh apples are also traded in international markets. The United States imported fresh 
apples by 343.4 million pounds in 2009, which accounts for about 7 percent of annual demand. 
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Particularly, fresh apples imports peak primarily between April and June. U.S. fresh apples are 
also exported to other countries. In 2009, the United States exported 1,777.7 million pounds of 
fresh apples, which accounts for about 30% of total fresh apple production in the country.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Diagram of the fresh apple supply chain 
 
 Our model focuses solely on the supply chain for fresh apples. The model considers six 
apple producer states (Washington, New York, Michigan, California, Pennsylvania and Virginia) 
and forty-nine consumption locations, each corresponding to the country's continental states. We 
take into account five fresh apple varieties (Red Delicious, Golden Delicious, Granny Smith, 
Gala and All others) to accommodate regional specialization on specific varieties (e.g. Granny 
Smith in Washington) and regional differences in consumer preference. The model is inter-
temporal and, considers two time periods: (1) the harvest season (September to December), 
during which apples are primarily put into short-term storage prior to distribution; and (2) the 
non-harvest season (January to August), when apples are put into long-term CA storage. Our 
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model takes into account exports and imports of fresh apples. The primary transportation method 
employed in our model is heavy-duty diesel trucks which account for approximately 95 percent 
of total apple transportation (USDA AMS 2011). 
 
1.3 The model  
 
1.3.1 Spatial price equilibrium model 
We employ a spatially- and temporally-disaggregated price equilibrium model following 
Takayama and Judge (1964) to estimate optimal product flows from supply regions to 
consumption locations. The model solves a quadratic programming problem to maximize social 
surplus measured as the sum of consumers and producers surplus less total costs resulting from 
all activities within the supply chain (see Appendix 1.1 for an analytical presentation of the 
model). The objective function of the model can be expressed as:  
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where the objective function represents surpluses from both domestic and international sources 
of fresh apples minus total costs from all practices including production, storage and 
transportation. The model yields optimal quantities for production, consumption, exports and 
imports; producer prices for each supply region; retail prices for each consumption location; 
inter-regional commodity flows; and social welfare levels. The objective function in equation 
(1.1) is constrained to ensure balance between supply and demand, capacity restrictions (e.g. 
land capacity for production and the capacity for storage), and technical constraints in production 
and storage (e.g. yield rate in production and loss rate in storage). These constraints are stated as 
follows:  
  
         ikPCAPqs ikiik ,,, ∀⋅≤ µ , where kacreaveyieldPCAP iikikik ∀⋅×= ,,, θ                          (1.2) 
         
ikqssa ik
t
isk
t s
t
is
,1 ,,,
,
∀≤∑∑λ , where iksa
springt
irssk ,0,, ∀=
=
=                                                    (1.3) 
         
isSCAPsa is
t k
t
isk ,,,, ∀≤∑∑                                                                                               (1.4) 
         
isktsaqextfa t sikt
is
t
isk
j
t
jisk ,,,
1
,,
,
,,,,, ∀≤+∑ λ                                                                         (1.5) 
         
jkttfamtfaqd
j
t
jmk
s i
t
jisk
t
jk ,,,,,,,, ∀+≤ ∑∑∑                                                                       (1.6) 
         
jktqimtfam t mk
j
t
jmk ,,,,, ∀≤∑                                                                                             (1.7) 
 
 Equation (1.2) ensures that the total quantity of apple variety k produced in supply area i, 
ikqs , , does not exceed the maximum production capacities, iki PCAP ,⋅µ , of each region, where iµ
is the percent rate of fresh utilization in supply region i. The maximum production capacities are 
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determined by average yield, ikaveyield , , production percentage of variety k, ik ,θ and total 
acreages in production region i, iacre . Equations (1.3) and (1.4) specify the balance of apples 
moved from orchards to storage facilities and the maximum storage capacity in each production 
region i, respectively. In equation (1.3), the total amount of stored apples in each region i, t isksa ,, , 
after considering storage loss rates, t is,λ , must be less than or equal to total fresh apple supply in 
region i, ikqs , . Following standard management practices, apples for sale during the harvest 
season are put into regular storage, whereas those for sale during the non-harvest season are put 
into CA storage. In the model, apples for sale in the harvest season can be distributed from either 
regular or CA storage. In contrast, apples for sales during the non-harvest season can be 
distributed only from CA storage. Therefore, the amounts stored in regular storage during the 
non-harvest season are set to equal to zero in our model. Equation (1.4) ensures that the total 
amount of stored apples at storage facility s in each supply region i, t isksa ,, , must be less than or 
equal to the maximum storage capacity, isSCAP , . Equation (1.5) ensures that the total amount of 
apples in storage facility s, taking into account storage losses must be greater than or equal to the 
sum of shipments to both consumption locations, t jisktfa ,,, , and export point of shipment, 
t
iskqex ,, . 
Equation (1.6) ensures that fresh apple demand for variety k in location j at time t, t jkqd , , is less 
than or equal to the total shipments from all supply regions i, t jisktfa ,,, , plus imports from all 
import points m, t jmktfam ,, . Equation (1.7) specifies that total shipment from import point m to 
consumption location j, t jmktfam ,, , must not exceed total imports at point m at t, 
t
mkqim , . Finally, 
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all decision variables in the model are required to be non-negative. Table 1.2 presents the indices 
and variables used in the model. 
 
Table 1.2 Index, variables and definitions 
Index (variable) Definition 
𝑡 time period 
𝑘 apple variety 
𝑖 supply region 
𝑗 consumption location 
𝑠 storage facility 
𝑚 import and export port 
𝑝𝑑𝑘,𝑗𝑡  retail price of fresh apple variety k at time t in consumption location j ($/pound) 
𝑞𝑑𝑘,𝑗𝑡  fresh apple quantities consumed of variety k at time t in consumption location j (million pounds) 
𝑝𝑠𝑘,𝑖 price received by farmer for apple variety k in supply region i ($/pound) 
𝑞𝑠𝑘,𝑖 fresh apple quantities produced of apple variety k in supply region i (million pounds) 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑡 price differential between import price and retail price at time t ($/pound) 
𝑞𝑖𝑚𝑡 quantities of imported apple at time t (million pounds) 
𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡 price differential between export price and producers price at time t ($/pound) 
𝑞𝑒𝑥𝑡 quantities of exported apple at time t (million pounds) 
𝑝𝑐𝑘,𝑖 production cost for apple variety k in supply region i ($/pound) 
𝑠𝑎𝑘,𝑠,𝑖𝑡  fresh apples of variety k put into storage facility s at time t in region i (million pounds) 
𝑠𝑐𝑘,𝑠,𝑖𝑡  storage cost to operate storage facility s at time t in region i ($/pound) 
𝑡𝑐𝑖,𝑗𝑡  transportation cost at time t from supply region i to consumption site j ($/pound) 
𝑡𝑐𝑚,𝑗𝑡  transportation cost at time t from supply region i to port m ($/pound) 
𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑘,𝑠,𝑖,𝑗𝑡  shipment of apple variety k at time t from storage facility s in supply region i to consumption 
location j (million pounds) 
𝑡𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑘,𝑚,𝑗𝑡  shipment of apple variety k at time t from port m to consumption site j (million pounds) 
𝑃𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑘,𝑖 production capacity for variety k in supply region i (million pounds)  
𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑘,𝑖 average yield per acre in supply region i (pounds) 
𝜃𝑘,𝑖 production percentage of variety k in supply region i (%) 
𝑎𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑖 bearing acreage for apple in supply region i (acres) 
𝜆𝑠,𝑖𝑡  apple loss rate at storage s in supply region i at time t (%) 
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑠,𝑖 capacity of storage facility s in supply region i (million pounds) 
𝜇𝑖 percentage rate of fresh utilization in supply region i (%) 
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1.3.2 Estimation of price elasticities 
The spatial equilibrium model employs price-dependent linear supply and demand functions to 
formulate the objective function. A linear inverse supply (demand) function can be written as: 
 
                                                   )(,)(,)(,)(, jikjikjikjik qp ⋅+= βα ,                                                 (1.8) 
 
where k is the apple variety, i (j) is the supply (demand) region. The coefficient )(, jikβ  is 
obtained from the relationship 
)(,
)(,
)(,
)(,
1
jik
jik
jik
jik q
p
⋅=
ε
β , where )(, jikε  refer to price elasticities of 
supply (demand) in region i (j). Therefore, estimating price elasticities of supply (demand) is 
required to establish the linear relationship between prices and quantities in supply and demand.    
 We employ the Linear Approximate Almost Ideal Demand System (LA-AIDS), 
developed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) to estimate price elasticities of demand for each 
variety, time period and demand location. The LA-AIDS is useful for capturing consumer 
demand patterns in household-level micro data by controlling for different socio-economic 
variables (e.g. race, education level and gender) and income levels (Blundell, Pashardes and 
Weber 1993). We use Nielsen's Homescan panel database for the period 2005 and 2006 to 
estimate demand elasticities of fresh apples.3
 While the use of household-level data is preferable in the complete demand system, one 
has to solve the zero expenditure problem presented in the data. That is, households do not 
always purchase all apple varieties in each time period specified in the model. If this problem is 
  
                                                 
3 The households reporting fresh apple purchase in 2005 and 2006 numbered 5,642 and 4,736, respectively. The 
sample size used in the estimation is 20,297. 
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not addressed, parameter estimates can be biased (Park et al. 1996). We follow the censored 
method of Heckman (1978) to deal with the zero consumption problem. First, we estimate a 
probit model to determine the probability that a given household would purchase a specific 
variety k as follows: 
 
                                           ),,,,,,( ,,1,,1, hNhhhkhhk Xppfq ηη ⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅⋅= ,                                           (1.9) 
 
where hkq ,  is a binary variable equal to 1 if variety k is purchased by household h, zero 
otherwise; hkp ,  is the price of variety k ; hn,η  are the socio-economic variables describing 
household characteristics (n=1,···,N); and htX ,  is the expenditure level. Second, using the fitted 
value, hkq ,ˆ  , from the probit estimation in equation (1.9), we compute the inverse Mills ratio, 
),,(/),,(, hhhhhhhk XpXpMR ηηφ Φ=  for households consuming apple variety k. )(⋅φ  and )(⋅Φ  
refer to the density and cumulative probability functions, respectively (Heien and Wessells 1990). 
Similarly, )},,(1/{),,(, XpXpMR kkkhhk ηηφ Φ−=  is computed for households that do not 
purchase the variety k. Finally, we estimate the missing prices stemming from zero purchase of 
variety k at time t, employing seasonal and regional dummy variables for the complete data set. 
Consequently, with the complete data set, the LA-AIDS model incorporating the inverse Mills 
ratio, kMR  is given by: 
 
                  
TMRPXpw hkkhhk
l
hllk
n
hnnkkhk ρδπγηςσ +++++= ∑∑ ,,,,,, )/ln(ln ,              (1.10) 
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where hkw ,  is the budget share of household h for variety k; ∑ ==
5
1 ,k hkkh
qpX is the total 
expenditure of household h for five apple varieties; hkMR , is the inverse Mills ratio; 
∑ ==
5
1 ,
lnln
k hkkh
pwP is the Stone Price Index for the LA-AIDS specification; and T is year 
dummy variable. To be consistent with economic theory, the parameter restrictions for 
estimation of equation (1.10) include the following: for homogeneity, 15
1
=∑ =k kσ , 0
5
1
=∑ =k kπ , 
05
1 ,
=∑ =k lkγ , 0
5
1 ,
=∑ =l lkγ ; and for symmetry, kllk ,, γγ = . Finally, the own price elasticity of 
demand is obtained by 1ˆ −−=
k
kkkk
kk w
wπγε .  
 Table 1.3 reports the estimated seasonal price elasticities of demand for four multistate 
Census regions, varieties and seasons, respectively (See Appendix 1.3 for the detailed estimation 
results of the LA-AIDS model in equation (1.10) for the four Census divisions). The results show 
differences in the price elasticities of demand across regions, varieties and seasons. Red 
Delicious apples tend to have the same elasticity, regardless of the region, but the elasticity is 
higher in the non-harvest season. The other varieties (Golden Delicious, Granny Smith and Gala) 
exhibit elasticities that appear to be more sensitive to changes in prices compared to Red 
Delicious, the most consumed variety.  
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Table 1.3 Price elasticities of demand by season, region and variety 
Time period Region 
Harvest season 
(September-December) 
Northeast Midwest South West 
   Golden Delicious -1.537 -1.168 -0.970 -0.608 
   Granny Smith -3.349 -1.490 -2.000 -2.078 
   Red Delicious -0.984 -1.016 -0.998 -0.933 
   Gala -1.517 -0.691 -0.787 -1.120 
   Others -1.054 -1.079 -1.080 -1.087 
Non-harvest season 
(January-August) 
Northeast Midwest South West 
   Golden Delicious -2.004 -2.712 -1.710 -3.222 
   Granny Smith -2.562 -4.681 -1.955 -2.693 
   Red Delicious -1.002 -1.105 -0.989 -0.901 
   Gala -0.707 -1.269 -0.717 -0.959 
   Others -1.057 -1.077 -1.098 -1.063 
 
 
 We also need to estimate price elasticities of supply in the production regions. For this 
purpose, we employ Nerlove's (1956) model and yearly data showing fresh apple production and 
farm gate prices for the period 1973 to 2008. Since these are national data, price elasticities of 
supply are assumed to be identical across all varieties in each supply region. Following Nerlove 
(1956), the general supply function of partial adjustment is specified as follows: 
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i
t
ii
t
i
t uTzpQ ++++= − 32110
* lnln αααα ,                                  (1.11) 
 
where *itQ  implies desired (equilibrium) output in production region i at time t, 
i
tp 1ln −  is output 
price in region i at time t-1, T  is a time trend and iz  represents weather conditions (e.g. 
precipitation). The supply dynamics for the actual adjustment to the equilibrium relationship is 
given by:  
 
                                                  )ln(lnlnln 1
*
1
i
t
i
t
ii
t
i
t QQQQ −− −=− ϕ ,                                       (1.12) 
 
where itQ  is the actual output in region i and 
iϕ  is the partial adjustment coefficient. By 
substituting equation (1.12) into equation (1.11), rearranging terms and employing regional 
dummy variables, the Nerlovian model for estimating price elasticities of supply for each supply 
region is given as: 
 
                   
i
t
ii
tj
i
t
jji
t
i
t eTzQpdpQ ++++⋅⋅++= −−− ∑ 431211110 lnlnlnln ββββββ ,           (1.13) 
 
where 1=jd  if ji =  and zero otherwise. 11 ϕαβ =  is the short-run price elasticity of apple 
supply in each region. Table 1.4 presents the estimation results of equation (1.13). Based on the 
estimates, the price elasticities of supply are obtained for each supply region. The estimated 
elasticities for each supply region suggest that supply in California tends to be the most sensitive 
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with respect to farm gate prices among all six production regions. In contrast, supply in 
Washington seems to be the most inelastic to farm gate prices. 
 
Table 1.4 Estimate results of Nerlovian model and estimated price elasticities of supply 
 Coefficient Standard Errors 
Constant 2.818**a (1.199) 
lnpt-1 0.359** (0.105) 
dCA·lnpt-1 0.206** (0.069) 
dMI·lnpt-1 0.012 (0.040) 
dPA·lnpt-1 0.143** (0.059) 
dVA·lnpt-1 0.186** (0.068) 
dWA·lnpt-1 -0.242** (0.068) 
lnqt-1 0.746** (0.045) 
Precipitation -0.020 (0.029) 
Temperature -0.006 (0.017) 
Time -0.009** (0.003) 
2R  0.95 
# of Observations 210 
Price Elasticities of Supply   
   California 0.565 
   Michigan 0.359 
   New York 0.359 
   Pennsylvania 0.501 
   Virginia 0.545 
   Washington 0.117 
a. ** indicates 5% significance level. 
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 Finally, we estimate price elasticities of apple imports and exports for the harvest and 
non-harvest seasons. The quantities of exports and imports are assumed to be dependent on the 
differential between domestic and international import (export) prices and domestic production 
quantities.4
 
 
1.3.3 Costs in production, storage and transportation 
To build the optimization model in equation (1.1), a specification of cost structure in the fresh 
apple supply chain is required. To this end, we compiled per unit costs for production, storage 
and transportation activities. Apple production costs consist of variable costs (e.g. labor, fertilizer, 
agricultural chemical) and ownership costs (e.g. depreciation, interest, insurance and tax). Labor 
costs are primary input during apple production, requiring when pruning, thinning, and apple 
picking. Moreover, fertilizer and agricultural chemical costs also account for a substantial part in 
apple production cost. Variable costs in production account for about 63 percent of total apple 
production costs. In contrast, ownership costs refer to overhead cost such as depreciation, interest, 
insurance and tax. In general, ownership costs in apple production account for about 37 percent 
of total apple production costs (Schotzko and Granatstein 2005). We compiled production costs 
from existing apple crop budget studies and generated the other states' costs by adjusting general 
farm unit labor costs in each state (BLS 2011).5
                                                 
4 Due to data limitations, we assume that fresh apples are exported only from Washington and New York. 
Furthermore, fresh apples are assumed to be imported through four major ports (e.g. LA, Miami, Newark and 
Seattle) and distributed to forty-nine consumption locations in the same proportion. Linear import functions for the 
non-harvest season and the harvest season are estimated to be pnh=1.151+0.003imnh , ph=1.151+0.022imh, 
respectively. Linear export functions for non-harvest and harvest season are estimated to be pnh=6.423-0.005exnh , 
ph=6.423-0.008exh, respectively. 
 Storage costs depend on the amount of time that 
apples are stored and the costs of energy. Storage costs were obtained from a direct survey of 
5 See the Appendix 1.3 for data table for production costs.  
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apple packer-shippers,6 and other states' data are generated by adjusting the industry's electricity 
price data for each state (BLS 2011). Transportation costs were compiled from the "Agricultural 
Refrigerated Truck Quarterly"(USDA AMS 2011) and missing data were generated taking into 
account the relationship between costs and distances.7
 
 
1.3.4 CO2 emissions in production, storage and transportation 
Bringing apples from the orchard to consumers requires various activities including farm-level 
production, storage and transportation, which generate CO2 emissions released into the 
atmosphere. Therefore, accounting for CO2 emissions along the fresh apple supply chain is 
critical to assess the economic impacts of CO2 emissions reduction policies.       
 First, farm-level activities in orchards contribute to CO2 emissions in two ways: direct 
and indirect energy use. CO2 emissions from direct energy use are primarily associated with 
water irrigation which is a critical input in apple production in some parts of the United States. 
Because of regional differences in rainfall patterns, irrigation requirements are different across 
the supply locations. Table 1.5 shows CO2 emissions resulting from irrigation activities in each 
supply region (NYSERDA 2008). These data show that the Western states, California and 
Washington, are arid and require relatively more irrigation due to lower precipitation. In contrast, 
the Eastern states need less energy for irrigation in apple production. However, given differences 
in yields across supply regions, CO2 emissions per million pounds of apples are lowest in 
Washington and highest in California. 
  
                                                 
6 We collected storage costs data from H.H. Dobbins, Inc in Lyndonville, NY. In western New York, the storage 
costs operating regular (cold air) storage are $23.50 per bin. In contrast, CA storage costs $33.50 per bin for apple 
storage. See the Appendix 1.3 for data table for storage costs. 
7 See the Appendix 1.3 for data table for transportation costs. 
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Table 1.5 CO2 emissions per unit apple production and storage 
 
CA MI NY PA VA WA 
 
       Metric Ton of CO2 per million pounds 
Production 
      
 Direct usea 
  Rainfall (inch) 
  Energy use (kBTU/acre) 
  CO2 emissions  
 
0.5 
20,347 
312.98 
 
3.0 
3,393 
208.65 
 
3.0 
3,391 
163.29 
 
3.5 
3,393 
185.97 
 
3.5 
3,393 
185.97 
 
1.0 
23,739 
154.22 
 Indirect useb 
  CO2 emissions 
  from fertilizer use 
 
 
3.145 
 
 
2.367 
 
 
1.892 
 
 
1.197 
 
 
2.783 
 
 
2.328 
  CO2 emissions  
  from ag-chemical use 
 
17.246 
 
10.770 
 
8.198 
 
8.629 
 
15.699 
 
11.943 
 
Metric Ton of CO2 Ton per Acre 
  CO2 sequestration ratec 
  during apple production 
 
0.105 
 
0.145 
 
0.129 
 
0.129 
 
0.129 
 
0.105 
Storaged  Metric Ton of CO2 per million pounds 
  Regular Storage    80.45 
  CA Storage   314.45 
Transportatione 
  Heavy-diesel truck (class 8) 
                     Kg Ton of CO2 per mile per truck 
    1.64 
a. Source: NYSERDA (2008). 
b. Source: Saunders, Barber and Taylor (2006). 
c. Source: Kroodsma and Field (2006). 
d. Source: Canals et al. (2004). 
e. Source: Mobile 6.2, US EPA (2011) 
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 Another CO2 emission source in farm-level apple production comes indirectly due to the 
application of fertilizer and agricultural chemicals.8
 Although food supply chain activities release CO2 to the atmosphere, agricultural 
practices can capture a considerable amount of CO2 in soils and biomass (Lewandrowski et al. 
2004). The extent to which carbon is sequestered varies between crop types. Particularly, 
orchards extract relatively more CO2 from the atmosphere than the average of all crops. For 
instance, non-silage annual crop capture an average of 14 g of CO2 per m2 annually, whereas 
orchards sequester 26 g of CO2 per m2 annually (Kroodsma and Field 2006). We take into 
account CO2 capturing, naturally occurring in orchard farms. Table 1.5 reports annual carbon 
sequestration rates during apple production by each region. Given differences in soil 
characteristics and climatic conditions across supply regions, carbon sequestration rates are 
relatively low in the Western states (California and Washington) and is relatively high in the 
Eastern states (New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia). Net CO2 emissions in apple production 
are obtained by deducting the sequestered CO2.           
 Data on fertilizer and agricultural chemicals 
usage in each supply location are from the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA NASS 2008). 
Subsequently, the data were converted into CO2 emissions following Saunders, Barber and 
Taylor (2006). Table 1.5 reports CO2 emissions resulting from the use of fertilizers and 
agricultural chemicals. Our accounting process suggests that, on a per unit basis, CO2 emissions 
are highest in California. In contrast, Pennsylvania shows the lowest emissions in terms of 
fertilizer and agricultural chemical use.  
                                                 
8 Components of fertilizer such as nitrogen, phosphate, potash and sulfur are converted to CO2 when they are 
applied to soil. Furthermore, the use of agricultural chemicals including herbicide, insecticide and fungicide also 
generates CO2 emissions. 
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 Storage activities also discharge a substantial amount of CO2 into the atmosphere. As 
described in section 2, apples for fresh utilization are put into either regular or CA storage 
depending on the time of year that the apples are sold. Each storage facility is operated using 
electricity to maintain the proper temperature for apple freshness (Canals et al. 2007). Table 1.5 
shows CO2 emissions generated by storage operation. Transport activities also emit CO2 during 
apple distribution. Fresh apples are mostly moved by heavy-duty trucks (class 8) which haul 
about 40,000 pounds with fuel economy of 6.1 mpg (King et al. 2010)9
  
. We compiled CO2 
emission data in fresh apple transportation using the MOBILE 6.2 model developed by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA 2011). We used the average CO2 emission rate of 
1.64 kg/mile with fuel economy of 6.1 mpg.  
1.3.5 Model calibration and baseline solutions  
Before calibration, we constructed the linear supply and demand functions as in equation (1.8) 
using the estimated price elasticities of supply and demand, quantities for supply and demand, 
and producer prices and retail prices, respectively. We calibrated the model using the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS). The estimated solutions were compared with actual data 
in 2006 for model verification. Table 1.6 presents the baseline solutions of the model, the actual 
2006 data and the ratio of our estimated to the actual value for all supply locations and for 
selected consumption locations.  
 
 
                                                 
9 There are three transportation options depending on distribution networks: 1) a semi-trailer hauling 40,000 pounds 
of apples; 2) a mid-size truck hauling 10,000 pounds of apples; and 3) a pick-up truck hauling 1,000 pounds of 
apples (King et al. 2010).  
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Table 1.6 Baseline solutions and comparison with actual data in 2006 
 Estimateda Actual Estimated/Actual 
(%) 
Total Supply (million pounds) 5,523 5,656 98 
  Quantity (million pounds)    
   California 146 155 94 
   Michigan 286 295 97 
   New York 678 690 98 
   Pennsylvania 129 132 98 
   Virginia 32 34 94 
   Washington 4,251 4350 98 
  Producer Price ($/pound)    
   California 0.370 0.412 90 
   Michigan 0.222 0.245 91 
   New York 0.289 0.302 96 
   Pennsylvania 0.247 0.257 96 
   Virginia 0.218 0.238 92 
   Washington 0.274 0.313 88 
Export (million pounds) 1,495 1,508 99 
Import (million pounds) 376 345 109 
Total demand (million pounds) 4,454 4,493 99 
Retail Price (Non-harvest) 
($/pound) 
   
   Atlanta 1.37 1.25 110 
   Los Angeles 1.31 1.16 113 
   New York 1.37 1.24 110 
   Philadelphia 1.37 1.26 109 
 Retail Price (Harvest)  
 ($/pound)   
   
   Atlanta 1.33 1.40 95 
   Los Angeles 1.28 1.27 101 
   New York 1.34 1.33 101 
   Philadelphia 1.34 1.34 100 
a. Source: Authors' calibration  
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 The estimated total production accounts for around 98 percent of actual apples produced 
in all six states. Due to the slightly low quantities estimated by the model, prices in each supply 
region are also modestly underestimated in comparison to actual producer prices in 2006. These 
differences may be because we do not take into account direct distribution systems (e.g. orchard 
to retailers and orchard to consumers). The estimated retail prices for the harvest season are 
practically the same as the actual retail prices in selected consumption locations (Table 1.6). 
However, the estimates for the non-harvest season are higher in comparison to actual data. These 
differences may be due to under-estimated production quantities, leading to low supplies of fresh 
apples in the non-harvest season in the model.     
 Table 1.7 presents CO2 emissions derived from the baseline model. The results show that 
the largest emissions along the fresh apple supply chain are attributable to farm-level apple 
production activities, accounting for about 46.6 percent of total supply chain CO2 emissions. 
Storage activities rank second in CO2 emissions, generating 43.6 percent of total CO2 emissions. 
Emissions from transportation activities are relatively low compared to production and storage 
activities, discharging 9.8 percent of total CO2 emissions in supply chain.   
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Table 1.7 CO2 emissions along the fresh apple supply chain 
 
CA MI NY PA VA WA Total % 
 
Metric Ton of CO2 
 Productiona 48,613 63,360 117,631 25,228 6,633 716,300 977,764 46.6 
Regular storagea 10,196 13,553 37,070 3,855 408 150,480 215,563 10.3 
CA storagea 
 
31,130 55,760 22,551 7,765 582,075 699,281 33.3 
Transportationa 
      
206,375 9.8 
Total Emission 
      
2,098,983 100 
a. Source: Authors' calibration 
 
1.4 Empirical framework for CO2 emission policies 
 
1.4.1 CO2 emission policies and application to the model 
Policy instruments to address CO2 emission reductions can be characterized into two categories. 
The first category is an incentive-based policy such as a carbon tax scheme or a cap-and-trade 
system. The second category is a regulatory-based policy which includes a non-tradable cap and 
a technology or a performance standard. In this study, we consider two alternative incentive-
based policy instruments targeting CO2 emission reductions: a carbon tax scheme and a cap-and-
trade program. A carbon tax scheme levies a tax on a per-unit amount of CO2 released into the 
atmosphere. In contrast, a cap-and-trade program sets upper limits on total CO2 emissions within 
a certain industry or a certain region, and gives the participants the right to trade CO2 emission 
permits. Given the non-point source nature of CO2 emissions from transportation activities, we 
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apply these policy instruments only to CO2 emissions generated from apple production and 
storage activities.  
 To implement a carbon tax scheme in our model, let τ  be a carbon tax rate levied on a 
metric ton of CO2 (mt C) emitted from apple production and storage activities. It is important to 
note that a carbon tax is not an ad valorem tax, but a specific (per unit) tax (Goulder 1992). 
Therefore, a carbon tax raises the production and storage costs proportionally to tax rates and to 
CO2 emission rates. In our model, in equation (1.1), the new production cost function that 
orchard owners face becomes ipikik pccp ,,,ˆ µτ ⋅+= , where ip,µ represents the CO2 emission rate 
per unit of apples production in supply region i. Similarly, the new storage cost function 
becomes t is
t
is
t
is sccs ,,,ˆ µτ ⋅+= , where 
t
is,µ refers to the CO2 emission rate per unit of apples put 
into storage facility s at time t in region i (see Appendix 1.2 for a carbon tax policy application to 
the baseline model).  
 We now consider a market-based emissions cap-and-trade program. Let iE  represent 
CO2 emissions from supply region i, where total emissions are ∑= i iEE . Let iA  be the lump-
sum allocation of emission permits to the supply region i where total emission permits are 
exogenously determined by the emission reduction plan. That is, EA
i i
)1( ψ−=∑ , where ψ  is 
the predetermined emission reduction plan. Let ω  refer to the permit price. To implement a cap-
and-trade program in this analysis, the objective function in equation (1.1) is modified by adding 
the term, ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑−−⋅i k t k t iskt isikipi saqsA ][ ,,,,, µµω , which measures the benefits from selling 
or buying emission permits to or from other regions and segments of fresh apple supply chain. In 
a cap-and-trade system, emission permits can be distributed to each entity by grandfathering or 
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auctioning. Under a grandfathering, permit allocation in each i, iA  is freely distributed based on 
the predetermined allocation rule (e.g. output-based or performance-based rule). In contrast, 
under auctioning, 0=iA . In addition, total emissions are controlled by a new set of constraints, 
∑∑∑ ∑ −≤+ t k t iskt isi i ikip Esaqs )1(][ ,,,,, ψµµ , which ensures that total CO2 emissions from 
production and storage activities must be less than or equal to an exogenously determined 
emission reduction plan (see Appendix 1.2 for a cap-and-trade program policy application to the 
baseline model). 
 Furthermore, our model takes into account the potential value of carbon sequestration in 
farm-level production. As one of the important methods of mitigating CO2 emissions, carbon 
sequestration provides an additional incentive for agricultural producers who might participate in 
this program by switching production practices or land use. We consider two carbon 
sequestration options: (i) changes in production practices from conventional orchard operation to 
no orchard operation; (ii) changes in land use from orchard to forest. Carbon sequestration rates 
differ across regions because they depend on various local factors such as climatic conditions, 
soil characteristics, historical land use patterns and current management practices 
(Lewandrowski et al. 2004). Table 1.8 shows data suggesting that sequestration rates for changes 
in land use from orchard to forest are higher than those for changes in production practice from 
conventional orchard operation to no orchard operation.10 However, converting orchard into 
forest is accompanied by a site preparation and tree establishment costs.11
                                                 
10 To obtain the estimated average annual carbon sequestration rate, first, the highest value for CO2 accumulated in 
ecosystem for each of the first 15 years is calculated. Then, these values are divided by 15.    
 Table 1.8 reports the 
estimated costs for forest establishment. If the policy makers introduce carbon sequestration 
11 General forest-establishment costs are not available for most regions. Lewandrowscki et al. (2004) generated 
estimates of forest establishment costs for each region following DuBois et al. (1999) and USDA FS (1999).    
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incentive programs, orchard owners may benefit from payments for offset credits created by the 
following carbon sequestration practices: i) no orchard operation and ii) converting their orchard 
into forest. Carbon sequestration is formulated in our model by adding a term which describes 
benefits from changes in land use or changes in production practices (see Appendix 1.2 for 
carbon sequestration incentive programs application to the baseline model).    
 
Table 1.8 Selected carbon sequestration rates and forest establishment costs  
State From conventional 
operation to no 
operationa 
(Metric Ton/Acre) 
From orchard 
to foresta 
 
(Metric Ton/Acre) 
Forest 
establishment costb 
 
($/Acre) 
California 0.120 0.786 108.93 
Michigan 0.165 1.331 75.85 
New York 0.147 1.210 75.85 
Pennsylvania 0.147 1.210 75.85 
Virginia 0.147 1.573 123.51 
Washington 0.120 0.786 108.93 
a. Source: Lewandrowski et al. (2004). 
b. Source: Birdsey (1996); Lewandrowski et al. (2004). 
 
1.4.2 Policy scenarios 
Based on the values of the economic variables and CO2 emissions derived from the baseline 
solution, we explore the impacts of alternative CO2 emission policies on the U.S fresh apple 
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supply chain. Specifically, we focus on 1) the extent of contribution to CO2 emission reduction; 
2) the extent of changes in fresh apple supply chain structure; 3) the potential impact of carbon 
sequestration incentives; and 4) the cost effectiveness of alternative policies.   
 We examine four alternative policy scenarios in this study. In our simulation scenarios, 
carbon prices per mt C are exogenously determined. To trace out the marginal social costs for 
emission reductions, we run each scenario with eight alternative carbon price levels where the 
value of a mt C is $25, $50, $75, $100, $125, $150, $175 and $200, respectively.12 Given that 
our model is based on a partial equilibrium framework, we do not consider general equilibrium 
issues that may take place in a multi-sector model and a second-best environment where 
distortionary taxes such as income, payroll and sales taxes exist. In this regard, we ignore the tax 
interaction effect and the revenue recycling effect.13
 Scenario I examines the impacts of a carbon tax on the fresh apple supply chain. For this 
scenario, we assume that a social planner has perfect information on CO2 emission rates in this 
industry. We impose a tax per mt C generated by production and storage activities. In scenario I, 
various tax rates from $25 to $200 per mt C are imposed and examined, respectively. Scenario II 
also employs a carbon tax scheme, but additionally offers two possible carbon sequestration 
incentives to orchard owners. The first option (i) refers to an incentive program based on the 
sequestered CO2 resulting from changes in production practices from conventional orchard 
  
                                                 
12 Theoretically, optimal carbon prices are determined by the social cost of carbon (SCC) which is a marginal 
damage cost by CO2 emission. Various ranges of the SCC have been estimated through extensive literatures. 
According to Toll (2008), the SCC varied from $2 to $1677 per metric ton of CO2 in literatures. In this study, we 
employ the carbon prices range between $25 and $200 per mt C, frequently addressed in several studies (Bovenberg 
and Goulder 1996; Lewandrowski et al. 2004; Fischer and Fox 2007; Metcalf 2009). 
13 For example, in a general equilibrium framework, the imposition of a new tax (e.g. a carbon tax) on the economy 
raises output prices, leading to decreases in real wages, resulting in an excess burden to consumers. That is, the gross 
costs resulting from the imposition of a carbon tax are determined by pre-existing distortionary taxes which are 
already imposed in other sectors. On the other hand, gross costs of a carbon tax would be reduced by recycling the 
revenues from imposing a tax through lowering the distortionary taxes. (Goulder 1994; Fischer and Fox 2007).      
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operation to no orchard operation. The second option (ii) represents an incentive program 
targeting on the sequestered CO2 resulting from changes in land use from orchard to forest. 
Carbon payment levels for CO2 sequestration and carbon tax rates are equally set from $25 to 
$200 per mt C, respectively. In Scenario I and II, we do not consider the revenue recycling. That 
is, the revenues from newly imposing tax scheme are assumed to be ignored. 
 Scenario III simulates the potential effects of a cap-and-trade program on the fresh apple 
supply chain. In this scenario, emission permits are assumed to be allocated through auctioning, 
but the revenues from selling these permits are assumed to be ignored as in Scenario I and II. In 
addition, we allow the practitioners in the fresh apple supply chain to trade the permits with both 
the entities in supply chain and the ones outside supply chain. Each supply region would 
purchase CO2 emission permits to the extent which they would want to produce apples. 
Therefore, if CO2 emissions in a certain supply region are greater than the established baseline 
CO2 emissions, this region is considered to act as a net buyer of emission permits. In contrast, a 
region acts as net seller when CO2 emissions are less than the baseline emissions. For 
comparison with a carbon tax scheme, the emission cap is set by the total emission from 
production and storage activities in the baseline. Each region (entity) is assumed to be a price 
taker in the emission permit market. Lastly, Scenario IV incorporates carbon sequestration 
incentives with a cap-and-trade system. Like Scenario II, two sequestration incentive options (e.g. 
changes in production practice and changes in land use) are examined. Moreover, carbon 
payment levels for the sequestered CO2 and permit prices are also set equally in this scenario.     
 
1.5 Simulation results 
 
 33 
 
Empirical results are obtained from comparing the baseline model solution to the four alternative 
policy scenario simulation. Tables 1.9-1.12 and Figures 1.2-1.4 summarize selected results from 
each scenario, focusing on changes in economic variables and on CO2 emissions in the fresh 
apple supply chain. Simulation results should be interpreted as differences of each policy 
scenario relative to the baseline solution.  
 
1.5.1 Carbon tax 
Table 1.9 reports the percent change in outputs and prices for tax rates of $25, $100 and $200 per 
mt C under Scenario I. The results show that the imposition of a carbon tax of $25, $100 and 
$200 per mt C leads to decreases in total supply by 0.05, 0.15 and 0.28 percent, respectively. 
This suggests that a carbon tax in the range of $25 to $200 per mt C has modest effects on total 
fresh apple production because CO2 emission rates on a per unit basis are very small. For 
instance, a carbon tax of $25 per mt C raises the per-pound production costs by $0.0043-$0.0083 
across supply regions. However, because of differences in CO2 emission rates and per unit apple 
production costs across supply regions, our simulation results show regional differences 
regarding the impact of a carbon tax. For example, California seems to be more responsive to a 
carbon tax policy than other supply regions. This is explained by the fact that California has the 
highest CO2 emission rates in apple production and the highest production costs among all 
regions.  
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Table 1.9 Percent changes (%) in output and price under a carbon tax scheme 
 Scenario I Scenario II 
 
Carbon Tax 
Carbon Tax with 
Sequestration Option I 
Carbon Tax with 
Sequestration Option II 
Tax ratess $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 
Total Supply -0.05 -0.15 -0.28 -0.05 -0.15 -0.29 -0.03 -0.15 -0.30 
  Quantity          
   CA  -0.78 -2.23 -4.20 -0.79 -2.27 -4.28 -0.57 -2.12 -4.37 
   MI -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 
   NY -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 
   PA -0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 -0.10 -0.18 -0.03 -0.10 -0.20 
   VA -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.09 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 -0.24 
   WA -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 
  Producer Price          
   CA  -1.62 -4.32 -7.84 -1.62 -4.32 -8.11 -1.08 -4.05 -8.11 
   MI 0.00 0.00 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.45 
   NY -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.69 
   PA 0.00 -0.41 -0.41 0.00 -0.41 -0.41 0.00 -0.41 -0.41 
   VA 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 
   WA -0.37 -1.10 -1.83 -0.37 -1.10 -2.19 -0.37 -1.10 -2.19 
Export -0.11 -0.27 -0.49 -0.11 -0.27 -0.49 -0.11 -0.27 -0.49 
Import 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.19 0.16 0.14 
Total demand -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 -0.08 -0.18 -0.31 
Retail Price  
(Non-harvest) 
         
   Atlanta 1.61 3.95 7.03 1.61 3.95 7.03 1.61 3.95 7.03 
   Los Angeles 1.60 4.04 7.32 1.60 4.04 7.32 1.60 4.04 7.32 
   New York 1.60 3.86 6.92 1.60 3.86 6.92 1.60 3.86 6.92 
   Philadelphia 1.60 3.86 6.92 1.60 3.86 6.92 1.60 3.86 6.92 
 Retail Price  
(Harvest)    
         
   Atlanta 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.38 0.45 0.38 0.38 
   Los Angeles 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.71 0.63 0.55 0.71 0.63 0.55 
   New York 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.37 
   Philadelphia 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.37 0.37 
Total Welfare -0.50 -1.14 -1.98 -0.50 -1.14 -1.98 -0.50 -1.14 -1.98 
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Table 1.10 Percent changes (%) in CO2 emissions under a carbon tax scheme 
 Scenario I Scenario II 
 
Carbon Tax 
Carbon Tax with 
Sequestration Option (i) 
Carbon Tax with 
Sequestration Option (ii) 
Tax rates $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 
Emissions from 
Production 
         
   CA  -0.78 -2.22 -4.20 -0.79 -2.27 -4.28 -0.57 -2.12 -4.37 
   MI -0.03 -0.08 -0.15 -0.03 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.09 -0.18 
   NY -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.07 -0.12 -0.04 -0.08 -0.13 
   PA -0.04 -0.10 -0.17 -0.04 -0.10 -0.18 -0.03 -0.10 -0.20 
   VA -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 0.00 -0.10 -0.24 
   WA -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 
Emissions from 
Regular Storage 
            CA  -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 -30.44 
   MI 8.98 4.52 7.10 8.98 4.52 7.09 8.99 4.51 7.06 
   NY 7.16 7.47 7.41 7.16 7.46 7.40 7.16 7.46 7.38 
   PA -58.59 -58.74 -62.71 -58.59 -58.74 -62.72 -58.56 -58.76 -62.79 
   VA -33.28 -33.72 -34.32 -33.28 -33.75 -34.37 -33.14 -33.78 -34.64 
   WA 1.16 1.91 2.32 1.16 1.91 2.32 1.16 1.91 2.33 
Emission from 
CA storage 
            CA  
            MI -15.07 -7.76 -12.26 -15.07 -7.76 -12.26 -15.07 -7.76 -12.26
   NY -17.96 -18.84 -18.84 -17.96 -18.84 -18.84 -17.96 -18.84 -18.84 
   PA 37.68 37.68 40.11 37.68 37.68 40.11 37.68 37.68 40.11 
   VA 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 6.57 
   WA 0.61 -0.45 -1.28 0.61 -0.45 -1.28 0.61 -0.45 -1.28 
Emissions  
Activity 
            Production -0.06 -0.20 -0.38 -0.06 -0.20 -0.38 -0.04 -0.19 -0.40
   Regular Storage 0.05 0.34 0.71 0.05 0.34 0.71 0.05 0.34 0.71 
   CA Storage -0.31 -0.93 -1.75 -0.31 -0.93 -1.75 -0.31 -0.93 -1.75 
   Transportation 0.43 0.24 0.08 0.41 0.21 0.04 0.41 0.25 0.09 
Total Emission -0.09 -0.34 -0.68 -0.09 -0.35 -0.69 -0.08 -0.35 -0.71 
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 Decreases in apple production caused by a newly imposed carbon tax also lead to 
decreases in total demand. Total demand falls by 0.08, 0.18 and 0.31 percent, in response to a 
carbon tax of $25, $100 and $200 per mt C, respectively. These changes in total demand are 
slightly greater than those in total supply. The changes in apple production in each region give 
rise to different responses in retail markets between the non-harvest and harvest seasons. When a 
carbon tax of $25, $100 and $200 per mt C is imposed, retail prices during the non-harvest 
season increase by about 1.6, 4.0 and 7.0 percent, respectively. In contrast, during the harvest 
season, they increase only by about 0.5, 0.5 and 0.5 percent, respectively. These results indicate 
that the impacts of a carbon tax seem to affect more those who purchase fresh apples in the non-
harvest season than those who purchase fresh apple in the harvest season. These results may be 
due to changes in apple storage decisions. Recall that CO2 emission rates of apples put into CA 
storage are higher than those that are put into regular storage. Therefore, a carbon tax increases 
the relative cost of apples put into CA storage, perhaps inducing less utilization of CA storage. 
Consequently, retail prices of fresh apples in the non-harvest season may increase more than 
those in the harvest season if these costs are successfully passed on to consumers.  
 The overall social costs generated by the introduction of a carbon tax, measured by social 
welfare losses increase with the carbon tax rate. Our simulation results show that social costs 
increase by 0.5, 1.14 and 1.98 percent for a carbon tax rate of $25, $100 and $200 per mt C, 
respectively.  
 Table 1.10 presents the percent change in CO2 emissions corresponding to changes in 
production and consumption under a carbon tax scheme. Given that CO2 emissions are 
proportional to apple production, total CO2 emissions from production activities decrease by 
0.06, 0.20 and 0.38 percent under a carbon tax of $25, $100 and $200 per mt C, respectively. As 
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predicted by changes in retail prices, there are changes in the amount of apples kept in regular 
and CA storage. Total CO2 emissions generated from regular storage increase slightly by 0.05, 
0.34 and 0.71 percent for a tax rate of $25, $100 and $200 per mt C, respectively. In contrast, 
CO2 emissions from CA storage decrease by 0.31, 0.93 and 1.75 percent for the same tax rates, 
respectively. These results imply that storage managers seem to avoid increases in CA storage 
costs caused by a carbon tax by selling more apples in the harvest season. These lead to greater 
increases in retail prices for fresh apples in the non-harvest season than in the harvest season.   
 The results also show substantial differences across supply regions regarding CO2 
emissions from storage activities. For instance, in Michigan, New York and Washington, the 
three largest apple producer states, CO2 emissions from regular storage increase, while 
emissions from CA storage decrease. That is, these three states seek to decrease some of the 
storage costs caused by a carbon tax by increasing fresh apples sale in the harvest season. In 
contrast, in Pennsylvania and Virginia, CO2 emissions from regular storage decrease, but those 
from CA storage increase. That is, these two states rather increase the amount of fresh apples in 
CA storage in response to increases in retail prices in the non-harvest season.  
 Furthermore, the simulation results suggest that changes in storage behaviors seem to 
affect distribution routes from supply regions to consumption locations. Table 1.10 shows that 
even though total supply and total demand fall, total emissions from transportation activities 
rather increase by 0.43, 0.24 and 0.08 percent for a carbon tax of $25, $ 100 and $200 per mt C, 
respectively. This suggests that the inter-temporal reallocation of apple storage causes the Food 
Miles to increase. Overall, the results from Scenario I suggest that the introduction of a carbon 
tax of $25, $ 100 and $200 per mt C leads to decreases in fresh apple supply-chain-wide 
emissions by 0.09, 0.34 and 0.68 percent, respectively.     
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 Table 1.9 and 1.10 also present empirical results from Scenario II where two alternative 
carbon sequestration incentives (i.e. option (i) refers to no orchard operation and option (ii) 
represents changes in land use from orchard to forest) are incorporated into a carbon tax scheme. 
In this scenario, if benefits from sequestering CO2 in the soil or biomass through decreases in 
apple production are greater than the income generated by apple production, orchard owners may 
participate in a carbon sequestration incentive program. The results show that the overall effects 
of CO2 sequestration on apple production and the corresponding emission reductions are modest 
relative to Scenario I (i.e. carbon tax scheme where carbon sequestration options are not 
considered). Specifically, at a carbon tax and carbon price level of $200 per mt C, sequestration 
options (i) and (ii) lead to additional reductions in apple production of 0.01 and 0.02 percent, 
respectively, relative to a carbon tax scheme without carbon sequestration. At carbon price of 
$200 per mt C, total emissions are reduced 0.01 and 0.03 percent more, relative to Scenario I. 
These results suggest that carbon payment levels ranging from $25 to $200 per mt C may not 
provide enough incentive for orchard owners to participate in the carbon sequestration program.  
 Regardless of the modest impacts of carbon sequestration in these payment ranges, the 
results of Scenario II provide important information about regional differences of the economic 
impacts between two carbon sequestration options. Recall that carbon sequestration rates of 
option (ii) are greater than those of option (i). In contrast, option (ii) requires installation costs 
for afforestation. In this regard, the scope to which each supply region would participate in 
carbon sequestration programs may differ based on carbon sequestration rates and carbon 
payment levels for sequestrated CO2. Therefore, it is meaningful to find differences in economic 
scope between alternative carbon sequestration options by each supply region. Figure 1.2 
exhibits total acreage participating in both carbon sequestration programs by each payment level.  
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Figure 1.2 Reduced acreages by carbon payment levels between carbon sequestration options 
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 The results suggest that at carbon payment levels between $75 and $100 per mt C, 
conversion of option (i) to option (ii) seems to be more effective in Michigan, New York, 
Pennsylvania and Virginia. In contrast, carbon payment levels of around $175 per mt C seem to 
be a threshold price that induces conversion of option (i) to option (ii) in California and 
Washington.   
 
1.5.2 Cap-and-Trade 
We now examine the economic impacts of a cap-and-trade program targeting CO2 emission 
reductions in the fresh apple supply chain. As described in Section 4, we consider two possible 
scenarios regarding a cap-and-trade program: Scenario III examines impacts of a cap-and-trade 
program and Scenario IV adds carbon sequestration incentive programs to a cap-and-trade 
system. In both scenarios, CO2 emissions are restricted by a predetermined CO2 emission 
reduction plan based on CO2 emissions from the baseline solution. Like a carbon tax scheme, a 
cap-and-trade program is only applied to production and storage segments.        
 Table 1.11 presents the percent changes in outputs and prices under Scenario III 
employing various CO2 emission permit prices. The results show that the implementation of a 
cap-and-trade system leads to decreases in total supply because CO2 emission reductions are 
primarily accomplished by decreases in apple production. At permit prices of $25, $100 and 
$200 per mt C, total apple supply under Scenario III decreases by 0.03, 0.13 and 0.27 percent, 
respectively. These figures are slightly smaller than those under a carbon tax scheme in Scenario 
I. These results imply that emission permit prices ranging from $25 to $200 per mt C seem to be 
insufficient to have the same effect as a carbon tax. This is because apple production is still more 
profitable than selling emission permits in these permit price ranges. Reduced apple production 
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caused by a cap-and-trade program leads to modest decreases in producer prices. Like a carbon 
tax scheme, California seems to be more responsive to the introduction of a cap-and-trade 
program.  
 The impacts on total demand are also modest relative to total demand in the baseline 
model. However, these effects are about two times less than those under a carbon tax in Scenario 
I. Specifically, there are seasonal differences in retail prices. Unlike a carbon tax scheme in 
Scenario I, retail prices in the harvest season for selected consumption locations are unchanged 
or rather decrease (at permit price of $200 per mt C) under a cap-and-trade system, compared to 
the baseline. In contrast, retail prices in the non-harvest season rise under a cap-and-trade 
program. This is similar to retail prices under a carbon tax in Scenario I. But the magnitudes of a 
rise in retail price in these locations is much smaller than those in Scenario I. These results show 
different apple storage allocations between regular and CA storage in comparison to a carbon tax 
scheme in Scenario I. Recall that a carbon tax raises the storage costs. Therefore, storage 
managers may avoid cost increases by selling more fresh apples in the harvest season under a 
carbon tax policy. In contrast, under a cap-and-trade system, storage managers may buy or sell 
their emission permits from or to other practitioners. Therefore, they may adjust their storage 
plan based on the permit price level.  
 The social costs caused by the introduction of a cap-and-trade system, measured by 
welfare losses increase by 0.15, 0.59 and 1.17 percent for permit prices of $25, $100, and $200 
per mt C, respectively. These are slightly smaller than those from a carbon tax scheme, mainly 
due to benefits from trading emission permits between practitioners inside and outside supply 
chains. 
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Table 1.11 Percent changes (%) in output and price under a cap-and-trade program 
 Scenario III Scenario IV 
 
Cap-and-Trade 
Cap-and-Trade with 
Sequestration Option (i) 
Cap-and-Trade with 
Sequestration Option (ii) 
Permit Prices $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 $25 $100 $200 
Total Supply -0.03 -0.13 -0.27 -0.03 -0.13 -0.27 -0.01 -0.13 -0.28 
  Quantity          
   CA  -0.33 -1.77 -3.74 -0.34 -1.81 -3.82 -0.12 -1.66 -3.91 
   MI -0.02 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 
   NY -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 
   PA -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.19 
   VA -0.02 -0.10 -0.20 -0.02 -0.10 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.25 
   WA -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 
  Producer Price          
   CA  -0.81 -3.51 -7.03 -0.81 -3.51 -7.30 -0.27 -3.24 -7.30 
   MI 0.00 0.00 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.45 0.00 0.00 -0.45 
   NY -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 
   PA 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00 -0.40 0.00 0.00 -0.40 
   VA 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 0.00 -0.46 -0.46 
   WA -0.36 -1.09 -1.82 -0.36 -1.09 -2.19 -0.36 -1.09 -2.19 
Export -0.03 -0.11 -0.23 -0.03 -0.11 -0.23 -0.03 -0.11 -0.23 
Import -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 
Total Demand -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 -0.02 -0.07 -0.13 
Retail Price  
(Non-harvest) 
         
   Atlanta 0.44 1.68 3.29 0.44 1.68 3.29 0.44 1.68 3.29 
   Los Angeles 0.38 1.68 3.43 0.38 1.68 3.43 0.38 1.68 3.43 
   New York 0.36 1.60 3.20 0.36 1.60 3.20 0.36 1.60 3.20 
   Philadelphia 0.44 1.60 3.28 0.44 1.60 3.28 0.44 1.60 3.28 
 Retail Price  
 (Harvest)    
         
   Atlanta 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 
   Los Angeles -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 -0.08 -0.08 -0.16 
   New York 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
   Philadelphia 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.07 
Total Welfare -0.15 -0.59 -1.17 -0.15 -0.59 -1.17 -0.15 -0.59 -1.17 
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Table 1.12 Percent change (%) in CO2 emissions under a cap-and-trade program 
 Scenario III Scenario IV 
 
Cap-and-Trade 
Cap-and-Trade with 
Sequestration Option (i) 
Cap-and-Trade with 
Sequestration Option (ii) 
Permit Prices $25  $100  $200  $25  $100  $200  $25  $100  $200  
Emissions from 
Production 
         
   CA  -0.33 -1.77 -3.74 -0.34 -1.81 -3.82 -0.12 -1.66 -3.91 
   MI -0.02 -0.07 -0.14 -0.02 -0.07 -0.15 -0.01 -0.08 -0.17 
   NY -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.04 -0.09 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 
   PA -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.02 -0.08 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.19 
   VA -0.03 -0.10 -0.20 -0.03 -0.10 -0.21 0.00 -0.11 -0.25 
   WA -0.02 -0.09 -0.19 -0.02 -0.10 -0.19 -0.01 -0.09 -0.20 
Emissions from 
Regular Storage 
            CA  -0.37 -1.46 -2.92 -0.37 -1.49 -2.98 -0.13 -1.38 -3.05 
   MI 0.10 8.08 1.84 0.10 8.07 1.83 0.11 8.06 1.79 
   NY 0.02 -2.73 -2.58 0.02 -2.73 -2.58 0.03 -2.74 -2.60 
   PA 0.39 1.58 3.16 0.39 1.57 3.14 0.42 1.56 3.08 
   VA -0.15 -0.61 -34.37 -0.16 -0.63 -34.42 -0.01 -0.66 -34.68 
   WA 0.07 0.29 1.27 0.07 0.29 1.28 0.05 0.28 1.29 
Emission from 
CA storage 
            CA  
            MI -0.22 -13.67 -3.45 -0.22 -13.67 -3.45 -0.22 -13.67 -3.45 
   NY -0.10 6.65 6.12 -0.10 6.65 6.12 -0.10 6.65 6.12 
   PA -0.29 -1.15 -2.29 -0.29 -1.15 -2.29 -0.29 -1.15 -2.29 
   VA 0.00 0.00 6.57 0.00 0.00 6.57 0.00 0.00 6.57 
   WA -0.10 -0.38 -1.46 -0.10 -0.38 -1.46 -0.10 -0.38 -1.46 
Emissions from 
Activity 
            Production -0.04 -0.17 -0.35 -0.04 -0.17 -0.36 -0.02 -0.16 -0.37 
   Regular Storage 0.05 0.20 0.41 0.05 0.20 0.41 0.05 0.20 0.41 
   CA Storage -0.11 -0.44 -0.88 -0.11 -0.44 -0.88 -0.11 -0.44 -0.88 
   Transportation -0.01 -0.06 -0.26 0.00 -0.18 -0.26 -0.05 -0.09 -0.27 
Total Emission -0.05 -0.21 -0.44 -0.05 -0.23 -0.45 -0.05 -0.21 -0.45 
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 Table 1.12 reports changes in CO2 emissions under Scenario III. Total emissions under a 
cap-and-trade system decline by 0.05, 0.21 and 0.44 percent for emission permit prices of $25, 
$100 and $200 per mt C, respectively. The extent to which a cap-and-trade program influences 
CO2 emission reductions is smaller compared to a carbon tax scheme. These results suggest that 
emission permit prices ranging from $25 to $200 per mt C are not sufficient to induce production 
and storage practitioners to participate in an emission trading system. 
 Changes in CO2 emissions in each segment indicate that a cap-and-trade program affects 
production regions in a different ways. CO2 emissions from each supply region are all decrease, 
indicating that all supply regions act as net seller their emission permits relative to the baseline 
counterpart. They may sell their permits to other segments within supply chain or other 
industries outside supply chain. However, compared to the results from a carbon tax in Scenario 
I, some supply regions (California, Michigan, New York and Pennsylvania) discharge more CO2 
emissions. This indicates that under a cap-and-trade system, they produce more apples than 
under a carbon tax scheme.     
 Similar to a carbon tax scheme, the introduction of a cap-and-trade program also leads to 
differences in storage patterns. That is, total CO2 emissions from regular storage increase 
slightly, whereas those from CA storage tend to decrease. However, the simulation results show 
that, unlike other supply regions, there is differences in storage pattern between a carbon tax and 
a cap-and-trade in New York. At the permit price level range from $100 and $200 per mt C, CO2 
emissions from regular storage decrease, whereas those from CA storage increase in New York. 
These results are contrary to those in a carbon tax scheme in Scenario I. Moreover, the 
introduction of a cap-and-trade program does not increase CO2 emissions from transportation 
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activities, indicating that total distances apples move decrease under this policy scheme, unlike a 
carbon tax scheme in Scenario I.  
 Table 1.11 also presents the simulation results of scenario IV where two carbon 
sequestration options are incorporated into a cap-and-trade program. An incentive for carbon 
sequestration to orchard owners may promote further reductions in apple production. The results 
show that for carbon payments ranging from $25 to $200 per mt C, a carbon sequestration 
incentive program leads to modest decreases in apple production, although with slight 
differences across supply regions. Similar to the results of Scenario II, at low carbon payment 
levels, carbon sequestration option (i) has a greater effect on farm-level production, inducing 
more participation of orchard owners. In contrast, at higher carbon payment levels, carbon 
sequestration option (ii) seems to be more efficient due to the installation costs for preparing 
afforestation. However, similar to Scenario IV, the overall impacts of the carbon payments 
incentive on outputs, prices and welfare level are modest for carbon payment levels between $25 
and $200 per mt C. This indicates that carbon payment levels in this range for carbon 
sequestration do not encourage apple production practitioners to participate in the carbon 
sequestration incentive program.  
 Table 1.12 also reveals percent changes in CO2 emissions under Scenario IV. The extent 
of decreases in CO2 emissions by the introduction of Scenario IV are very similar to the results 
from Scenario III. The notable differences between sequestration options are only observed at 
farm-level production. The results show that at carbon payments between $25 and $100 per mt C, 
sequestration option (i) is more effective, whereas at carbon payments of $200 per mt C, 
sequestration option (ii) seems to encourage more participation in a carbon sequestration 
program. (Figure 3.3).  
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Figure 3.3. Reduced acreages by carbon payment levels between carbon sequestration options 
under a cap-and-trade program 
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1.5.3 Cost effectiveness 
In this section, we compare the trade-off relationship between CO2 emissions reduction and 
social costs by examining the degree of cost effectiveness in each policy scenario. Figure 1.4 
exhibits the costs per CO2 emissions reduction (CO2 gram) under each scenario.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4 Costs per CO2 emissions reduction (g) under carbon prices levels and policy 
scenarios 
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program excluding carbon sequestration incentives seems to be the most cost-effective policy 
intervention at carbon price of $25 per mt C among all policies. However, if carbon price ranges 
between $50 and $150 per mt C, a cap-and-trade program with carbon sequestration option (i) is 
most efficient in mitigating CO2 emissions. On the other hand, for carbon price range between 
$150 and $200 per mt C, a cap-and-trade system including carbon sequestration option (ii) seems 
to require the smallest social cost to mitigate a unit amount CO2.  
 These differences between carbon sequestration options in terms of cost efficiency are 
also observed in a carbon tax scheme. However, the overall cost efficiencies are smaller than 
those under a cap-and-trade program. The results show that a carbon tax scheme with 
sequestration option (ii) leads to the largest social costs to reduce CO2 emissions at a carbon 
price of $25 per mt C. But, as a carbon price increases, this option seems to be most cost 
effective than option (i) in terms of CO2 emission reduction among carbon tax policies. In 
addition, our results imply that there are differences in cost efficiency patterns between a carbon 
tax and a cap-and-trade system in terms of sequestration options. That is, under a cap-and-trade 
program, only at a relatively higher payment level (e.g. $150-$200), sequestration option (ii) is 
cost-effective. However, under a carbon tax scheme, at even lower carbon payment levels (e.g. 
$50-$200), this option seems to be acceptable compared to sequestration option (i).  
 
1.6 Conclusions 
 
Previous studies to measure CO2 emissions generated by activities along food supply chains 
such as Food-Miles and LCA provide piecemeal information regarding the tradeoffs relationship 
between economic performance and environmental impacts. To overcome this problem, we built 
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an optimization model of the U.S. fresh apple supply chain employing a spatial equilibrium 
framework. We examined the impacts of alternative CO2 emission policies, including a carbon 
tax scheme and a cap-and-trade program, on fresh apple supply chains in terms of the extent of 
CO2 emission reduction contributions and cost effectiveness to reduce CO2 emissions. We also 
investigated the potential impact of carbon sequestration incentives potentially involved in 
agricultural production practices.  
 The results show that all CO2 emission policies examined in this study lead to only slight 
decreases in total CO2 emissions from the fresh apple supply chain. These results are brought 
about primarily by decreases in apple production in each supply region. Given regional 
differences in price elasticities of supply, production costs and sequestration rates, California 
seems to be most affected by the introduction of CO2 emission policies. Our results suggest that 
a carbon tax scheme may lead to more decreases in apple production than a cap-and-trade 
program at the same carbon prices. These results indicate that, compared to a carbon tax scheme, 
benefits from selling emission permits in some regions are still less than those from producing 
more apples by purchasing additional emission permits from other entities or other sectors. These 
results are obtained when carbon prices range between $25 and $200 per mt C.  
 Furthermore, impacts of CO2 emission polices seem to be passed on primarily to 
consumers who purchase fresh apples in the non-harvest season. This is mainly due to changes in 
apple storage usage because CO2 emission policies lead to greater utilization of short-term 
storage and lesser use of CA storage. However, as in apple production, the extent of impacts on 
fresh apple demand is larger in a carbon tax scheme than in a cap-and-trade program. In addition, 
carbon sequestration options targeting CO2 emission reductions appear to decrease total CO2 
emissions a bit more compared to a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system without carbon 
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sequestration options. But, the magnitude of CO2 emission reductions is modest under carbon 
payments ranging from $25 to $200, regardless of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade. Our results 
suggest that a cap-and-trade system is more cost-efficient than a carbon tax scheme for CO2 
emission mitigation in the fresh apple supply chain, regardless of the presence of CO2 
sequestration options.  
 The models and simulation results in this study provide valuable insights for decision 
makers promoting industry- or sector-specific initiatives intended to reduce their carbon footprint. 
Furthermore, the model developed here can assist policy-makers who are interested in the 
identification of socially acceptable carbon prices and tax levels satisfying both CO2 emission 
reductions and social welfare losses through the simulation of various policy scenarios. But there 
are limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, our study should be extended to 
a general equilibrium framework to take into account substitutability between fruit commodities, 
revenue recycling effects from tax revenues or emission permit sales and policy interaction 
effects between other sectors. Second, other emission permit allocation rules such as lump-sum 
grandfathering, output based allocation, value-added based allocation and historical emissions 
based allocation should be also examined because each has different potential regarding CO2 
emission reductions and regional or sectoral competitiveness.   
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Appendix 1.1 Spatial price equilibrium model 
 
For a better understanding of a spatial price equilibrium framework, we present a simple model 
with a single commodity and two separated locations. Consider a perfectly competitive industry 
with two representative firms. Two firms are assumed to be located in two regions. These firms 
are price takers in this commodity market. Assume that an inverse demand (supply) function in 
each region i is linear as follows: 
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where )(sdip  is demand (supply) prices and 
)(sd
iq  is demand (supply) quantities in each region i. 
Let )(xc  be the vector of per unit cost with a constant marginal cost structure 
in all practices. To simplify, this cost is transportation cost from region i to region j. Then net 
social welfare is given by: 
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where jix ,  is the quantities shipped from supply region i to demand point j.  
 The spatial price equilibrium model solves this quadratic form in equation (A1.2) to 
maximize social surplus measured as the sum of consumers and producers surplus minus 
transportation costs. The model yields optimal quantities for supply, demand; inter-regional 
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shipments; producer prices, consumer prices; and social welfare. The objective function in 
equation (A1.2) is constrained to ensure the balances between supply and demand. First, the 
quantities produced in supply region i must be greater than or equal to total outflows from each 
supply region i to all consumption locations j. Second, the quantities consumed in demand 
location j must be less than or equal to total inflows from all supply regions i to each demand 
location j. A social planner chooses supply, demand and shipment quantities to maximize social 
surplus subject to the balance between supply and demand as follows: 
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 Let 1λ  and 2λ  be the Lagrangian multipliers which are associated with equations (A1.4) 
and (A1.5), respectively. The first order condition of this maximization problem implies that at 
optimum, the Lagrangian multiplier 1λ  and 2λ  represent demand shadow price, 
d
ip  and supply 
shadow price, sip , respectively. The transportation costs are determined by the gap between 
consumer and producer prices at optimum.  
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Appendix 1.2 The spatial price equilibrium model with policy application 
 
A1.2.1. A carbon tax scheme 
Let τ  be the carbon tax rate levied on a metric ton of CO2 (mt C) emitted from apple production 
and storage activities. The newly imposed tax increases the production and storage costs in 
proportion to tax rates, τ  and CO2 emission rates, ip.µ  and 
t
is,µ , respectively. That is, the new 
production and storage costs are ipikik pccp ,,,ˆ µτ ⋅+=  and 
t
is
t
is
t
is sccs ,,,ˆ µτ ⋅+= , respectively. 
Therefore, the objective function in equation (1.1) is modified as follows: 
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 The new objective function in equation (A1.6) is maximized subject to the same set of 
constraints as equations (1.2)-(1.7).  
 
A1.2.2. A cap-and-trade program 
Production and storage sectors in the fresh apple supply chains are assumed to be regulated 
under a cap-and-trade program. In this program, aggregate CO2 emissions generated by 
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production and storage activities cannot exceed a predetermined emission cap, ∑= i iEE , 
where iE  is CO2 emissions emitted from supply region i. Let iA  be the lump-sum allocation of 
CO2 emission permits to the supply region i . Total emission permits distributed to each entity 
are determined by predetermined CO2 emission reduction plan. That is, EA
i i
)1( ψ−=∑ , where 
ψ  is the predetermined emission reduction plan. In general, emission permits can be distributed 
to each entity by grandfathering or auctioning. Under grandfathering, each entity receive 
emission permits freely based on the allocation rule (e.g. output based or performance based). In 
contrast, under auctioning, each entity must purchase emission permits to the extent to which 
they are going to produce apples in emission permit market. We consider in this study, 
auctioning as an allocation method. Let ω  refer to the permit price. Under a cap-and-trade 
program, the new objective function is given as:    
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where the term, ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑−−⋅i k t k t iskt isikipi saqsA ][ ,,,,, µµω  describes the benefits from selling or 
buying emission permits to or from other regions and segments of fresh apple supply chain. In 
addition, total CO2 emissions from production and storage activities must be less than or equal to 
the predetermined emission reduction plan. New constraint is added to the set of constraints in 
equations (1.2)-(1.7).   
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A1.2.3. Carbon sequestration incentive program 
An introduction of carbon sequestration incentive program provides benefits for orchard owners 
if they participate in the incentive program. Two activities are incorporated into our model: (i) 
changes in production practice from conventional orchard operation to no orchard operation; (ii) 
changes in land use from orchard to forest.  
 Let i,1π  and i,2π  represent the sequestration rates for changes in production practice from 
conventional operation to no operation and for changes in land use from orchard to forest in 
supply region i, respectively. Denote pr  by the price of sequestered unit CO2. Under a carbon 
tax or a cap-and-trade program, if apple production is reduced, orchard owners have a choice 
between letting no production acres be set-aside land and shifting no production acres to forest.  
 If orchard owners choose option (i), they receive carbon payments from the regulator for 
the amounts of sequestered CO2, obtained by activity of option (i) as follows: 
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where iqs  represents the baseline apple production in region i. To implement carbon 
sequestration option (i), equation (A1.9) can be incorporated into both equation (1.6) under a 
carbon tax scheme and equation (A1.7) under a cap-and-trade program.  
 In contrast, if orchard owners participate in option (ii) incentive program, for set-aside 
lands acquiring from apple production reduction, they convert orchard lands in no production 
into forest. It requires forest establishment cost. Let iforestc  be the unit cost for forest 
establishment per acre in region i. Then, their benefits are: 
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Therefore, orchard owners would choose this option, if the price of sequestered CO2 exceeds 
forest installation costs. Similarly, carbon sequestration option (ii) is implemented by adding 
equation (A1.10) to equation (1.6) under a carbon tax scheme or equation (A1.7) under a cap-
and-trade program.  
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Appendix 1.3 Estimation results of the LA-ADIS model and cost data tables 
Table A1.1 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the non-harvest season in the Northeast 
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.199 0.011 107.01 <.0001 
η -0.126 0.002 -78.45 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.038 0.019 -2.01 0.045 
lnpgs 0.054 0.016 3.32 0.0009 
lnprd -0.011 0.009 -1.18 0.2383 
lnpgl -0.005 0.011 -0.46 0.6448 
lnpot -0.001 0.006 -0.11 0.9131 
X/P 0.003 0.002 2.04 0.0414 
MRgd -0.165 0.001 -114.92 <.0001 
T 0.000 0.003 -0.04 0.9669 
GS Constant 1.283 0.034 37.34 <.0001 
η -0.287 0.009 -33.67 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.054 0.016 3.32 0.0009 
lnpgs -0.096 0.029 -3.29 0.001 
lnprd 0.012 0.015 0.8 0.4248 
lnpgl -0.006 0.015 -0.41 0.6842 
lnpot 0.036 0.016 2.26 0.0241 
X/P 0.000 0.005 0 0.999 
MRgd -0.344 0.009 -37.36 <.0001 
T -0.009 0.009 -1.02 0.3083 
RD Constant 1.203 0.007 161.51 <.0001 
η 0.024 0.001 16.41 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.011 0.009 -1.18 0.2383 
lnpgs 0.012 0.015 0.8 0.4248 
lnprd -0.002 0.008 -0.2 0.8436 
lnpgl -0.002 0.008 -0.2 0.8436 
lnpot 0.002 0.007 0.28 0.7813 
X/P -0.007 0.002 -3.39 0.0007 
MRgd 0.332 0.002 193.52 <.0001 
T 0.004 0.004 0.98 0.3264 
GL Constant 1.067 0.007 145.44 <.0001 
η 0.013 0.001 10.07 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.005 0.011 -0.46 0.6448 
lnpgs -0.006 0.015 -0.41 0.6842 
lnprd -0.014 0.011 -1.25 0.2122 
lnpgl 0.032 0.013 2.37 0.0179 
lnpot -0.007 0.006 -1.11 0.2651 
X/P -0.005 0.002 -2.72 0.0066 
MRgd 0.357 0.002 169.99 <.0001 
T 0.004 0.004 1.27 0.2044 
# of Observations 1465 R2 0.93 
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Table A1.2 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the harvest season in the Northeast 
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.080 0.011 94.94 <.0001 
η -0.110 0.002 -61.64 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.028 0.016 -1.75 0.0796 
lnpgs 0.040 0.015 2.74 0.0063 
lnprd -0.008 0.010 -0.78 0.4347 
lnpgl 0.000 0.011 0.02 0.9806 
lnpot -0.005 0.006 -0.82 0.4132 
X/P -0.004 0.002 -2.19 0.0289 
MRgd -0.148 0.001 -103.62 <.0001 
T -0.007 0.004 -1.99 0.0462 
GS Constant 1.154 0.030 38.03 <.0001 
η -0.245 0.008 -32.21 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.040 0.015 2.74 0.0063 
lnpgs -0.167 0.029 -5.76 <.0001 
lnprd 0.025 0.018 1.41 0.1595 
lnpgl 0.070 0.018 3.95 <.0001 
lnpot 0.031 0.014 2.23 0.0261 
X/P -0.014 0.004 -3.25 0.0012 
MRgs -0.302 0.008 -37.34 <.0001 
T -0.007 0.009 -0.82 0.4149 
RD Constant 1.072 0.011 95.31 <.0001 
η 0.019 0.002 8.31 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.008 0.010 -0.78 0.4347 
lnpgs 0.025 0.018 1.41 0.1595 
lnprd 0.000 0.010 -0.03 0.9723 
lnpgl 0.000 0.010 -0.03 0.9723 
lnpot -0.016 0.010 -1.66 0.0969 
X/P -0.018 0.003 -5.97 <.0001 
MRrd 0.289 0.003 112.44 <.0001 
T -0.009 0.006 -1.59 0.1131 
GL Constant 0.926 0.011 84.93 <.0001 
η 0.012 0.002 5.9 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.000 0.011 0.02 0.9806 
lnpgs 0.070 0.018 3.95 <.0001 
lnprd 0.007 0.016 0.42 0.6729 
lnpgl -0.068 0.019 -3.7 0.0002 
lnpot -0.009 0.009 -0.98 0.329 
X/P -0.016 0.003 -5.74 <.0001 
MRgl 0.306 0.003 103.44 <.0001 
T -0.001 0.006 -0.19 0.8525 
# of Observations 1707 R2 0.83 
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Table A1.3 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the non-harvest season in the Midwest  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.212 0.014 85.73 <.0001 
η -0.124 0.002 -59.47 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.074 0.017 -4.28 <.0001 
lnpgs 0.070 0.019 3.76 0.0002 
lnprd -0.007 0.010 -0.65 0.5177 
lnpgl 0.005 0.012 0.4 0.6879 
lnpot 0.006 0.007 0.9 0.3683 
X/P -0.003 0.002 -1.23 0.2176 
MRgd -0.167 0.002 -94.32 <.0001 
T -0.003 0.004 -0.65 0.5137 
GS Constant 1.386 0.037 37.46 <.0001 
η -0.311 0.009 -34.19 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.070 0.019 3.76 0.0002 
lnpgs -0.212 0.035 -5.98 <.0001 
lnprd 0.053 0.018 2.89 0.0039 
lnpgl 0.045 0.019 2.4 0.0164 
lnpot 0.044 0.015 2.85 0.0044 
X/P -0.010 0.005 -1.98 0.0481 
MRgs -0.361 0.010 -37.56 <.0001 
T -0.010 0.009 -1.07 0.285 
RD Constant 1.168 0.009 122.91 <.0001 
η 0.025 0.002 12.66 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.007 0.010 -0.65 0.5177 
lnpgs 0.053 0.018 2.89 0.0039 
lnprd -0.020 0.010 -2.09 0.0367 
lnpgl -0.020 0.010 -2.09 0.0367 
lnpot -0.007 0.008 -0.81 0.4175 
X/P -0.005 0.003 -2.04 0.0417 
MRrd 0.326 0.002 146.36 <.0001 
T 0.010 0.005 1.9 0.0573 
GL Constant 1.035 0.010 103.32 <.0001 
η 0.014 0.002 7.95 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.005 0.012 0.4 0.6879 
lnpgs 0.045 0.019 2.4 0.0164 
lnprd -0.016 0.013 -1.18 0.2377 
lnpgl -0.025 0.016 -1.5 0.1344 
lnpot -0.009 0.008 -1.17 0.2404 
X/P -0.005 0.002 -2.25 0.0244 
MRgl 0.346 0.003 119.17 <.0001 
T 0.000 0.005 -0.01 0.992 
# of Observations 1113 R2 0.92 
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Table A1.4 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the harvest season in the Midwest  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.144 0.013 85.02 <.0001 
η -0.113 0.002 -50.79 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.012 0.017 -0.69 0.4881 
lnpgs 0.012 0.018 0.68 0.4987 
lnprd 0.004 0.011 0.36 0.7226 
lnpgl -0.005 0.011 -0.44 0.6583 
lnpot 0.001 0.007 0.13 0.8938 
X/P -0.012 0.002 -4.92 <.0001 
MRgd -0.156 0.002 -94.54 <.0001 
T 0.002 0.005 0.36 0.7209 
GS Constant 1.062 0.039 27.14 <.0001 
η -0.226 0.010 -23.5 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.012 0.018 0.68 0.4987 
lnpgs -0.033 0.033 -0.99 0.3205 
lnprd 0.001 0.019 0.07 0.944 
lnpgl 0.008 0.019 0.4 0.6865 
lnpot 0.012 0.016 0.78 0.4342 
X/P -0.018 0.005 -3.37 0.0008 
MRgs -0.282 0.010 -27.81 <.0001 
T 0.003 0.010 0.33 0.7436 
RD Constant 1.105 0.012 93.16 <.0001 
η 0.023 0.002 9.49 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.004 0.011 0.36 0.7226 
lnpgs 0.001 0.019 0.07 0.944 
lnprd -0.005 0.010 -0.56 0.5785 
lnpgl -0.005 0.010 -0.56 0.5785 
lnpot 0.006 0.009 0.6 0.5469 
X/P -0.016 0.003 -5.07 <.0001 
MRrd 0.301 0.003 110.18 <.0001 
T -0.007 0.006 -1.11 0.2654 
GL Constant 0.981 0.012 78.74 <.0001 
η 0.010 0.002 3.99 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.005 0.011 -0.44 0.6583 
lnpgs 0.008 0.019 0.4 0.6865 
lnprd -0.024 0.017 -1.41 0.1575 
lnpgl 0.036 0.017 2.09 0.0372 
lnpot -0.014 0.010 -1.51 0.1303 
X/P -0.025 0.003 -7.56 <.0001 
MRgl 0.317 0.003 91.66 <.0001 
T -0.005 0.006 -0.74 0.4587 
# of Observations 1282 R2 0.86 
 
  
 61 
 
Table A1.5 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the non-harvest season in the South  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.232 0.007 169.82 <.0001 
η -0.130 0.001 -118.42 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.030 0.009 -3.41 0.0007 
lnpgs 0.026 0.009 2.83 0.0046 
lnprd -0.004 0.005 -0.73 0.4641 
lnpgl 0.003 0.007 0.39 0.6967 
lnpot 0.005 0.005 1.06 0.2878 
X/P -0.003 0.001 -2.67 0.0077 
MRgd -0.168 0.001 -180.15 <.0001 
T 0.002 0.002 1.15 0.2513 
GS Constant 1.425 0.025 56.79 <.0001 
η -0.323 0.006 -50.82 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.026 0.009 2.83 0.0046 
lnpgs -0.066 0.022 -3 0.0027 
lnprd 0.001 0.010 0.14 0.8851 
lnpgl -0.006 0.012 -0.46 0.6475 
lnpot 0.044 0.014 3.12 0.0019 
X/P -0.010 0.003 -2.89 0.0039 
MRgs -0.377 0.007 -56.3 <.0001 
T 0.000 0.007 -0.07 0.9455 
RD Constant 1.203 0.006 210.97 <.0001 
η 0.024 0.001 20.34 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.004 0.005 -0.73 0.4641 
lnpgs 0.001 0.010 0.14 0.8851 
lnprd 0.001 0.005 0.12 0.902 
lnpgl 0.001 0.005 0.12 0.902 
lnpot 0.001 0.006 0.13 0.8929 
X/P -0.008 0.002 -5.16 <.0001 
MRrd 0.332 0.001 252.43 <.0001 
T 0.002 0.003 0.81 0.4188 
GL Constant 1.062 0.007 158.7 <.0001 
η 0.013 0.001 10.18 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.003 0.007 0.39 0.6967 
lnpgs -0.006 0.012 -0.46 0.6475 
lnprd -0.020 0.009 -2.35 0.019 
lnpgl 0.033 0.012 2.74 0.0062 
lnpot -0.010 0.007 -1.38 0.1673 
X/P -0.009 0.002 -5.58 <.0001 
MRgl 0.353 0.002 182.4 <.0001 
T -0.004 0.003 -1.26 0.209 
# of Observations 2487 R2 0.93 
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Table A1.6 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the harvest season in the South  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.064 0.009 115.59 <.0001 
η -0.107 0.002 -68.94 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.001 0.012 0.09 0.9291 
lnpgs 0.016 0.011 1.47 0.1423 
lnprd 0.001 0.008 0.08 0.9389 
lnpgl -0.019 0.009 -2.17 0.0303 
lnpot 0.001 0.006 0.09 0.9301 
X/P -0.012 0.002 -7.27 <.0001 
MRgd -0.145 0.001 -126.47 <.0001 
T 0.003 0.003 0.86 0.3877 
GS Constant 1.289 0.022 58.02 <.0001 
η -0.282 0.006 -50.15 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.016 0.011 1.47 0.1423 
lnpgs -0.081 0.021 -3.93 <.0001 
lnprd 0.011 0.012 0.94 0.3477 
lnpgl 0.027 0.013 2.14 0.0322 
lnpot 0.027 0.013 2.06 0.0391 
X/P -0.017 0.003 -5.11 <.0001 
MRgs -0.339 0.006 -57.66 <.0001 
T -0.007 0.007 -0.98 0.329 
RD Constant 1.105 0.009 129.45 <.0001 
η 0.021 0.002 11.16 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.001 0.008 0.08 0.9389 
lnpgs 0.011 0.012 0.94 0.3477 
lnprd -0.004 0.007 -0.54 0.591 
lnpgl -0.004 0.007 -0.54 0.591 
lnpot -0.004 0.009 -0.46 0.6424 
X/P -0.020 0.002 -8.47 <.0001 
MRrd 0.301 0.002 156.17 <.0001 
T 0.008 0.005 1.64 0.1018 
GL Constant 0.970 0.009 109.97 <.0001 
η 0.010 0.002 5.44 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.019 0.009 -2.17 0.0303 
lnpgs 0.027 0.013 2.14 0.0322 
lnprd -0.021 0.012 -1.79 0.073 
lnpgl 0.031 0.014 2.29 0.0218 
lnpot -0.018 0.009 -1.97 0.049 
X/P -0.021 0.002 -8.99 <.0001 
MRgl 0.318 0.002 136.15 <.0001 
T 0.006 0.005 1.19 0.233 
# of Observations 2747 R2 0.85 
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Table A1.7 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the non-harvest season in the West  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.267 0.007 188 <.0001 
η -0.136 0.001 -146.98 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.052 0.009 -5.9 <.0001 
lnpgs 0.053 0.007 7.16 <.0001 
lnprd 0.000 0.005 -0.1 0.9224 
lnpgl -0.004 0.005 -0.75 0.4559 
lnpot 0.003 0.002 1.55 0.1216 
X/P 0.000 0.001 0.18 0.8557 
MRgd -0.172 0.001 -194.21 <.0001 
T -0.001 0.002 -0.4 0.689 
GS Constant 1.471 0.030 49.06 <.0001 
η -0.343 0.008 -45.52 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.053 0.007 7.16 <.0001 
lnpgs -0.075 0.018 -4.18 <.0001 
lnprd -0.020 0.010 -2.08 0.0381 
lnpgl 0.014 0.012 1.11 0.2692 
lnpot 0.028 0.008 3.5 0.0005 
X/P -0.011 0.003 -3.72 0.0002 
MRgs -0.383 0.008 -49.02 <.0001 
T -0.007 0.006 -1.19 0.2338 
RD Constant 1.185 0.007 175.08 <.0001 
η 0.024 0.001 20.94 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.000 0.005 -0.1 0.9224 
lnpgs -0.020 0.010 -2.08 0.0381 
lnprd 0.010 0.005 1.89 0.0591 
lnpgl 0.010 0.005 1.89 0.0591 
lnpot 0.001 0.004 0.25 0.8065 
X/P -0.003 0.001 -2.17 0.0302 
MRrd 0.327 0.002 204.82 <.0001 
T 0.001 0.003 0.35 0.7258 
GL Constant 1.029 0.009 118.15 <.0001 
η 0.009 0.002 5.78 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.004 0.005 -0.75 0.4559 
lnpgs 0.014 0.012 1.11 0.2692 
lnprd -0.012 0.011 -1.04 0.2984 
lnpgl 0.003 0.013 0.24 0.8115 
lnpot -0.001 0.005 -0.18 0.8538 
X/P -0.006 0.002 -3.36 0.0008 
MRgl 0.340 0.002 138.27 <.0001 
T 0.001 0.004 0.33 0.7445 
# of Observations 1842 R2 0.93 
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Table A1.8 Estimation results of LA-AIDS model for the harvest season in the West  
Budget Share Variables Parameter Std. Err. t-value Probability 
GD Constant 1.055 0.010 104.6 <.0001 
η -0.112 0.001 -75.5 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.011 0.012 0.91 0.3625 
lnpgs 0.014 0.010 1.31 0.1888 
lnprd -0.016 0.007 -2.23 0.0259 
lnpgl -0.009 0.006 -1.53 0.1266 
lnpot 0.000 0.004 -0.06 0.9501 
X/P -0.004 0.001 -2.74 0.0062 
MRgd -0.143 0.001 -110.57 <.0001 
T -0.003 0.003 -1.07 0.2848 
GS Constant 1.298 0.027 47.43 <.0001 
η -0.290 0.007 -41.45 <.0001 
lnpgd 0.014 0.010 1.31 0.1888 
lnpgs -0.081 0.020 -4.01 <.0001 
lnprd 0.000 0.012 0.01 0.9927 
lnpgl 0.040 0.012 3.3 0.001 
lnpot 0.027 0.010 2.71 0.0069 
X/P -0.012 0.004 -3.18 0.0015 
MRgs -0.342 0.007 -47.61 <.0001 
T 0.012 0.008 1.51 0.1303 
RD Constant 1.032 0.011 96.24 <.0001 
η 0.020 0.002 9.96 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.016 0.007 -2.23 0.0259 
lnpgs 0.000 0.012 0.01 0.9927 
lnprd 0.006 0.007 0.93 0.3547 
lnpgl 0.006 0.007 0.93 0.3547 
lnpot 0.003 0.007 0.44 0.6568 
X/P -0.016 0.003 -6.37 <.0001 
MRrd 0.280 0.002 113.45 <.0001 
T -0.003 0.005 -0.63 0.5302 
GL Constant 0.963 0.011 88.41 <.0001 
η 0.011 0.002 4.83 <.0001 
lnpgd -0.009 0.006 -1.53 0.1266 
lnpgs 0.040 0.012 3.3 0.001 
lnprd 0.001 0.013 0.1 0.9232 
lnpgl -0.021 0.012 -1.79 0.0742 
lnpot -0.010 0.007 -1.44 0.1501 
X/P -0.023 0.003 -8.68 <.0001 
MRgl 0.312 0.003 112.47 <.0001 
T -0.006 0.005 -1.18 0.2398 
# of Observations 1973 R2 0.84 
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Table A1.9 Average production costs by varietiesa (Washington) 
 
Golden 
Delicious 
Granny 
Smith 
Red 
Delicious 
Gala 
Fuji 
(Others) 
Variable Costs 
     
   Labor 1,760 1,760 1,570 2,010 1,815 
   Chemicals 380 380 380 380 380 
   Operator Labor 285 333 285 333 285 
   Other 275 275 275 275 275 
 Total 2,700 2,748 2,510 2,998 2,755 
Ownership Costs 
     
   Depreciation 490 490 490 777 775 
   Interest 770 770 770 1,055 1,055 
   Taxes & Ins. 150 150 150 210 210 
   Total 1,410 1,410 1,410 2,042 2,040 
Total Cost per Acre 4,110 4,158 3,920 5,040 4,795 
Yield (bin) 50 50 40 40 35 
$/lb 0.1025 0.1040 0.1225 0.1575 0.1713 
a. Source: Schotzko and Granatstein (2005). 
  
 66 
 
Table A1.10 Unit storage cost by storage facility in each region 
 Regular Storage 
 
($/lb) 
Controlled Atmosphere 
Storage 
($/lb) 
California 0.031 0.044 
Michigan 0.019 0.027 
New York 0.029 0.042 
Pennsylvania 0.020 0.029 
Virginia 0.015 0.021 
Washington 0.015 0.022 
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Table A1.11 Transportation costs from supply regions to consumption locations 
 
ALB ATL BAL BIL BMH BOS BPT BSE BUR CIN 
 
$/lb 
California 0.056 0.112 0.125 0.057 0.106 0.135 0.130 0.036 0.133 0.106 
Michigan 0.072 0.045 0.039 0.063 0.041 0.049 0.044 0.087 0.041 0.027 
New York 0.087 0.048 0.023 0.086 0.051 0.027 0.024 0.104 0.024 0.033 
Pennsylvania 0.084 0.039 0.014 0.086 0.042 0.029 0.022 0.105 0.030 0.030 
Virginia 0.084 0.036 0.016 0.087 0.039 0.033 0.025 0.105 0.033 0.030 
Washington 0.064 0.114 0.121 0.041 0.109 0.131 0.125 0.026 0.128 0.102 
 
CHA CHE CHI CHT COL DAL DEN DET FAG IND 
California 0.122 0.058 0.097 0.114 0.120 0.083 0.062 0.107 0.082 0.102 
Michigan 0.042 0.057 0.019 0.031 0.045 0.057 0.059 0.018 0.040 0.022 
New York 0.038 0.075 0.037 0.032 0.042 0.070 0.077 0.030 0.062 0.035 
Pennsylvania 0.029 0.075 0.037 0.025 0.033 0.066 0.076 0.030 0.063 0.032 
Virginia 0.026 0.075 0.037 0.022 0.030 0.062 0.076 0.030 0.063 0.032 
Washington 0.121 0.056 0.091 0.110 0.122 0.094 0.059 0.103 0.066 0.098 
 
JAC KAN LAG LTR LVG LUS MCH MEM MIA MIL 
California 0.099 0.083 0.028 0.092 0.035 0.104 0.138 0.097 0.137 0.097 
Michigan 0.048 0.039 0.100 0.044 0.089 0.026 0.047 0.040 0.072 0.017 
New York 0.060 0.055 0.118 0.057 0.107 0.037 0.029 0.052 0.067 0.040 
Pennsylvania 0.052 0.052 0.116 0.053 0.107 0.034 0.030 0.048 0.057 0.041 
Virginia 0.049 0.052 0.116 0.050 0.107 0.032 0.033 0.044 0.056 0.041 
Washington 0.107 0.074 0.054 0.098 0.051 0.101 0.134 0.099 0.141 0.089 
 
MIN MOI NOR NYC NWK OKL OMH PHI PHO POR 
California 0.093 0.083 0.104 0.128 0.127 0.078 0.078 0.126 0.043 0.141 
Michigan 0.036 0.032 0.055 0.042 0.041 0.050 0.038 0.040 0.089 0.049 
New York 0.053 0.049 0.065 0.023 0.022 0.065 0.055 0.023 0.104 0.032 
Pennsylvania 0.053 0.050 0.056 0.021 0.020 0.062 0.055 0.017 0.101 0.033 
Virginia 0.054 0.050 0.053 0.023 0.023 0.062 0.056 0.021 0.101 0.036 
Washington 0.075 0.079 0.114 0.123 0.123 0.086 0.075 0.122 0.063 0.136 
 
POT PRO RCH SEA SLC STL SUX WDC WMT 
 California 0.036 0.136 0.127 0.043 0.040 0.093 0.081 0.124 0.126 
 Michigan 0.104 0.045 0.041 0.096 0.075 0.030 0.037 0.038 0.040 
 New York 0.122 0.027 0.028 0.119 0.092 0.045 0.060 0.024 0.023 
 Pennsylvania 0.122 0.027 0.019 0.119 0.092 0.042 0.060 0.015 0.017 
 Virginia 0.123 0.030 0.018 0.119 0.093 0.043 0.060 0.015 0.019 
 Washington 0.019 0.132 0.123 0.017 0.040 0.091 0.068 0.120 0.122 
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CHAPTER 2 
IMPACTS OF THE END OF THE COFFEE EXPORT QUOTA SYSTEM ON 
INTERNATIONAL-TO-RETAIL PRICE TRANSMISSION 
 
Abstract 
We examine the impact of the end of the coffee export quota system (EQS) on international-to-
retail price transmission in France, Germany and the United States, taking into account the 
existence of long-run threshold effects and short-run price transmission asymmetries (PTAs). We 
find evidence of threshold effects in two periods (EQS and post-EQS) in the three countries and 
the presence of short-run PTAs during the post-EQS period in the three countries, but not during 
the EQS period. Our results indicate that the threshold values are smaller in the post-EQS period, 
suggesting that retail prices become more responsive to changes in international prices. However, 
the speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium decreases during the post-EQS period in 
the three countries. In the short-run, nonlinear impulse response analyses indicate that a shock in 
international prices was more persistent during the EQS period than in the post-EQS period. 
Moreover, we find evidence of short-run PTAs in the post-EQS period, with differences across 
countries. We find support for the “rockets and feathers” principle in the United States; in 
contrast, retail prices respond faster when international prices are falling in Germany and France. 
We explain these differences in terms of market structures. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The International Coffee Agreement is a treaty that sets out the objectives and the basic 
framework for the International Coffee Organization (ICO) member countries, which includes 
coffee exporting and importing countries. An important policy instrument for the implementation 
of this agreement was an Export Quota System (EQS), operative from 1962 to 1989. The EQS 
was introduced to address an oversupply problem in the world coffee market in the 1950s and 
early 1960s. It was an intergovernmental initiative, supported by importing countries, to stabilize 
the market and to mitigate the negative political and economic impacts of falling prices for many 
coffee producing countries in the developing world (ICO 2012).  
 Figure 2.1 illustrates how the EQS contributed to keep international and retail prices high 
(Houck 1986). The export quota, QQ was set below the competitive equilibrium quantity, QC in 
the international market. The corresponding equilibrium price under the EQS, PQ was higher 
than the competitive equilibrium price, PC. The EQS also led to higher retail prices in importing 
countries (Panel B of Figure 2.1). Further, Akiyama and Varangis (1990) argue that the EQS 
contributed to relatively stable international coffee prices, in spite of frequent supply shocks due 
to weather conditions in the major coffee producing countries. The authors show that the EQS 
scheme encouraged maintenance of a "buffer stock" to prevent price volatility in the international 
coffee market.  
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A. International commodity market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Domestic retail market in an importer country 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 The impact of an export quota on the international market and on the domestic market 
in and importer country 
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 The EQS expired in 1989 due to disagreements on how to allocate the export quota 
among exporting countries14
 In this study, we examine whether price transmission between international and retail 
coffee prices in the three largest coffee importers (France, Germany and the United States) 
changed in the post-EQS period. Figure 2.2 suggests that the end of the EQS in 1990 may have 
affected price response in these countries in different ways. For instance, retail prices in the three 
countries seem to have had a similar relationship with international prices in the EQS period. In 
 and lack of support from importing countries. Theoretically, 
termination of the EQS should have resulted in increased export quantity (from QQ to QC) and 
reduced international prices (from PQ to PC) for coffee beans (Panel A in Figure 2.1). In addition, 
one would expect that EQS termination should have led to higher price variability in all 
segments of the supply chain because the market becomes more exposed to exogenous shocks 
(e.g. climatic conditions). Moreover, EQS elimination should have weakened the ability of 
exporting countries to set international prices. In contrast, coffee processors and distributors in 
importing countries should have increased ability to influence the extent to which changes in 
international prices are passed on to retail prices paid by end consumers. If coffee processors and 
distributors in importing countries gained market power, it is possible that “rockets and feathers” 
type of price transmission asymmetries exists in the post-EQS period (Bacon 1991). That is, 
retail prices rise faster than they fall in response to changes in international prices. Consequently, 
two relevant empirical questions are: Did price transmission behavior (e.g. the magnitude and the 
speed) between international and retail prices change after elimination of the EQS? Did price 
transmission respond differently to increases compared to decreases in international coffee prices?  
                                                 
14 Under the EQS, the basic export quota of each exporting member was determined each October for a one-year 
period. The quota was adjusted depending on global market conditions. 
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contrast, in the post-EQS period, after sharp decreases in international prices in the early 1990s, 
retail prices in France and the United States decreased accordingly, while retail prices in 
Germany were more volatile and stayed relatively high. 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Monthly international and retail coffee prices in France, Germany and the United 
States 
 
 There is an extensive literature on price transmission in supply chains for agricultural 
commodities. Early studies, conducted by Wolffram (1971) and Houck (1977), examined price 
transmission asymmetries (PTAs) measured by asymmetric supply responses to positive and 
negative changes in input prices. Observed usually at downstream stages of supply chains, PTAs 
were found to be closely associated with numerous factors, including market structure, market 
power, consumer behavior and public policy. Subsequently, von Cramon-Taubadel (1998) 
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pointed out that prices at different segments of the supply chain are often co-integrated and 
econometric models that ignore this property may generate spurious parameter estimates. The 
suggested remedy was error correction models (ECMs), which allow for short-run asymmetric 
price adjustments, to overcome the limitations of Wolffram's and Houck’s approaches (von 
Cramon-Taubadel and Loy 1996; von Cramon-Taubadel 1998). The standard ECM specification 
assumes that the dependent variable responds identically to deviations from the long-run price 
equilibrium regardless of the magnitude of the shock and that adjustments occur in every period 
(Balke and Fomby 1997). However the presence of any transaction costs between spatially 
separated markets or other factors generating price friction may result in the existence of 
thresholds which trigger adjustments toward the long-run equilibrium in response to exogenous 
shocks (Meyer 2004). 
 For the purpose here, we focus on two separate dimensions of price transmission in order 
to understand their relevance for policy impact evaluation. The first dimension posits that price 
adjustments respond differently to positive and negative exogenous shocks in the short run (i.e. 
PTAs). The second dimension is that there may be thresholds beyond which price adjustments 
occur in the long-run (i.e. threshold effects). Our approach involves an error correction model 
with threshold effects, patterned after work by Tong (1983) and extended by Balke and Fomby 
(1997). The threshold approach allows us to model price adjustments toward the long-run 
equilibrium through threshold values estimated using nonparametric methods. In addition, we 
extend the threshold error correction model by incorporating short-run PTAs. 
 The overall objective of this study is to examine differences in international-to-retail 
coffee price transmission behavior during and after the elimination of the EQS in France, 
Germany and the United States. Specifically, we compare the extent to which shocks in 
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international coffee prices are passed on to retail prices in terms of magnitude and speed, during 
and after the EQS. In order to understand how price transmission changed with termination of 
the EQS, we take into account two important features of the price transmission process: the 
existence of long-run threshold effects and short-run asymmetries. We contribute to the literature 
by improving our understanding of the impact of policy interventions on price transmission in 
global supply chains for agricultural commodities.  
 A number of researchers have examined the impact of the EQS termination at various 
segments of the coffee supply chain. Akiyama and Varangis (1990) employed simulation 
methods for the global coffee supply chain to demonstrate that the EQS contributed to the 
stability of international coffee prices. Krivonos (2004) conducted a co-integration analysis and 
found that the speed of price transmission between producer and international prices increased in 
the post-EQS period and the share of retail value going to coffee growers increased after the EQS 
termination. The analysis also showed that retail prices adjusted faster in response to shocks in 
international prices during the post-EQS period. Shepherd (2004) examined the impact of the end 
of the EQS on price transmission from producer to international prices; and from international to 
retail prices employing a vector autoregression (VAR) model. Study results suggested that the 
EQS termination did not lead to improved price transmission because of market power exerted 
by coffee processors. Moreover, asymmetries in price transmission at all levels of the supply 
chain were identified, particularly during the post-EQS period. Gemech and Struthers (2007) 
examined impacts of market reforms in Ethiopia on the volatility of coffee producer prices using 
the Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model. They found 
that coffee price volatility increased after market reforms, triggered by the end of the EQS. 
Mehta and Chavas (2008) studied the price effects of the EQS termination and found that the 
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short-run retail prices response was greater for increases than for decreases in international prices 
during the post-EQS period. In contrast, they found no evidence of price transmission 
asymmetries between producer and international prices. More recently, Gómez, Lee and Körner 
(2010) examined price transmission from international to retail coffee prices by employing an 
asymmetric error correction model (AECM) and found evidence of short-run asymmetries with 
substantial differences among importing countries. This study extends and refines this literature 
by accounting for long-run threshold effects and short-run asymmetries in error correction 
models. This approach adds precision to impact evaluations for private and public decision-
makers who are concerned with policies that influence the international trade of agricultural 
commodities. 
 This paper is organized as follows. We first review the literature that deals with the 
threshold approach to analyses of price transmission in agricultural commodity markets. Next, 
we develop an asymmetric threshold error correction model (ATECM) to examine impacts of the 
coffee EQS termination. In turn, we describe our data and present empirical results. Finally we 
summarize our findings and discuss the benefits and limitations of the ATECM representation to 
assess policies affecting price transmission in global commodity supply chains.   
 
2.2 Modeling threshold co-integration in price transmission 
 
A number of studies have utilized the threshold approach to examine price transmission in 
supply chains of agricultural commodities. Goodwin and Holt (1999) employed a threshold error 
correction model (TECM) to evaluate linkages between producer, wholesale, and retail prices in 
U.S. beef markets. Subsequently, Goodwin and Piggott (2001) developed a TECM to examine 
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market integration among four corn and soybean markets in North Carolina, while accounting for 
transaction costs. More recently, Abdulai (2002) employed the threshold co-integration model 
developed by Enders and Granger (1998) to analyze price transmission between producer and 
retail prices in Switzerland's pork supply chain. He compared a standard ECM with a TECM 
using the Akaike and Schwarz information criteria and showed that the threshold representation 
is superior to its standard counterpart. Meyer (2004) considered the possibility of transaction 
costs in separated markets during the price transmission process with a vector error correction 
model following the procedures of Balke and Fomby (1997). He examined market integration 
between swine markets in Germany and the Netherlands and found the existence of significant 
transaction costs. Overall, these studies generally confirm the existence and relevance of 
thresholds between spatially separated markets and indicate that TECM representations generally 
show a faster adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium than their standard counterparts. 
 In this study, we follow and extend the threshold co-integration approach developed by 
Enders and Granger (1998) to incorporate two relevant properties in price transmission: the 
existence of thresholds in the co-integrating vector and the possible asymmetries in short-run 
price responses. As Balke and Fomby (1997) pointed out, the conventional co-integration tests of 
Johansen (1992a, 1992b, 1995) may be misspecified if there are thresholds in the adjustment to 
the long-run equilibrium. To overcome this problem, Enders and Granger (1998) suggested an 
alternative to the standard augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression model. 
 Consider two price series, tRP  retail coffee prices and tIP  international coffee prices at 
time period t. Both price variables are assumed to be integrated of order one, I(1). If these two 
price series are co-integrated, the error term ttt IPRP 10 σσε −−=  indicates deviations from the 
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long-run equilibrium. In the presence of threshold effects, Enders and Granger (1998) proposed 
the following threshold autoregressive (TAR) representation of tε : 
 
                       
[ ] [ ] tpi titININttOUTOUTtt vII +∆++−++=∆ ∑
−
= −−−
1
1 1110110
)1( εγερρερρε ,                (2.1) 
 
where the autoregressive process of tε  can be separated into two regimes, namely the 'OUT' and 
the 'IN' regime, depending on whether or not the threshold variable dt−ε  exceeds a threshold 
valueθ . The 'OUT' regime represents deviations outside the threshold interval [ ]θθ ,− ; and the 
'IN' regime represents deviations of magnitude smaller than the threshold θ  (i.e. the inside 
threshold interval). In equation (2.1), the Heaviside indicator function, tI , is defined as 1=tI  if 
θε >−dt , zero otherwise. The parameter d represents the delay in the change from one regime to 
the other (e.g. d=1 indicates a change on an immediate occurrence) and is typically determined 
through statistical testing (Goodwin and Holt 1999; Gouveia and Rodrigues 2004).  
 Tsay (1989) suggested a nonparametric approach to identify the existence of threshold 
effects in the autoregressive process of variable (i.e. error correction term tε  in this case). 
Following Tasy's approach, we employ a recursive least squares procedure to examine whether 
or not the coefficients of this autoregressive process are constant. Subsequently, we compute 
TAR-F statistics to test the null hypothesis of no changes in the parameter estimates of the 
autoregressive representation of tε . Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests the existence of a 
threshold θ, which must be estimated using the procedure explained below (see the details in 
Tsay 1989). 
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 If threshold effects in the autoregressive series of tε  are observed, we estimate the 
unknown threshold value θ using Chan’s (1993) grid search method in which threshold values 
are obtained through a search over all possible threshold values minimizing the Squared Sum of 
Errors (SSE). Specifically, the threshold variable dt−ε  is first sorted from the lowest to the 
highest value. Second, the TAR model in equation (2.1) is estimated using the ordered values of 
dt−ε  as thresholds. Finally the threshold value θ is chosen so that the SSE is minimized. Hansen 
(1997) argued that the conventional test is not appropriate because the null hypothesis of 
linearity in the AR process does not follow a standard distribution. Consequently, he proposed a 
Chow-type test for threshold values using simulation methods, and provided asymptotic p-values 
based on bootstrap methods (Hansen 1997; Goodwin and Holt 1999; Goodwin and Piggott 2001).  
 Once the presence of threshold effects in the autoregressive process of tε  is confirmed, 
the threshold error correction model (TECM) can be estimated. International and retail prices 
may be determined simultaneously given that these three countries account for about 50 percents 
of total imports from all origins (ICO 2010). Therefore, we employ Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression (SUR) estimation (Zellner 1962) taking into account threshold effects in the error 
correction process in long-run and short-run dynamics in price transmission. We also incorporate 
identification variables for short-run dynamics in the retail and international price equations. 
These variables allow us to control for additional factors that may influence retail prices (e.g. 
exchange rates) and international prices (e.g. precipitation in coffee producing region). A 
simultaneous representation of the system of equations yields: 
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where itkz −∆ , 2,1=∀k  are the identification variables. The term 
OUT
t 1ˆ −ε  represents deviations from 
the long-run equilibrium larger than the absolute value of the threshold θ. The term INt 1ˆ −ε  
represents deviations from the long-run equilibrium within the threshold interval [-θ, θ].  
 Possible short-run asymmetries in price transmission can be examined by splitting the 
variables itRP−∆ , itIP−∆  and itz −∆ ),2(1  into positive and negative changes (von Cramon-Taubadel 
and Loy 1996). As a result, an asymmetric threshold error correction model (ATECM) can be 
specified by modifying equations (2.2) and (2.3) as follows: 
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where the variables itit yy −−
+ ∆=∆  if 0≥∆ −ity , zero otherwise; and itit yy −−− ∆=∆  if 0<∆ −ity , 
zero otherwise, where ),,,( 21 zandzIPRPy = . 
 In the threshold error correction model, price adjustments may occur only when the 
benefits offset the cost of changing prices due to the presence of transaction costs or other 
sources of price frictions (Balke and Fomby 1997). That is, the error correction mechanism 
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operates only when deviations from the long-run equilibrium exceed a critical range [-θ, θ]. Here, 
the inside regime between -θ and θ can be defined as a “neutral band” within which no 
adjustments take place given an exogenous shock (Goodwin & Piggott 2001; Meyer 2004; 
Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel 2004).  
 We follow a systematic approach to determine the appropriate model specification for 
understanding changes in price transmission in the post-EQS period. We first investigate the time 
series properties of international and retail coffee prices including nonstationarity and co-
integration using various unit-root tests and the Johansen's co-integration test. Second, we 
examine possible threshold effects in the autoregressive series of the error correction term, tε  in 
equation (2.1) following Tsay (1989). If threshold effects are found, we then estimate the 
threshold value θ using Chan's (1993) grid search method; and we test for the statistical 
significance of the threshold estimates following Hansen (1997). Third, for each importing 
country, we estimate the system of equations (2.2)-(2.3) for a symmetric TECM and the system 
of equations (2.4)-(2.5) for an asymmetric TECM for two periods: The EQS period, from 
January 1980 through December 1989; and the post-EQS period, from January 1990 to 
December 2009. Next, we test the short-run parameter asymmetries using F-tests under the null 
hypothesis of symmetries and employ the AIC model selection criteria to assess whether a 
symmetric or an asymmetric representation is more appropriate to compare price transmission 
behavior between the EQS and the post-EQS period.  
 
2.3 Data 
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We employ monthly data of international coffee prices (the weighted average price of different 
coffee bean varieties) and retail prices of roasted coffee in France, Germany and the United 
States during the period January 1980 to December 2009. These data were obtained from the 
International Coffee Organization (ICO). Retail prices of roasted coffee and international prices 
are denoted in US dollars per pound. For identification purposes, we compile monthly exchange 
rates of the French Franc and the German Mark15
 In Table 2.1, we present descriptive statistics of these data. The results show that the 
average retail price in Germany ($4.13 per pound) is the highest among the three countries. The 
coefficients of variation in Table 2.1 suggest that international prices are more volatile than retail 
prices in the three countries. This suggests that changes in international prices may not be fully 
and instantaneously transmitted to retail prices. Retail prices in the United States exhibit less 
variation (coefficient of variation equals 0.16) than retail prices in France and Germany 
(coefficients of variation equal 0.22 and 0.20, respectively).  
 to the US dollar for France and Germany and 
the Consumer Price Index for food and beverage for the United States. These data are from the 
Federal Reserve Bank Statistics (2010) and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (2010). Moreover, 
monthly average precipitation observed in Fortaleza, Brazil is used for the international price 
equation since weather patterns in this region influence international coffee prices. Precipitation 
data were compiled from the National Centre for Atmospheric Research (2010).  
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Conversion factors for the Franc and the Mark and Euro were employed since January 2002. For German Marks, 
1 Euro = 1.95583 DM; for French Francs, 1 Euro = 6.55957FF. Here we assume full transmission of the exchange 
rates to retail prices, since retail prices in France and Germany are denominated in dollars. 
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Table 2.1 Descriptive statistics of data, 1980:1-2009:12 (N=360) 
 
Mean Std. Dev. C.V.b Max Min 
International price 1.014 0.365 0.360 2.042 0.412 
Retail price in France 3.061 0.674 0.220 4.717 1.904 
Retail price in Germany 4.125 0.810 0.196 6.179 2.473 
Retail price in the US 3.136 0.510 0.163 4.669 2.352 
Exchange Rate (Franc/US Dollar) 5.982 1.171 0.196 4.041 10.093 
Exchange Rate (Mark/US Dollar) 1.861 0.420 0.226 3.303 1.241 
Consumer Price Index, Foods and Beverages a 1.480 0.373 0.252 0.833 2.192 
Precipitation (100mm) 1.348 1.527 1.133 8.310 0 
a. Index 2000 = 1. 
b. Coefficient of Variation. 
 
2.4 Results 
 
2.4.1 Test of integration and co-integration 
We first test the time-series properties of the price data during the EQS and the post-EQS periods. 
We conduct the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and DF-GLS (Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock 
1996; Elliott 1999) tests for the null hypothesis of nonstationarity; and we also use the KPSS 
(Kwiatkowski et al. 1992) test for the null hypothesis of stationarity. We present test results for 
the levels and the first differences of each price series in Table 2.2. The ADF-t and DF-GLS tests 
for all first difference variables (international price and retail prices in the three countries) 
indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of nonstationarity. Furthermore, the KPSS test do not 
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reject the null hypothesis of stationarity, showing that all price series in first differences follow 
I(0) processes.  
 
Table 2.2 Integration tests of price series 
Variables in Levels 
Retail 
Price in 
France 
Retail 
Price in 
Germany 
Retail 
Price in 
the U.S. 
Inter. 
Price 
ADF-t H0 ~ I(1) 
EQS -1.87 -2.50 -2.76 -2.40 
Post- EQS -1.49 -1.68 -2.69 -2.47 
DF-GLS H0 ~ I(1) 
EQS -0.92 -1.27 -0.47 -1.29 
Post- EQS -0.66 -0.01 -0.13 -0.18 
KPSS H0 ~ I(0) 
EQS 0.63** a 0.34* 0.61** 0.45* 
Post- EQS 0.69** 0.80** 0.56** 0.41* 
Variables in First Differences 
    
ADF-t H0 ~ I(1) 
EQS -7.13** -7.96** -7.30** -7.64** 
Post- EQS -12.47** -11.89** -10.32** -13.21** 
DF-GLS H0 ~ I(1) 
EQS -7.15** -7.95** -7.32** -7.63** 
Post- EQS -9.61** -10.87** -10.32** -13.21** 
KPSS H0 ~ I(0) 
EQS 0.31 0.26 0.10 0.08 
Post- EQS 0.17 0.14 0.04 0.06 
a. ** and * indicate 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. 
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 We follow Johansen’s (1992a, 1992b, 1995) approach to test whether international and 
retail price series are co-integrated. This procedure identifies the number of equations that 
determine the co-integration relationship between these prices in each country. For both periods 
and the three countries, we conduct λmax and trace tests between international and retail prices. 
We present test results in Table 2.3, where r represents the co-integration rank (i.e. the number of 
co-integration vectors). Test results indicate that the relationship between international and retail 
prices in each country has at least one co-integrating vector. These results imply the existence of 
a long-run relationship between two price series in the three countries.  
 
Table 2.3 Test of co-integration (Johansen test) 
France H0:r EQS period Post- EQS period 
λmax 0 10.43*a 29.56** 
trace 0 11.92* 29.63** 
Germany H0:r EQS period Post- EQS period 
λmax 0 16.31** 16.99** 
trace 0 17.74** 17.03** 
United States H0:r EQS period Post- EQS period 
λmax 0 26.56** 38.60** 
trace 0 28.34** 38.60** 
a. ** and * indicate 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. 
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2.4.2 TAR parameter estimates 
Table 2.4 presents the parameter estimates of the TAR model in equation (2.1). We employ the 
AIC and SBC criteria to identify the optimal lag structure of each TAR model. The delay 
parameter, d is selected as the lag value showing the largest TAR-F statistics in the Tsay test 
(Goodwin and Holt 1999; Goodwin and Piggott 2001). Interpreting the test statistics, we find 
evidence of threshold effects in the co-integrating vector ( 1−tε ) in both periods (EQS and post-
EQS) and in the three countries. The test statistics suggest that the null hypothesis of a linear 
autoregressive (AR) process in the co-integrating vector is rejected at the 5 percent significance 
level in the three countries and in both time periods. In addition, the selected delay parameters d 
for both periods show that the threshold lags, which represent the reaction time determining the 
switch between regimes (‘IN’ and ‘OUT’ in equation (2.1)) in the error correction process is 
smaller in the post-EQS period - two, one and three months in France, Germany and the United 
States, respectively; versus six in all countries in the EQS period. This indicates that the time lag 
associated with regime switching becomes more instantaneous in the post-EQS period.  The 
threshold value θ presented in Table 2.4 is estimated using Chan’s grid search method. The 
magnitude of the thresholds decreases during the post-EQS period relative to its EQS counterpart: 
from 0.28 to 0.20 in France; 0.48 to 0.18 in Germany; and 0.18 to 0.08 in the United States. 
Following Balke and Fomby (1997), the interval [-θ, θ] can be interpreted as the range where no 
price adjustments toward the long-run equilibrium occur. This may be due to transaction costs 
arising from adjusting retail prices in response to changes in international prices. These values 
suggest that the magnitude of deviations beyond which price adjustments take place decreases in 
the post-EQS period. That is, even smaller changes in international prices result in changes in 
retail prices in all three countries.  
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Table 2.4 TAR estimates 
 
 France Germany United States 
Optimal Lags (p)a 
EQS 1 2 2 
Post- EQS 5 5 7 
Delay Parameters (d)b 
EQS 6 6 6 
Post- EQS 2 1 3 
Tsay (1997) Testc 
 
EQS 4.42** (0.01) 3.91** (0.01) 2.96** (0.04) 
Post- EQS 2.56** (0.02) 3.70** (0.00) 2.37** (0.02) 
Hansen (1997) Testd 
EQS 7.77** (0.00) 5.74** (0.00) 9.33** (0.00) 
Post- EQS 4.83** (0.00) 3.63** (0.03) 6.80** (0.00) 
Threshold (θ) 
EQS 0.28 (20.2%)e 0.48 (55.3%) 0.18 (31.9%) 
Post- EQS 0.20 (36.1%) 0.18 (23.8%) 0.08 (24.5%) 
Long-run Asymmetry 
across Regimesf 
EQS 2.72* 10.26** 23.64** 
Post- EQS 17.15** 14.80** 15.81**  
a. Optimal lags are determined by AIC and SBC. 
b. Delay parameters are chosen by the lags giving the largest TAR-F statistics from Tsay test.  
c. The null hypothesis of Tsay test is that AR follows a linear process in a recursive least square 
estimation. That is, 01,1 =−mβ  in equation (1.4). The F test for no linear process and parenthesis 
shows asymptotic p values for test statistics. 
d. The null hypothesis of Hansen test is that there are no threshold effects in autoregressive 
representation of variable. The F test for no threshold effects and parenthesis indicates 
asymptotic p values of bootstrap simulations with 100 replications.  
e. Numbers in parenthesis indicate the percentage of observed deviations that lie inside the 
threshold.  
f. The null hypothesis is that OUTIN 11 ρρ =  in equation (1.1).  
g. ** and * indicate 5 percent and 10 percent level of significance, respectively. 
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 These results are consistent with the argument that termination of the EQS should result 
in more volatile prices. Retail prices in importing countries seem to be more sensitive to small 
changes in international prices. This reflects the fact that exporter countries lost the ability to set 
international prices during the post-EQS period, whereas downstream segments of supply chains 
in importing countries increased their influence to coordinate international and retail prices.  
 Table 2.4 also shows the percentage of observed deviations that lie in the inside regime 
(i.e. deviations from the long-run equilibrium within the interval [-θ, θ]). The results indicate that 
while the percentage decreases during the post-EQS period in Germany and in the United States, 
it increases in France. A percentage decrease implies that price adjustments take place more 
frequently in the post-EQS period relative to the EQS period. The German results yield the 
steepest decline (from 55 to 24 percent) of observations in the inside regime, suggesting a more 
extensive adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium after the EQS termination. In the United 
States the percentage of observations in the inside regime decreases modestly, from 32 percent in 
the EQS period to 25 percent in the post-EQS period. These results support the argument that 
downstream market segments wielded increasing influence over international-to-retail price 
spreads. On the contrary, this percentage in France increases in the post-EQS period. This result 
indicates that price adjustments take place less frequently in the post-EQS period than the EQS 
period, although retail prices become more responsive after the end of the EQS (e.g. the 
decreased magnitude of threshold value). Thus, in France there might be other factors generating 
price friction in the post-EQS period.16
                                                 
16 For example, the Galland Law passed in 1996 limited the ability of processors and retailers to modify prices 
(Gomez, Lee and Körner 2010).  
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 The Hansen tests presented in Table 4 also reject the null hypothesis of no threshold 
effects for both periods and all three countries at the 5 percent significance level. Additionally, 
the F statistic testing the null hypothesis that the autoregressive coefficients of each regime in 
equation (2.1) are equal ( OUTIN 11 ρρ = ) also confirms that the coefficients are different across 
regimes. These tests provide additional evidence of threshold effects in the co-integrating vector 
of each country. 
 
2.4.3 Model selection 
Given the existence of threshold effects in the co-integrating vector of each country, we examine 
possible short-run asymmetries in contemporary and lagged explanatory variables for both 
periods. For this purpose, we first estimate an asymmetric TECM in equations (2.4)-(2.5) using 
SUR for the EQS and the post-EQS periods.17
−+ = ii ,3,3 αα
 Next we test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients for positive and negative changes in the independent variables in first differences are 
equal (e.g. ). In table 2.5, we show the χ2 statistics corresponding to the null hypothesis 
of symmetry between positive and negative variables in contemporary and lagged international 
price changes for both periods (EQS and post-EQS). Our results provide evidence of symmetries 
during the EQS period and asymmetries during the post-EQS period in France. The null 
hypothesis of symmetries between split variables in contemporary and lagged international 
prices is accepted in the EQS period, but rejected in the post-EQS period. In contrast, there is 
modest evidence of asymmetries for Germany and the United States in both periods. The null 
                                                 
17 The exogeneity test results indicate that international prices are weakly exogenous to retail prices. The parameter 
estimates of the OLS and SUR specifications are practically the same. However, we prefer to use the SUR given the 
best fit according to Akaike Information Criteria. 
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hypotheses of symmetries are accepted for contemporary variables, but rejected for lagged 
variables in both periods. 
 
Table 2.5 Tests of short-run asymmetries (Retail price equation) 
Period )1(
2χ a 
Null 
Hypothesis 
France Germany 
United 
States 
EQS period 3.84 
tt IPIP
−+ ∆=∆  0.120 0.018 0.527 
11 −
−
−
+ ∆=∆ tt IPIP  1.576 6.117** 8.169*** 
Post- EQS period 3.84 
tt IPIP
−+ ∆=∆  4.670** 0.736 1.603 
11 −
−
−
+ ∆=∆ tt IPIP  15.082*** 4.234** 42.484*** 
a. Critical value at 5% significance level. 
 
 Because the above tests tend favor asymmetric specifications (Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel 2004), we further employ additional model selection criteria for robustness.18
                                                 
18 Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel (2004) show that the standard tests of short-run asymmetries often lead 
excessive rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry. 
 The AIC 
measures presented in Table 2.6 provide additional information for model selection. During the 
EQS period, the AIC values of the symmetric model specifications are smaller than their 
asymmetric model counterparts in all three countries. This indicates that a symmetric 
formulation (equation (2.2)-(2.3)) is more appropriate for the EQS period. In contrast, goodness-
of-fit measures for the post-EQS period favor an asymmetric representation. Overall, Table 2.6 
 97 
 
supports a symmetric TECM for the EQS period and an asymmetric TECM for the post-EQS 
period in the three countries.19
 
 
Table 2.6 Comparison of the AIC measures across model specificationsa 
 EQS period Post- EQS period 
 Symmetric 
TECM 
Asymmetric 
TECM 
Symmetric 
TECM 
Asymmetric 
TECM 
France -1290.02b -1275.73 -2635.71 -2667.10 
Germany -1168.79 -1163.93 -2333.57 -2337.27 
United States -1269.25 -1252.46 -2327.11 -2391.95 
a. AIC is the Akaike Information Criteria; TECM is Threshold Error Correction Model; and 
ATECM is Asymmetric Threshold Error Correction Model. 
b. Number in bold indicates smaller value of AIC measure. 
 
2.4.4 Price transmission in the long-run 
Tables 2.7, 2.8 and 2.9 show the parameter estimates of the retail price equations (2.2) and (2.4) 
corresponding to a symmetric TECM model during the EQS period and an asymmetric TECM 
model in the post-EQS period for France, Germany and the United States, respectively.20
 
  
 
                                                 
19 In model formulation, a linear trend is considered in the United States model for the post-EQS period. Other than 
France and Germany, co-integration test with a linear trend also suggests that the U.S. model in the post-EQS period 
have a possibility of a linear trend in co-integrating vector.   
20 We do not present the parameter estimates of the international price equation. The estimates results are available 
from authors upon request. 
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Table 2.7 Estimation results for France (Retail price equation) 
Variables 
EQS period 
(Symmetric TECM) 
Post- EQS period 
(Asymmetric TECM) 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Constant - 0.001 (0.004) - 0.001 (0.007) 
OUT
t 1−ε  - 0.048***
a (0.010) - 0.043*** (0.009) 
IN
t 1−ε  - 0.026 (0.021) 0.009 (0.026) 
1−∆ tRP  0.500*** (0.074) --  
1−
+∆ tRP  --  0.576*** (0.063) 
1−
−∆ tRP  --  0.036 (0.106) 
tIP∆  - 0.130 (0.049) --  
tIP
+∆  --  - 0.008 (0.053) 
tIP
−∆  --  0.239*** (0.084) 
1−∆ tIP  - 0.003 (0.049) --  
1−
+∆ tIP  --  0.230*** (0.057) 
1−
−∆ tIP  --  - 0.196** (0.078) 
tExrate∆  - 0.461*** (0.020) --  
tExrate
+∆  --  - 0.559*** (0.044) 
tExrate
−∆  --  - 0.423*** (0.039) 
1−∆ tExrate  0.179*** (0.042) --  
1−
+∆ tExrate  --  0.013 (0.067) 
1−
−∆ tExrate  --  0.246*** (0.046) 
2R  0.85 0.77 
N 120 240 
a. *** and ** indicate 1% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 2.8 Estimation results for Germany (Retail price equation) 
Variables 
EQS period 
(Symmetric TECM) 
Post- EQS period 
(Asymmetric TECM) 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Constant - 0.010 (0.007) 0.006 (0.015) 
OUT
t 1−ε  - 0.062***
a (0.016) - 0.046*** (0.012) 
IN
t 1−ε  - 0.038 (0.024) - 0.045 (0.075) 
1−∆ tRP  0.135 (0.120) --  
1−
+∆ tRP  --  0.250** (0.101) 
1−
−∆ tRP  --  0.017 (0.094) 
tIP∆  0.069 (0.081) --  
tIP
+∆  --  0.372*** (0.110) 
tIP
−∆  --  0.571*** (0.172) 
1−∆ tIP  0.127 (0.084) --  
1−
+∆ tIP  --  0.127 (0.125) 
1−
−∆ tIP  --  - 0.358** (0.167) 
tExrate∆  - 1.415*** (0.100) --  
tExrate
+∆  --  - 2.464*** (0.304) 
tExrate
−∆  --  - 1.405*** (0.278) 
1−∆ tExrate  0.140*** (0.202) --  
1−
+∆ tExrate  --  - 0.463 (0.372) 
1−
−∆ tExrate  --  0.113*** (0.309) 
2R  0.69 0.55 
N 120 240 
a. *** and ** indicate 1% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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Table 2.9 Estimation results for the Unites States (Retail price equation) 
Variables 
EQS period 
(Symmetric TECM) 
Post- EQS period 
(Asymmetric TECM) 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard  
Errors 
Constant - 0.002 (0.012) - 0.082 (0.016) 
trend --  0.0002** (0.000) 
OUT
t 1−ε  - 0.044 (0.016) - 0.119***
a (0.024) 
IN
t 1−ε  - 0.243*** (0.052) - 0.150** (0.053) 
1−∆ tRP  0.522*** (0.078) --  
1−
+∆ tRP  --  0.184*** (0.059) 
1−
−∆ tRP  --  -0.031 (0.135) 
tIP∆  - 0.575*** (0.080) --  
tIP
+∆  --  0.243*** (0.095) 
tIP
−∆  --  -0.049 (0.147) 
1−∆ tIP  0.447*** (0.088) --  
1−
+∆ tIP  --  0.902*** (0.111) 
1−
−∆ tIP  --  - 0.503*** (0.152) 
tCPIFB∆  0.820 (2.365) --  
tCPIFB
+∆  --  1.151 (1.704) 
tCPIFB
−∆  --  0.371 (6.828) 
1−∆ tCPIFB  0.129 (2.321) --  
1−
+∆ tCPIFB  --  0.371 (1.688) 
1−
−∆ tCPIFB  --  1.960 (6.724) 
2R  0.41 0.55 
N 120 240 
a. *** and ** indicate 1% and 5% significant level, respectively. 
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 The estimated coefficients of OUTt 1ˆ −ε and 
IN
t 1ˆ −ε  describe the speed of adjustment towards the 
long-run equilibrium in each regime where the ‘OUT’ regime refers to deviations outside the 
threshold values [-θ, θ] and the ‘IN’ regime represents deviations of magnitude smaller than the 
threshold. 
 For France and Germany, the estimated coefficients of the outside regime are negative, as 
predicted by theory, and statistically significant in both periods. Our results indicate that, in both 
countries, the speed of adjustment in the outside regime decreased slightly during the post-EQS 
period. In France (Germany), deviations from the long-run equilibrium adjust at a rate of 0.048 
(0.062) in the EQS period; whereas this speed decreases to a rate of 0.043 (0.046) during the 
post-EQS period. Additionally, the parameter estimates suggest that the long-run parameters for 
the inside regime ( INt 1ˆ −ε ) in both countries are not significant. This is consistent with the existence 
of friction in the price transmission process for deviations below the threshold value.  
 In the United States, the speed of adjustment of the outside regime is negative and 
significant for the post-EQS period, while this parameter estimate for the EQS period is not 
significant. In contrast to France and Germany, the estimated coefficients of error correction 
terms for the inside regime are significant for both periods and the speed of adjustment in this 
regime is reduced to a large extent in the post-EQS period (adjusting at a rate of 0.243 to 0.138). 
These results may be due to the smaller deviations from the long-run equilibrium in the United 
States compared to France and Germany. As mentioned in TAR estimates results, the threshold 
values of the United States for the EQS period and the post-EQS period are 0.18 and 0.08, 
respectively, which are much smaller than those of the two European countries. That means, in 
the United States, price adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium takes place for even small 
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deviations from the equilibrium. Additionally, the parameter estimate of the trend variable in 
Table 2.9 is positive and significant in the post-EQS period, indicating that international-retail 
price spreads have increased gradually over time.   
 We find fundamental differences between the EQS and the post-EQS periods in terms of 
the price adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium. The speed of adjustment appears to 
decrease during the post-EQS period in all three countries. These results are consistent with the 
expected changes in pricing behaviors after the end of the EQS. Under the EQS, international 
prices were relatively stable, and more predicable to international buyers, because the export 
quota was set in anticipation. In contrast, international prices were more volatile and probably 
less predictable during the post-EQS period. Therefore, distributors in importing countries had 
less information during the post-EQS period, and consequently the speed of adjustment of retail 
prices toward the long-run equilibrium relationship decreases.   
 
2.4.5 Price transmission in the short-run  
Tables 2.7-2.9 also show estimate results of the short-run dynamics of price transmission. These 
results suggest differences between periods (EQS and post-EQS) and across countries. Rather 
than interpreting the estimated coefficients, we use them to construct Nonlinear Impulse 
Response Functions (NIRFs) that reflect the short-run asymmetries in the price transmission 
process. 
 Following Potter (1995), the effect of exogenous shocks on the time path of responses 
depend on both the magnitude and direction of the shocks, making standard linear response 
functions unsuitable for this analysis (Goodwin and Holt 1999; Abdulai 2002). To overcome this 
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problem, Potter (1995) suggested a modified representation of the linear impulse response 
function that involved replacing the linear predictor with a conditional expectation, such that:  
 
        [ ] [ ]⋅⋅⋅==−⋅⋅⋅=+==⋅⋅⋅ ++++++− ,,,,),,;( 11111 ttttntttttntttn xXxXxExXxXxEXXNIRF δδ ,   (2.6) 
 
where Xt is a vector of observed variables and δ is the postulated impulse. In Figure 1.3, we 
present retail price responses to positive and negative shocks in international prices with a 
magnitude of one standard deviation, for the three countries. The impulse response paths are 
calculated for the EQS and the post-EQS period for comparative purposes. Our results show 
interesting differences across periods and countries. During the EQS period, international price 
shocks exhibit symmetric effects on retail prices in all three countries regardless of the direction 
of the changes in international prices. This result supports our model selection (a symmetric 
TECM in the EQS period; and an asymmetric TECM in the post-EQS period). However, the 
NIRFs suggest differences in the price transmission time path between the two European 
countries and the United States during the EQS period. Panel A and B of Figure 2.3 show that 
international price shocks are not transmitted instantly to retail prices in France and Germany. 
The effect of the shock in these countries lasts for about seven months. This result indicates that 
changes in international prices generate modest short-run impacts on retail prices in these 
countries, consistent with parameter estimate results in Tables 2.7 and 2.8. In contrast, panel C of 
Figure 2.3 suggests that, in the United States, international price shocks are completely passed on 
to retail prices after four months. These results support the presence of short-run retail price 
adjustments in response to shocks in international prices, consistent with results in Table 2.9. 
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The NIRF results for the EQS period show that the U.S. domestic market is more responsive than 
in those of the two European countries.  
Our NIRF results for the post-EQS period show how the EQS elimination impacts the short-run 
price transmission behaviors in these three countries. As predicted by the parameter estimate 
results in Tables 2.7-2.9, the NIRFs indicate that the changes in international prices have a 
significant short-run impact on retail prices. In particular, the responses of retail prices to 
international shocks seem to be asymmetric for positive and negative shocks during the post-
EQS period, consistent with our model selection. However, there are differences in the time 
paths and their magnitude to which the shocks from the international market are completely 
absorbed at retail market between the two European countries and the United States. While retail 
prices in France and Germany tend to adjust more rapidly to negative shocks than to positive 
shocks, the adjustment process is quite different in the United States where positive shocks are 
absorbed almost entirely after two months, whereas negative shocks tend to last three months.  
 Our NIRFs results suggest that the end of the EQS resulted in changes in the short-run 
price transmission behaviors in these three countries. First, while retail prices seem to 
symmetrically adjust to changes in international prices in the EQS period, their responses are 
asymmetric in the post-EQS. Second, the effects of changes in international prices on retail 
prices tend to last longer in the EQS period, whereas their impacts disappear faster in the post-
EQS period. These phenomena are observed in all three countries. As Bark and de Melo (1988) 
pointed out, the end of the EQS may have led to a rent transfer from the exporting countries to 
importing countries, indicating that the influence of exporting countries on international prices 
was reduced in the post-EQS period. This implies that, in the post-EQS period, downstream 
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segments of the supply chain in importing countries respond more quickly and asymmetrically to 
changes in international prices to benefit from such changes.  
 Our results also show differences between the United States and the two European 
countries in terms of the asymmetric price transmission behaviors in the post-EQS period. In the 
United States, we find evidence of Bacon’s (1991) "rockets and feathers" behavior. That is, retail 
prices rise faster than they fall in response to changes in international prices, suggesting that 
downstream segments benefit from short-run price transmission behavior. In contrast, in France 
and Germany, our results suggest that retail prices decrease quickly and increase slowly, contrary 
to the "rockets and feathers" phenomena. These differences may result from dissimilarities in 
market structure identified in Gómez, Lee and Körner (2010). In the United States, the coffee 
processing sector is highly concentrated and the level of food retail concentration is moderate. In 
addition, the product volume handled by private label brands and hard retail discounters is 
relatively small. Therefore, coffee processors may have more ability to coordinate the supply 
chain and benefit from short-run asymmetries. In contrast, the European coffee processing (food 
retailing) sector is less (more) concentrated and the share or retailer private label is higher than in 
the United States. Moreover, a unique characteristic of French/German coffee market is the 
relatively larger market share of hard-discounter retailers (e.g. Aldi). Hard discounters often 
employ aggressive competitive strategies based on low prices relative to competitors. Indeed, the 
French and German retail sectors experienced coffee price wars in the early and late 1990s, 
respectively (Körner 2002). Such market structure features may explain the price patterns 
observed in Germany and France. 
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A. France 
                         <EQS Period>                                                        <Post-EQS period>  
  
B. Germany 
                       <EQS period>                                                          <Post-EQS period> 
  
C. United States 
                        <EQS period>                                                      <Post-EQS period> 
  
Figure 2.3 Responses of retail prices to the changes in international prices
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2.5 Concluding remarks 
 
In this study we investigated price transmission between international and retail coffee prices in 
the three largest coffee-importing countries, France, Germany and the United States. We 
examined differences in price transmission behaviors between the EQS and the post-EQS periods, 
taking into account the existence of threshold effects and asymmetries in the price transmission 
process.  
 Our analysis uncovered fundamental differences in long-run and short-run price 
transmission behaviors between periods. During the post-EQS period, retail prices became more 
responsive to changes in international prices (i.e. the threshold values θ became smaller), 
because trade liberalization appears to lead to greater integration between international and retail 
prices. Nevertheless, the speed of adjustment appeared to decrease slightly during the post-EQS 
period in all three countries. A plausible explanation is that international prices became more 
volatile during the post-EQS period, generating more uncertainty about international prices. In 
these circumstances, distributors in importing countries had less information to make pricing 
decision during the post-EQS period. The speed of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium 
slowed as a result. Our nonlinear impulse response analyses indicate that in the short-run, 
changes in international prices were transmitted faster and asymmetrically to retail prices during 
the post-EQS period in all three countries. These short-run dynamics may result from the 
increased influence of downstream segments of the supply chain in importing countries on 
pricing decision of international prices. However, our results show differences between the 
United States and the two European countries in terms of the nature of observed price 
transmission asymmetries. That is, we find evidence of "rockets and feathers" behavior in the 
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United States, where retail prices rise faster than they fall in response to changes in international 
prices. In contrast, in France and Germany, retail prices seem to fall quickly and rise slowly, 
which is contrary to the "rockets and feathers" phenomenon. We explained these differences in 
terms of dissimilarities in market structures across countries.  
 Our study provides valuable insights on the application of an ATECM representation for 
policy evaluation, but several limitations indicate the need for further research. There may be 
demand and supply factors other than termination of the EQS that may explain the changes in 
price transmission between international and retail coffee prices after 1990. In particular, price 
transmission from upstream to downstream markets in food supply chains is closely related to 
market structure. Therefore, the extent of price transmission depends on the behavior of 
consumers and firms as well as on the exertion of market power by supply chain participants. 
Consequently, future research on price transmission using threshold error correction models 
should incorporate formal models of market structure and their conduct. In addition, our model 
assumes full transmission of the exchange rates to domestic prices because domestic prices in 
France and Germany are denominated in dollars. Future research using error correction models 
to examine price transmission in global supply chains should allow for incomplete exchange rate 
transmission. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OLIGOPOLY POWER AND COST PASS-THROUGH IN THE U.S. AND THE GERMAN 
COFFEE MARKET 
 
Abstract 
In this study, we examine linkages between non-competitive pricing behavior and cost pass-
through patterns in markets for the roasted coffee in the United States and Germany, the two 
largest coffee importing countries. We develop a structural supply-demand model rooted in the 
new empirical industrial organization (NEIO) framework. We employ an iterative generalized 
method of moments (GMM) for estimation to evaluate the degree of market power. Subsequently, 
we use a threshold error correction model (TECM) to test whether the time-dependent market 
power measure influences cost pass-through behavior in the two countries. We find that the 
roasted coffee markets in both countries are oligopolistic. The degree of market power is 
stronger in Germany than in the United States, supporting the market observation that the 
German roasted coffee supply chain is more concentrated than in the United States. We find that 
market power leads to an increase of the pass-through rates when international prices are rising, 
but it has a modest effect on pass-through rates when they are falling. These results provide 
evidence of "rockets and feathers" behavior in retail pricing in both countries. The "rockets and 
feathers" phenomenon seems to be mainly caused by the exertion of market power in the United 
States. In contrast, other factors different than market power seem to also lead to this 
conventional phenomenon in Germany.    
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Non-competitive pricing behavior in markets for frequently purchased goods such as food and 
beverage products has been of concern to policy makers and consumers alike. In recent years, 
given sharp farm gate price increases for agricultural commodities, consumers often observe that 
food retail prices respond faster to commodity price increases than to commodity price decreases. 
This casts doubt on the practice of market power by food distributors (e.g. manufacturers and 
retailers) reflected in an asymmetric cost pass-through to retail prices. Unlike this mainstream 
perception, food distributors occasionally confront tradeoffs between profit and market share in 
their pricing decisions. That is, they may prefer setting relatively high retail prices in comparison 
to the equilibrium prices by exercising market power to increase their margins. However, at the 
same time, they may also have incentives to set retail prices relatively low to maintain or expand 
their market share in a competitive environment.  
 A substantial body of empirical literature shows that a positive or negative input price 
change in vertically-related food markets tends not to be completely, symmetrically and instantly 
passed on to downstream segments (Von Cramon-Taubadel 1998; Goodwin and Holt 1999; 
Abdulai 2002; Gómez, Lee and Körner 2010). As referred to in many studies, exertion of market 
power in an oligopolistic environment is often associated with incomplete and asymmetric cost 
pass-through to retail prices (Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert 1997; Meyer and von Cramon-
Taubadel 2004). Most studies use the error correction model (ECM) to study incomplete and 
asymmetric pass-through. However, the evidence generated by this approach is only indicative of 
market power because its theoretical grounding does not allow for distinguishing the source of 
variation in pass-through rates over time. (Digal and Ahmadi-Esfahani 2002; Meyer and von 
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Cramon-Taubadel 2004). In contrast, industrial organization theory offers an appropriate 
framework to explicitly measure the degree of market power by oligopolistic firms making 
pricing decision.  
 In this study, we shed new light on the relationship between non-competitive pricing 
behavior and cost pass-through patterns, focusing on the roasted coffee market in the United 
States and Germany, the two largest coffee importing countries.1
                                                 
1 United States and Germany are the largest coffee importing countries. The United States imported 1.25 million 
tons of green bean in 2009, which rank first among all countries. Germany ranks second, importing 1.05 million tons 
of green bean in same period (FAO 2011). 
 During the last two decades, 
coffee bean prices traded in international markets have exhibited substantial volatility. Figure 2.1 
illustrates movements in monthly average retail roasted coffee prices along with prices of three 
coffee bean varieties, Columbian Mild, Other Mild and Robusta, traded in New York and 
Germany exchange markets over the 1992 - 2009 period. Columbian Mild and Other Mild are the 
primary varieties consumed in these countries; Robusta is much cheaper than other varieties 
because of high crop yields and limited usage for espresso blending. Prices for Columbian Mild 
and Other Mild show similar evolution in both markets. However, the corresponding average 
retail prices for roasted coffee in each country appear to respond differently to changes in coffee 
bean prices. In particular, retail prices in Germany and the United States have shown different 
responses for upward spikes in international bean prices in the mid-1990s. For instance, while 
retail prices in the United States tended to respond instantly to shocks in international bean prices, 
those in Germany seemed react far more slowly for changes in bean prices. These differences are 
graphically shown for bean price shocks in 1994-1995. In addition, the degree to which changes 
in international bean prices are passed on to retail prices seem to be different between countries. 
That is, the pass-through appears to be smaller in Germany than the United States. These 
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differences between countries may be closely related to factors associated with market structure 
and the exertion of market power.2
 
  
A. United States 
 
B. Germany
 
Figure 3.1 Retail roasted coffee prices and coffee bean prices, 1992:01-2009:12 
                                                 
2 Morriset (1998) pointed out that the average spread between retail coffee prices and world bean prices increased by 
23 percent and 45 percent from 1975 to 1994 in Europe and the United States, respectively, which is much higher 
than other food commodities he studied (e.g. beef, rice, sugar and wheat). He posited that these are attributed to 
asymmetric responses of retail prices to upward movements and downward movements of coffee bean prices and 
that the market power of coffee roasting companies could be one factor in explaining increasing price spreads 
(Durevall 2007). 
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 There are only a few studies on the links between market power and cost pass-through. 
Peltzman (2000) evaluated price transmission asymmetries on 242 consumer and producer goods 
and measured the degree of asymmetry. He examined correlations with proxies of imperfect 
competition such as the number of competitors and the degree of market concentration using the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. He found that asymmetries were more extreme as the number of 
competitors falls, but they decrease when market concentration increases. Although Peltzman's 
(2000) approach is useful in cross-section analysis, it is not appropriate for the study of specific 
industries (e.g. coffee roasting) because the proxy capturing non-competitive pricing behavior 
does not exhibit enough variability over time (Meyer and von Cramon-Taubadel 2004). More 
recently, Richards, Allender and Hamilton (2011) investigated how falling and rising input prices 
influence market power in potato and fluid milk markets. They estimated consumer demand 
employing a Generalized Extreme Value Model. Subsequently, based on the derived consumer 
demand, they estimated a supplier pricing model using a traditional industrial organization 
framework. They found that for potatoes, wholesale and retail market power increases (decreases) 
when input prices decrease (increase). For fluid milk, findings were that market power declines 
when commodity prices increase but does not change with falling commodity prices, suggesting 
that market power of suppliers and retailers in fluid milk market weakens when price volatility is 
high. 
 Our objective is to evaluate the degree of market power exhibited in the roasted coffee 
market in the United States and Germany by examining critical factors determining different 
pricing behaviors (Iwata 1974)1
                                                 
1 Iwata (1974) posited that price setting power in a homogeneous product oligopoly market may first be related to 
differences in price elasticity associated with per capita consumption levels. Second, competitive differences may be 
related to different conjectural variations. Finally, differences in marginal costs lead to different price levels. 
 and to examine how the exertion of market power is associated 
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with cost pass-through patterns in these two countries. For this purpose, we build a structural 
supply-demand model of roasted coffee in the context of the new empirical industrial 
organization (NEIO) framework to develop a time-variant measure of market power in each 
country. Subsequently, the market conduct measures obtained from the NEIO model allow us to 
investigate the impact of market power on cost pass-through rates by utilizing a threshold ECM.  
 We contribute to the literature, by linking market power measures obtained from a 
structural supply-demand model grounded on industrial organization theory to a time-series 
based empirical cost pass-through model. In addition, from a policy perspective, we offer an 
empirical test for identifying sources causing incomplete and asymmetric cost pass-through in 
food supply chains. 
 The paper proceeds with a review of the U.S. and German roasted coffee markets in 
section 2. In section 3, we develop a theoretical model of market supply and demand in the 
context of the NEIO framework; and we subsequently build an empirical cost pass-through 
model that incorporates time-dependent market conduct measures. In section 4 we describe the 
data employed in estimation. In section 5 we discuss the econometric results of the structural 
supply-demand model and market conduct measures. Here, we also discuss the estimated cost 
pass-through rates results and the influence of market power in cost pass-through behavior. 
Section 6 concludes and suggests areas for future research.  
 
3.2 Roasted coffee markets in the United States and Germany 
 
A description of the coffee markets in the United States and Germany help inform the model 
(Table 3.1). Total coffee consumption in the United States and Germany in 2010 were 21.7 and 
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9.3 million bushels, respectively. The United States and Germany are the largest coffee 
importing countries, accounting for about 40 percent of total world imports (FAO 2011). While 
U.S. coffee consumption is twice as large as that of Germany, Germans consume more coffee at 
the per capita level. Average annual per capita coffee consumption in 2009 was 4.1kg and 6.5 kg 
in the United States and Germany, respectively. 
 
Table 3.1 Selected characteristics of coffee supply chain 
 U.S.a Germanyb 
Consumption   
  Total coffee consumption (million bushel) 21.78 9.29 
  Per capita consumption (kg) 4.1 6.5 
Manufactures sector   
  Share of four leading brands (%) 66.2 78.9 
  Share of private label brands (%) 10.1 13.0 
Retailing sector   
  Share of five leading supermarkets (%) 35.5 61.8 
  Share of hard-discounter retailers (%) <2.0 34.0 
a. Source: Mintel U.S. coffee report (2011) 
b. Source: Mintel Germany coffee report (2004) 
 
 Industry structures vary between these two countries in terms of the degree of 
concentration and market characteristics. In 2003, the German roasted coffee industry was made 
up of 44 firms; the four biggest companies in the German roasted coffee industry and their 
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market share were Tchibo with 33.3 percent, Melitta with 17.3 percent, Jacobs with 17.2 percent 
and Dallmayr with 11.1percent of Germany coffee sales. These companies had a combined 
market share of 78.9 percent (Mintel 2004). In 2010, the United States had 215 roasters and was 
slightly less concentrated than in Germany; the four biggest companies in the U.S. roasted coffee 
industry and their market share were J.M. Smucker with 32.4 percent, Kraft Foods with 15.7 
percent, Starbucks Coffee Company with 12.7 percent, and Green Mountain Coffee Roasters 
with 5.4 percent. These companies had a combined market share of 66.2 percent of total U.S. 
coffee sales (Mintel 2011). The shares of private label brands, which are often positioned as a 
lower cost alternative to major brands, are 10.1 percent and 13.0 percent in the U.S. and the 
German markets, respectively.    
 Food retailing in Germany is more concentrated than in the United States. In Germany, 
the market share of five leading supermarkets is about 62 percent, which is about twice as large 
as the share of the five largest supermarkets in the United States. A striking difference between 
two countries is the market share of hard discounters. The market share of hard discounters (e.g. 
Aldi and Lidl) is quite high in Germany, at about 34 percent. In contrast, the share of hard 
discounters in the United States was less than 2 percent in 2010. Hard discounters offer a limited 
assortment of products (typically 5,000 to 6,000 stock keeping units, compared to 45,000 stock 
keeping units in traditional supermarkets) in large quantities, which allows them to operate 
extremely low-cost supply chains (Gómez, Lee and Körner 2010). Another characteristic of the 
German coffee market is the presence of a coffee excise tax levied on roasters at 2.19 Euros per 
kilogram. In contrast, there is no excise tax on coffee in the United States.  
 These market characteristics suggest differences in the structure of the coffee supply 
chains between the United States and Germany. One may speculate that these market structures 
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may lead to differences in cost pass-through behaviors. In next section, we develop a model that 
describes behaviors in demand and supply sectors, and empirically evaluate the degree of market 
conduct. Estimated measures on market conduct are subsequently employed in the examination 
of links between the extent of market power and cost pass-through behaviors in both countries.  
 
3.3 Empirical model 
 
Our study follows two steps to examine linkages between non-competitive pricing behaviors and 
cost pass-through patterns in the U.S. and the German roasted coffee markets. In the first stage, 
we develop an empirical model to evaluate the extent to which the roasted coffee industry 
exercises market power in retail pricing. In the second stage, we employ the estimated time-
dependent market conduct measures in a threshold error correction model of cost pass-through. 
Here, the variable of market conduct is incorporated into the coefficient explaining the speed of 
adjustment toward the long run equilibrium between international and retail coffee prices. This 
allows us to measure how the degree of market power influences cost pass-through behaviors in 
both countries.     
 
3.3.1 Demand and supply model of roasted coffee 
We start our analysis by constructing a structural supply-demand model following Bettendorf 
and Verboven (2000). We first specify a demand function for roasted coffee, assumed to be 
linear and homogenous of degree zero in prices and income. Furthermore, roasted coffee is 
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assumed to be a homogenous good in this study.2
 
 Demand for roasted coffee is a function of 
retail price of roasted coffee, income level of households, changes in preferences over time and 
prices of substitute beverages. Then the aggregate demand function can be written as: 
                                            
s
tttt pTypQ 43210 ααααα ++++= ,                                             (3.1) 
 
where tQ is total consumption quantities of roasted coffee, tp is price for roasted coffee, ty is the 
income level of households, T is a linear trend capturing changes in preferences and stp  refers to 
prices of substitute goods such as tea, instant coffee and carbonated soft drinks. 
 Based on this consumer demand, coffee roasters are assumed to maximize profits by 
choosing quantity as their strategic variable. The profit of any individual firm i (i=1,···,N) at time 
t can be expressed as: 
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where ∑=
i
tit QQ , is total quantities sold in the market in period t, tiQ ,  is quantities sold by firm i 
in period t and τ is a value-added tax3 tiC ,. represents the cost function of firm i in period t 
where costs of firm i depend on its own quantity sold in period t, tiQ , and a vector of input prices 
                                                 
2 Homogeneity is assumed because of aggregate data in the empirical analysis (see e.g. Cowling and Waterson 1976; 
Clarke and Davies 1982). For the U.S. (Gollop and Roberts 1979; Roberts 1984) and the Netherlands (Bettendorf 
and Verboven 2000), homogeneity of roasted coffee is presumed as well.  
3 Due to the presence of an excise tax 𝜏𝑐 on roasted coffee in Germany, the term, 𝜏𝑐 ∙ 𝑄𝑖,𝑡 is incorporated in the right-
hand side of equation (2.2) in the German model. 
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in period t, tw . Differentiating equation (3.2) with respect to the firm i's quantity supplied, tiQ , , 
the first order condition of firm i yields: 
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In equation (3.3), )/)(/( tttt QppQ ∂∂−=η  refers to the price elasticity of demand for roasted 
coffee and )/)(/( ,, ttititi QQQQ ∂∂=θ  represents the conjectural variation elasticity. The 
conjectural variation elasticity measures firm i's strategic conjecture about other firms' behavior 
regarding their choice of quantities supplied, and it ranges from zero to one. A value of zero 
indicates that there is no response of total quantities to changes in firm i's output (i.e. a perfect 
competitive market), whereas a value of one is interpreted as a monopolistic market  structure (or 
a perfect collusion market).  
 The individual supply functions can be aggregated following Appelbaum (1982) where 
the cost function is assumed to have the Gorman-Polar form (Bettendorf and Verboven 2000; 
Durevall 2007).4
tti QQ /,
 By doing so, the market supply function is obtained multiplying equation (3.3) 
by  and aggregating over all firms. Then the market supply function yields: 
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θτ ++= ,                                        (3.4) 
 
                                                 
4 This function assumes that the individual cost functions are quasi-homothetic. Therefore, it implies that at the 
optimum, marginal costs are equal over all firms, but allowing for different cost curves across firms.  
 126 
 
where ∑ ∂∂=
i
ttitiit QQQCwMC )/)(/()( ,,  represents a weighted average marginal cost of  the 
industry and ∑=
i
ttii QQ )/( ,θθ  is an average industry conduct parameter. From equation (3.4), 
we derive the Lerner Index to measure the degree of market power. A Lerner Index equal to zero, 
provided evidence of a market operating in perfect competition, whereas a value of one implies 
that the market is monopolistic. The Lerner Index is obtained by: 
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From equation (3.1), price elasticity of demand can be computed as 
t
t
t Q
p
1αˆη = , so the market 
supply function of equation (3.4) can be modified as:  
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where the weighted average marginal cost of the industry, )(wMCt , is inferred indirectly from the 
evolution of input prices (Appelbaum 1982). Given that the production of roasted coffee is 
relatively simple (Sutton 1991) and that input factors are used in fixed proportions, the market 
marginal cost can be specified as a linear function in input prices (Bettendorf and Verboven 2000) 
as follows: 
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where mtw , ctw  and rtw  refer to prices of the three different coffee bean varieties, namely Other 
Mild, Colombian Mild and Robusta, respectively; ltw  is labor costs in the manufacturing sector 
and dtw  represents distribution costs. Using equations (3.1), (3.6) and (3.7), a structural demand 
and supply model for the roasted coffee market yields: 
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 We employ the iterative generalized method of moments (GMM) (Hansen 1982; Hansen 
and Singleton 1982) for estimation, given that the parameters in the system of equations (3.8)-
(3.9) are nonlinear. This is a convenient approach to estimating nonlinear models without 
complete knowledge of the probability distribution of the data (Hall 1993; Ogaki 1993).5
θˆ
 
Estimating equations (3.8) and (3.9) provides parameter estimates of the conjectural variation 
elasticity,  and of the time-varying price elasticity of demand, 
t
t
t Q
p
1ˆˆ αη = . Subsequently, the 
Lerner Index is derived using equation (3.5) to measure the degree of market power in the two 
countries.     
 
3.3.2 Cost pass-through 
                                                 
5 The two step and the iterative GMM estimators have asymptotically same distribution. However, the iterative 
estimator has superior properties in finite samples (Hall 2005).  
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The primary variations in roasted coffee processing costs result from changes in international 
coffee bean prices. Therefore, we evaluate cost pass-through behaviors by analyzing how fast 
changes in international coffee bean prices are passed on to retail prices in domestic markets.  
 To do this, we employ a threshold error correction model (TECM) representation, given 
that two price series at different segments in a food supply chain are typically co-integrated (Von 
Cramon-Taubadel and Loy 1996). Particularly, the ECM approach is useful in cost pass-through 
analysis because the pass-through rates are easily obtained through the long-run error correction 
term in the ECM representation. The coefficient of the error correction term can be interpreted as 
the speed at which retail prices adjust to the long-run equilibrium after a shock in international 
coffee bean prices. Moreover, the threshold approach in the ECM allows one to take into account 
the price rigidities that may affect price transmission behavior and cost pass-through (Tong 1983; 
Balke and Fomby 1997). The existence of price frictions such as transaction costs and menu 
costs may lead to different pass-through rates along the food supply chain, depending on the 
magnitude and sign of the upstream shock (Ben-Kaabia and Gil 2007). By allowing threshold 
effects in the error correction process, we can identify regime-specific pass-through behaviors. 
Specifically, we focus on whether pass-through rates are different when international coffee 
prices are rising and falling. For this purpose, we follow Hansen (1999) and Lo and Zivot (2001) 
to consider the time series nature of price data (e.g. integration and co-integration) and the 
regime-specific nonlinear pass-through by employing the threshold error correction model 
(TECM).  
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 We start our analysis by considering the co-integration relationship between two price 
series: retail prices of roasted coffee, tp , and international coffee prices, tw .
6
tεˆ
 If each price 
series is integrated of order one, I(1), and the two price series are co-integrated, then the error 
correction term,  can be calculated as the residual from the linear relationship between tp  and 
tw . The error correction term is interpreted as the deviation from the long-run equilibrium 
between tp  and tw . But the adjustment to restore the long-run equilibrium may depend on the 
magnitude and the sign of tεˆ . Therefore, to enable for regime-specific nonlinear pass-through, 
the first step is to specify a threshold autoregressive representation (TAR) of this residual, tεˆ  as 
follows (Balke and Fomby 1997; Enders and Granger 1998): 
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where the regime-dependent autoregressive (AR) process of the residual tεˆ  is determined by the 
unknown threshold values 1γ  and 2γ . In equation (3.10), d refers to a delay parameter that 
explains the time lag capturing threshold behavior in the autoregressive process of tεˆ . The 
coefficients )(1
Iσ , )(1
IIσ  and )(1
IIIσ  are determined by whether the threshold variables, dt−εˆ  are 
                                                 
6 International (composite) price is a weighted average price of coffee bean varieties traded in international market. 
This price is calculated and published by the International Coffee Organization (ICO).  
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greater than the upper threshold value, 2γ , are less than the bottom threshold value, 1γ  or are 
between them. 
 Formulating a TECM requires several steps. In the first step, we examine the existence of 
the threshold effects in the autoregressive process of variable, tεˆ , following Tsay (1989). We 
employ a recursive least squares procedure to examine whether or not the coefficients of this 
autoregressive process are linear. Subsequently, we compute TAR-F statistics to test the null 
hypothesis of no changes in the parameter estimates of the autoregressive representation of tεˆ . 
Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests the existence of a threshold effect (Tsay 1989; 
Goodwin and Holt 1999; Goodwin and Piggott 2001). 
 In the second step, we estimate the threshold values using the two-dimensional grid 
search method and examine the significance of the estimated threshold parameters following 
Hansen (1999) and Lo and Zivot (2001). We first consider two regimes defined by the threshold 
value, 1γ . This first TAR model includes two regimes ( 1ˆ γε >−dt  and 1ˆ γε ≤−dt ) and is estimated 
using conditional ordinary least squares. Let )( 11 γS  be the sum of squared errors of the two-
regime TAR model. The threshold value is obtained as the value that minimizes the sum of 
squared errors as follows (Chan 1993; Hansen 1999): 
 
                                                         
)(minargˆ 111
1
γγ
γ
S= .                                                        (3.11)  
 
Hansen (1999) suggests a method for testing whether the threshold parameter estimated in 
equation (3.11) is statistically significant. The likelihood ratio (LR) test for the null hypothesis of 
 131 
 
no threshold effect is based on the statistic 21101 ˆ/))ˆ(( σγSSF −= , where 0S  represents the sum 
of squared errors obtained from a model with no threshold. Since the threshold value, 1γ  is not 
identified in the null hypothesis, the classical tests of F1 do not follow standard distributions. To 
overcome this limitation, Hansen(1996) suggests a bootstrap method to calculate the p-value to 
conduct the LR test explained above. 
 We also examine the possible existence of a second threshold value in the TAR model as 
indicated in equation (3.10). Similar to the single threshold case, the TAR model with three 
regimes is estimated conditional on the fixed value 1γˆ , where 21ˆ γγ < . Given the first threshold 
1ˆγ , the optimal threshold value of 2γ  can be estimated as: 
 
                                                           
),ˆ(minarg~ 2122
2
γγγ
γ
S= ,                                                (3.12) 
 
where ),ˆ( 212 γγS  is the conditional sum of squared errors from the three-regime TAR model. 
Similarly, the LR test statistic for the null hypothesis of single threshold versus two thresholds 
can be calculated as 2212112 ~/)}~,ˆ()ˆ({ σγγγ SSF −= . To test the statistical significance of 2
~γ , we 
use the same bootstrapping method described above. If F2 is sufficiently large, the null 
hypothesis of a single threshold model is rejected in favor of a two-threshold model specification. 
The same procedure can be applied to test for additional thresholds.  
 If the presence of threshold effects in the error correction process is confirmed, then the 
threshold error correction model (TECM) representation yields:7
                                                 
7 The erogeneity test results indicate that international coffee bean prices, 𝑤𝑡  is weakly exogenous to retail roasted 
coffee prices, 𝑝𝑡  in both countries.  
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where the parameter estimates of the error correction terms k1λ  (k=I, II, III) are estimated for 
three different regimes, according to the magnitude of the threshold variable dt−εˆ . Equation 
(3.13) allows us to investigate how the practice of market power influences cost pass-through 
behavior. Recall that the pass-through rate is defined as the speed at which retail prices adjust to 
restore the long-run equilibrium relationship with international prices. A measure of this 
adjustment rate is provided by parameter estimates, k1λ  (k=I, II, III) of the error correction term 
in each regime.   
 We hypothesize that the pass-through rate depends on the degree of market power. That 
is, if distributors (e.g. coffee roasters or retailers) in the domestic market have market power, 
they may adjust retail prices faster for increases and slower for decreases in international prices 
of green coffee by exerting market power. This cost pass-through behavior is commonly referred 
to as the "rockets and feathers" phenomenon (Bacon 1991). For the purpose of this analysis, the 
regime-specific pass-through rate parameters, )(1
Iλ , )(1
IIλ  and )(1
IIIλ  are assumed to be linearly 
dependent on the time-varying Lerner Index, tLˆ  obtained from the structural model in equations 
(3.8)-(3.9). Therefore, the adjustment parameters can be expressed as:   
 
                                               t
kk
t
k LL ˆ)ˆ( )(2
)(
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1 ϕϕλ −= , IIIIIIk ,,=∀                                      (3.14) 
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where the pass-through rate in regime k, )(1
kλ is expected to have an inverse relationship with the 
estimated time-dependent Lerner Index, tLˆ .  
 By allowing regime-specific and market power-dependent pass-through rates, we can 
examine whether pass-through rates differ according to a rising and falling international prices. 
Moreover, we can test whether our measure of market power is associated with these different 
pass-through rates. Given the co-integration relationship ttt wp 10ˆ ρρε −−=  and the threshold 
parameters 1γ  and 2γ , the regime (I) ( 1ˆ γε <−dt ) is interpreted as the regime where retail prices 
are relatively low compared to the long-run equilibrium relationship, due to rising international 
prices. Therefore, in this regime, retail prices are expected to rise to reestablish the long-run 
equilibrium. If coffee processors have market power and want to increase their margin, then the 
pass-through rate should be accelerated by higher degrees of market power. That is, )(2
Iϕ in 
equation (3.14) is expected to be positive. Similarly, in regime (III) ( 2ˆ γε ≥−dt ), retail prices are 
relatively high compared to the equilibrium. In this regime, coffee processors with market power 
may want to keep their margins high by slowing the pass-through rate. Therefore, )(2
IIIϕ  is 
expected to be negative, reducing the speed of adjustment to the equilibrium. Regime (II) 
represents deviations of magnitude between the threshold values [ 21,γγ ]. This regime accounts 
for the potential presence of price friction underlying price transmission behaviors. As Balke and 
Fomby (1997) pointed out, retail prices may be expected to respond when the benefits from 
doing so exceed the costs. The regime between 1γ  and 2γ  in equation (3.13) can be interpreted 
as the sector where retail prices do not respond to changes in international coffee bean prices 
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because the magnitude of the change is too small to induce price changes at retail (Goodwin & 
Piggott 2001; Meyer 2004; Meyer & von Cramon-Taubadel 2004). Therefore, the pass-through 
rate parameters, )(1
IIϕ and )(2
IIϕ are expected to be close to zero and statistically insignificant. 
 Equation (3.13) can be extended by accommodating short-run asymmetric retail price 
responses for rising and falling international prices (Wolffram 1971; Houck 1982; von Cramon-
Taubadel and Loy 1996). An asymmetric formulation of equation (3.13) is specified by splitting 
the short-run dynamics variables )1( −∆ ttw  into their positive, )1( −+∆ ttw  and negative, )1( −−∆ ttw  
components. Thus, )1()1( −−
+ ∆=∆ tttt ww  if 0)1( ≥∆ −ttw , zero otherwise; and )1()1( −−− ∆=∆ tttt ww  if 
0)1( <∆ −ttw , zero otherwise. Therefore, an asymmetric formulation incorporating regime-specific 
and market power-dependent pass-through rates is given by: 
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where tkktk LL )(2)(1)(1 )( ϕϕλ −= , IIIIIIk ,,=∀ .   
 
3.4 Data  
 
The empirical analysis is based on monthly data for the roasted coffee market in the United 
States and Germany over the period January 1992 to December 2009. We compile coffee price 
data ($/lb) including retail prices in the United States and Germany, international coffee bean 
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prices of the three varieties under consideration and international composite prices. The latter are 
the weighted average prices of different coffee bean varieties constructed from the International 
Coffee Organization (ICO). Coffee consumption for each country is measured as imports minus 
re-exports (Bettendorf and Verboven 2000). These data are obtained from the ICO. We employ 
disposable income per capita as our measure of income. The income data for both countries are 
denoted in U.S. dollars and are obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2011) and the 
Federal Statistical Office (FSO 2011) for the United States and Germany, respectively. We 
employ a tea price index for the U.S. model and a carbonate soft drink price index for the 
German model as substitute goods, respectively. These data are also compiled from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics and the Federal Statistical Office for the United States and Germany, 
respectively. The unit labor cost index and the fuel price index are used as proxies for labor and 
distribution costs, respectively. All prices and income variables are adjusted by Consumer Price 
Index to take as real values.  
 Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for these data. The descriptive statistics reveal 
that the average retail price during the sample period is higher in Germany ($4.13/lb) than in the 
United States ($3.33/lb). Table 3.2 also shows that the degree of variation measured by the 
coefficient of variation.8
                                                 
8 The coefficient of variation is measured as the ratio of standard deviation to mean. This measure is also referred as 
a relative standard deviation.  
 The results indicate that variability of international bean prices and 
international composite prices are higher than those of retail prices in both countries. These 
figures imply that international prices of coffee beans are more volatile than retail prices. On the 
other hand, coffee bean prices for three varieties seems to be similar in terms of average and their 
standard deviations for both countries. As described in Table 3.1, total consumption of roasted 
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coffee is about two times larger in the United States than those in Germany. However, per capita 
consumption is larger in Germany and that of the United States. The coefficient of variation for 
consumption shows that variability of consumption seems to be higher in Germany than in the 
United States, implying a relatively more sensitiveness in the German coffee consumptions.   
 
Table 3.2 Descriptive statistics 
 United States Germany 
 Mean C.V. Mean C.V. 
Retail Price ($/lb) 3.33 0.16 4.21 0.22 
Other Mild ($/lb) 1.09 0.38 1.13 0.38 
Columbian Mild ($/lb) 1.18 0.38 1.17 0.38 
Robusta ($/lb) 0.68 0.47 0.67 0.48 
Composite price ($/lb) 0.90 0.39 0.90 0.39 
Consumption (Million Bushel) 1.62 0.17 0.80 0.29 
Per capita disposable income (1000 $) 26.80 0.21 7.79 0.18 
Tea/Coke (Price Index) a 1.32 0.10 0.98 0.04 
Labor (Price Index) b 0.96 0.07 0.90 0.10 
Distribution (Price Index)a 1.11 0.59 0.78 0.29 
a. For the U.S. 1982-84 =100 and for Germany 2005 = 100. 
b. 2005 = 100 
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3.5 Empirical results 
 
3.5.1 Demand and supply estimates of roasted coffee  
We estimate the simultaneous system shown in equations (3.8) and (3.9) using the iterative 
GMM. The estimation considers heteroscedasticity and serial correlation of the residuals, using 
distance matrices for weighting. The distance matrices for the orthogonality conditions are 
updated at each stage of the iterative process until the vector of coefficients converges. Thus, the 
regression standard errors and covariance matrices are corrected both for heteroscedasticity and 
autocorrelation (Ogaki 1999).  
 For the iterative GMM estimation, we employ a number of instrument variables9
 Table 3.3 reports the GMM parameter estimates for the U.S. and the German roasted 
coffee markets. Overall, our parameter estimates exhibit the expected signs and significances. In 
the demand equation, the estimated coefficient on price is negative and significant for both 
countries. Specifically, the estimate coefficients suggest that a $1 increase in retail prices in the 
U.S. and the German market leads to 0.32 million bushel and 0.09 million bushel decreases in 
 for 
model identification, and test whether or not this model is over-identified employing Hansen 
(1982)'s J-statistic. Our over-identification test results show that the null hypothesis of a valid 
model specification cannot be rejected at 5% significant level. This result suggests that both the 
U.S. and the German models are correctly specified.     
                                                 
9 We use three different international bean prices including Other Mild, Columbian Mild and Robusta, price indices 
for labor and distribution, household expenditure, exchange rate for Germany and import price index for the United 
States.  
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total quantities of roasted coffee consumed, respectively.10 1αˆ This parameter estimate, , is 
employed to derive the price elasticity of demand. The coefficients on the income variables for 
both countries are also positive and significant, as expected. The results show that when per 
capita disposable income increases by $1, total roasted coffee consumption increases by 82 
thousand and 87 thousand bushels in the United States and Germany, respectively. Given 
differences in total population, German coffee consumers seem to be more responsive to changes 
in income than those in the United States. The time trend variable shows a gradual decrease in 
roasted coffee consumption in both countries. However, the magnitude to which per capita 
consumption decreases is slightly larger in the German market than in the U.S. market. The 
coefficient on tea prices in the U.S. model is negative and significant. These results indicate that 
higher tea prices lead to lower coffee demand, which is contrary to our expectation. In the 
German model, the results suggest that there is no significant effect of the price of substitutes on 
coffee consumption.11
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 These values correspond to 0.0001737g/capita and 0.0001793g/capita decreases for the U.S. and the German 
market, respectively, indicating that German consumers seem to be slightly more sensitive to changes in retail prices 
than U.S. consumers.    
11 Feuerstein (2002) argues that there is no substitute good for roasted coffee in Germany, whereas Kutty (2000) and 
Bettendorf and Verboven (2000) consider tea as a close substitute. 
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Table 3.3 Roasted coffee demand and supply estimates in the U.S. and the German markets 
 
U.S. Germany 
 
Coefficient Std. Errors Coefficient Std. Errors 
Demand 
    
  Constant 2.915**a) (0.636)b) 0.482 (0.670) 
  Price -0.324** (0.084) -0.088** (0.023) 
  Time -0.008** (0.003) -0.003** (0.001) 
  Income 0.082** (0.026) 0.087** (0.017) 
  Tea/Coke -2.677** (0.584) 0.307 (0.616) 
Supply     
  Constant -2.241** (0.906) -3.737** (4.181) 
  Other Mild -1.239 (0.662) 1.175** (0.437) 
  Columbian Mild 2.244** (0.616) -0.640 (0.456) 
  Robusta 0.512** (0.255) 2.655** (0.299) 
  Labor 3.630** (1.050) 0.040** (0.013) 
  Distribution -0.222** (0.110) -1.975** (0.463) 
  Conjectural Variation  
  Elasticity (θ ) 
0.268** (0.127) 0.417** (0.164) 
Price Elasticity (η )d 0.403 
 
0.547 
 
Lerner Index (L)d 0.665 
 
0.762 
 
Hansen's J Statistics 
(Over-identifying tests) 
8.13 (0.087)c) 18.59 (0.100) 
Number of Observations 216 
 
216 
 
a. ** and * indicate 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. 
b. Parenthesis indicates standard errors. 
c. Parenthesis indicates P-value. 
d. Price elasticities and the Lerner Index are evaluated at sample means. 
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 As in equation (3.9), retail prices of roasted coffee are determined by two factors: the first 
factor represents the impacts of marginal costs. Recall that our model considers coffee processors 
and retailers as a single firm. Therefore, marginal costs in this model may include roasting costs 
of coffee beans for processors and distribution costs of roasted coffee for retailers; the second 
factor refers to the impacts of the extent of oligopoly power in retail pricing.  
 We first interpret the estimated parameters on the marginal cost measure. Given the 
relatively fixed proportion of other input factors such as labor and distribution in determining 
marginal costs, coffee bean prices have a substantial effect on the variation of the industry level 
marginal costs. In coffee processing, Other Mild and Columbian Mild are the primary varieties 
used in roasted coffee production and their mix ratio is closely related to product quality. 
Columbian Mild variety is employed in the production of premium roasted coffee. On the other 
hand, Robusta variety is only employed as an additive (in small amounts) in the production of 
roasted coffee. These varieties are used mostly in the production of instant coffee. In this regard, 
our parameter estimates show substantive differences in the structure of marginal costs between 
the two countries. The coefficients for Columbian Mild and Robusta prices have a positive and 
significant effect on marginal costs in the U.S. model. That is, marginal costs of the U.S. roasted 
coffee industry appear to be directly affected by variations in prices of Columbian Mild and 
Robusta varieties. In contrast, changes in Other Mild variety prices have a modest impact on 
marginal costs in the U.S. These results imply that the Columbian Mild variety is preferred to the 
Other Mild variety in the United States. Specifically, a 1$ increase of Columbian Mild and 
Robusta prices leads to a $2.24 and a $0.51 increase of marginal costs, respectively. The higher 
estimate of the coefficient on Columbian Mild prices may be explained by the fact that our model 
does not include marketing costs, which are presumably larger for premium products.  
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 The results are different from the German market. The marginal costs in the German 
roasted coffee sector seem to be driven by prices of Other Mild and Robusta varieties. These 
results imply that these two varieties, Other Mild and Robusta are the primary input in the 
production of roasted coffee in this country, reflecting the German consumers' preferences in 
taste. Similarly, higher estimated values of coefficients on Other Mild and Robusta also seem to 
take over marketing costs which are not reflected in our data. 
 We now focus on the interpretation of the market conduct parameters, which are closely 
related to pricing behaviors in an oligopolistic market environment. Pricing decisions in a 
homogeneous product oligopolistic market are influenced by the price elasticity of demand, the 
conjectural variation elasticity, and the marginal costs (Iwata 1974). Given that the marginal cost 
structure for roasted coffee processing is relatively similar,12
                                                 
12 In the cost structure of roasted coffee processing, the largest share of costs is green coffee beans (about 60 percent 
of total processing costs) for which the U.S. and Germany roasters purchase raw materials at world market prices.  
 disparities in pricing behavior 
depend on differences in the consumers' sensitivity to price changes in the demand side and the 
degree of competitiveness of firms on the supply side. First, we derive the absolute value of the 
price elasticity of demand evaluated at the sample mean. The price elasticities of demand are 
estimated at 0.403 and 0.547 for the United States and Germany, respectively. These results 
imply that German consumers are more sensitive to retail price changes of roasted coffee than 
U.S. consumers are. Second, the estimated conjectural variation elasticities for both countries are 
significant and range between 0 and 1, as expected. From equation (3.9), an elasticity of 
conjectural variation greater than zero implies that retail prices are set a higher level than the 
marginal costs. Our results thus provide evidence of non-competitive pricing behavior in both 
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countries, further indicating that the roasted coffee industries in the United States and Germany 
are oligopolistic.  
 These two measures are employed to derive the Lerner Index which measures the degree 
of market power, as in equation (3.5). The Lerner Index indicates to what extent the retail prices 
are set higher than the marginal costs. Our results suggest that the roasted coffee industries in 
both countries exert considerable market power in retail pricing. Specifically, the Lerner Index of 
the German roasted coffee market calculated at sample mean is 0.762, which is greater than the 
Lerner Index of the United States, calculated at 0.665. The difference is mainly driven by 
relatively higher conjectural variation elasticity in Germany. This implies that the German coffee 
industry seems to exercise more market power than its U.S. counterpart. This result supports the 
observation that the supply sector in the German roasted coffee market is more concentrated than 
in the United States (see Table 3.1). 
    
3.5.2 Cost pass-through  
We now use our estimates of the time-varying Lerner Index to evaluate whether market power is 
linked to cost pass-through behaviors of the roasted coffee market in the United States and 
Germany. The time-varying Lerner Index are calculated using the estimated conjectural variation 
elasticity and time-dependent price elasticity of demand, as in equation (3.5). To analyze cost 
pass-through behaviors in these two countries, our strategy is as follows: First, we examine the 
time series properties (e.g. integration and co-integration) of two prices series, international 
(composite) prices, tw , and retail prices in both countries, tp . Second, we estimate the TAR 
model in equation (3.10) to identify the unknown threshold values and to test their statistical 
significance. Lastly, we find empirical evidence on impacts of market power on the cost pass-
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through rates in these two countries by estimating the TECM incorporating the market power 
measures as in equation (3.15).    
 
3.5.2.1 Integration and Co-integration 
In this section, we examine the time series properties of price variables including stationarity of 
two price series, tw  and tp , and co-integration between them. To examine integration, we 
employ the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test under the null hypothesis of nonstationarity and 
the KPSS test under the null hypothesis of stationary. Panel A of Table 3.4 reports both test 
statistics for retail prices in the U.S. and Germany and for international prices. The ADF test 
results suggest that the null hypothesis of nonstationarity cannot be rejected in all variables in 
levels. In contrast, the test for the variables in first differences rejects the null hypothesis, 
indicating that they follow I(0) processes. The KPSS test results support these findings. The 
KPSS test indicates that all price variables in levels exhibit a unit-root, but all variables in first 
differences follow a stationary process.  
 Another issue in the ECM approach is whether the two price series have a long-run linear 
relationship. We test the co-movements between international and retail prices employing 
Johansen's (1992a, 1992b, 1995) approach. We conduct λmax and trace tests between retail and 
international prices in both countries. Panel B of Table 3.4 indicates that, for both countries, 
there exist at least one co-integration rank, indicating the presence of a co-integration 
relationship between the two price series in both countries.  
 
 
 
 144 
 
Table 3.4 Integration and co-integration tests 
A. Integration test 
Variables in Levels 
U.S. 
Retail Price 
Germany 
Retail Price 
Coffee  
Bean Price 
ADF-t 
H0 : ~I(1)  -2.77 -1.49 -2.51 
H0 : ~I(1) no constant -0.11 -0.13 -0.16 
KPSS 
H0 : ~I(0) no constant 0.36** 0.64** 0.46** 
H0 : ~I(0) no linear trend 0.36** 0.82** 0.45* 
Variables in First Differences 
Δ U.S. 
Retail Price 
Δ Germany  
Retail Price 
Δ Coffee Bean 
Price 
ADF-t 
H0 : ~I(1)  -9.70** -10.36** -12.51** 
H0 : ~I(1) no constant -9.72** -10.38** -12.52** 
KPSS 
H0 : ~I(0) no constant 0.05 0.11 0.07 
H0 : ~I(0) no linear trend 0.06 0.17 0.07 
 
B. Co-integration test 
 H0: r Critical Value U.S. Retail Price Germany Retail Price 
maxλ  0 11.44 34.98 18.73 
1 3.84 0.00 0.04 
trace 0 12.53 34.98 18.77 
1 3.84 0.00 0.04 
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3.5.2.2 The TAR estimate results 
Given that each price series is integrated of order one, I(1), and both are co-integrated, we 
estimate the TAR model in equation (3.10). Table 3.5 presents estimation results of the TAR 
model.  
 
Table 3.5 Threshold autoregressive (TAR) estimates 
 U.S. Germany 
Optimal Lag 7 5 
Delay Parameter 1 1 
Tsay (1997) Test  3.34** (0.00) a 7.51**(0.00) 
Estimated Threshold   
  1γ  -0.1896 -0.6997 
  2γ  -0.3357 -0.7537 
LR statistics  5.41 13.38 
Bootstrapped p value (0.00)b (0.00) 
Percentage of observations 
by regime 
  
  Regime I 0.13 0.09 
  Regime II 0.09 0.01 
  Regime III 0.78 0.90 
a. F-test for a linear AR process and parenthesis shows asymptotic p values for test statistics. 
b. 300 bootstrap replications were used to obtain the p value. 
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 We choose the optimal lags of 5 and 7 for the U.S. and German model, respectively, 
using the AIC and SBC measures. The delay parameter, d is selected to 1 for both countries 
based on the TAR-F statistics in Tsay test (Goodwin and Hold 1999; Goodwin and Piggott 2011). 
The Tsay (1989) test results suggest that the null hypothesis of no threshold effects in the 
autoregressive process is rejected at the 5% significant level, indicating the existence of 
nonlinear threshold effects in the error correction process of variable tεˆ .  
 Given the presence of threshold effects, we estimate the unknown threshold parameters, 
1γ  and 2γ , following Chan (1983) and Hansen (1999). The estimated threshold parameters are  
-0.336 and -0.189 for the U.S. model; and are -0.754 and -0.699 for the German model. The LR 
statistics and their bootstrapped p-values indicate that the estimated multiple threshold values are 
statistically significant. The percentage of observations falling in regimes I, II, and III is 13, 9 
and 78 percent in the United States and 9, 1 and 90 percent in Germany, respectively. 
 The estimated threshold values and distributions of observations falling in each regime 
reveal important preliminary facts associated with the cost pass-through behaviors in the two 
countries. Recall that the error correction terms derived from the co-integration relationship 
between retail and international prices are the deviations from the long-run equilibrium 
relationship. A positive deviation means that retail prices are high relative to the long-run 
equilibrium level, implying that international prices are falling. In contrast, a negative deviation 
indicates that retail prices are below the long-run equilibrium level, implying that international 
prices are rising. The results indicate that the threshold values partitioning regime I for the 
United State and Germany are estimated at -0.336 and -0.754, respectively. That is, retail prices 
are low relative to the long-run equilibrium level. Therefore, distribution in importing countries 
is expected to increase retail prices to restore the equilibrium. Interestingly, the estimated 
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threshold values partitioning regime III are -0.189 and -0.699 for the United States and Germany, 
respectively. Therefore, this regime includes all positive values of the error correction term (i.e. 
when retail prices are too high relative to the long run equilibrium), but also some values in 
which this term is negative (e.g. [-0.189, 0] for the U.S.; [-0.669, 0] for Germany). In other 
words, for modest increases in international prices (i.e. retail prices are relatively little low 
compared to the equilibrium), the distribution system adjusts toward the long run equilibrium in 
the same manner as when the retail prices are high. The percentage of observations falling in 
between [ 2γ , 0] of regime III observations for the U.S. and the German models is 29 percent and 
46 percent, respectively.   
 
3.5.2.3 Empirical results of cost pass-through  
In this section, we investigate cost pass-through behaviors reflecting the impact of market power 
in the United States and Germany, employing the TECM described in equations (3.14) and 
(3.15). Our analysis consists of the two steps. In the first step, we examine the existence of short-
run asymmetries in price transmission. In the second step, we interpret our estimated pass-
through rates and the influence of market power on them.  
 To examine the existence of short-run asymmetries, we test the null hypothesis of 
equality between the estimated parameters on variables in first differences for positive and 
negative changes in international prices (i.e. −+ = )4(3)4(3 λλ ). We present these results in Table 3.6. 
Our findings provide evidence of short-run asymmetries in parameters on the lagged variable in 
the United States, but not in Germany. We also employ the AIC and the SBC to explore whether 
or not an asymmetric model is appropriate to examine the relationship between international and 
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retail prices. The calculated AIC and SBC values indicate that an asymmetric model is preferable 
to a symmetric model in the United States. In contrast, a symmetric TECM is more appropriate 
than its asymmetric counterpart in Germany (Table 3.6).  
 
Table 3.6 Model selection criteria 
  U.S. Germany 
F-Statistic (H0: −+ = 33 λλ ) 1.88 (0.17) 1.95 (0.16) 
F-Statistic (H0: −+ = 44 λλ ) 25.26** (0.00) 0.03 (0.86) 
Symmetric 
TECM 
AIC 142.47 274.99 
SBC 176.13 308.02 
Asymmetric 
TECM 
AIC 110.95 277.76 
SBC 154.71 321.52 
a. Parenthesis indicates the p value. 
 
 Second, given the model selection results, we analyze the cost pass-through behaviors in 
the U.S. and the German roasted coffee markets. These results are presented in Table 3.7. Recall 
that the pass-through rate is defined as the extent to which retail prices adjust to reestablish the 
long run equilibrium after a change in international coffee bean prices. A measure of this 
adjustment is provided by the parameter estimates of the coefficient on the error correction terms 
)(
1
kλ , where k=I, II and III. 
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Table 3.7 Threshold error correction model (TECM) estimates 
 U.S. Germany 
Constant -0.046 (0.011)b 0.002 (0.011) 
)(
1
I
tECT −  -0.296**
a (0.101) -0.257** (0.086) 
)(
1
I
tt ECTL −⋅  0.260* (0.144) 0.152* (0.081) 
)(
1
II
tECT −  0.514 (0.399) -0.035 (0.246) 
)(
1
II
tt ECTL −⋅  -0.660 (0.466) 0.083 (0.220) 
)(
1
III
tECT −  -0.231** (0.095) -0.098 (0.063) 
)(
1
III
tt ECTL −⋅  0.219 (0.143) 0.054 (0.069) 
1−∆ tp  0.251** (0.054) 0.289** (0.064) 
tw∆  --  0.336** (0.105) 
tw
+∆  0.111 (0.109) --  
tw
−∆  -0.190 (0.166) --  
1−∆ tw  --  -0.098 (0.114) 
1−
+∆ tw  0.876** (0.137) --  
1−
−∆ tw  -0.357** (0.166) --  
t
II L⋅− )(1
)(
1 ϕϕ  -0.470 -0.653 
t
IIII L⋅− )(1
)(
1 ϕϕ  -- -- 
t
IIIIII L⋅− )(1
)(
1 ϕϕ  -0.231 -- 
DW  2.12 1.93 
2R  0.55 0.24 
b. ** and * indicate 5% and 10% significant level, respectively. 
c. Parenthesis indicates standard errors.  
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 We discuss the results for the United States first. For this country, the estimated 
parameters on the pass-through rates( )(1
kϕ ) which is independent of market power measure ( tL ) 
are negative and significant for regimes I and III as predicted by theory. In contrast, this 
coefficient is not significant in regime II. This is consistent with argument that there may be a 
"no-adjustment range" due to the presence of price rigidities, as reflected by the price 
transmission behavior observed in regime II. The estimated pass-through rates for regime I and 
III are -0.296 and -0.231, respectively. These results indicate that the magnitude of the pass-
through rate is slightly larger in regime I than regime III in the United States. Therefore, changes 
in international prices tend to be passed on to consumers slightly faster when international prices 
are rising than when they are falling. The pass-through rate could be also affected by market 
power as we hypothesize in equation (3.14). This is measured by the parameter estimates )(2
kϕ , 
for k=I, II and III. Our results show fundamental differences between regimes. That is, market 
power has a significant effect on the pass-through rate in regime I, whereas it has no influence on 
the pass-through rate in regime III. These results indicate that when international prices are 
increasing, retail prices tend to increase faster by the exertion of market power. However, when 
international prices are decreasing, we find no additional effect by the exertion of market power. 
The overall pass-through rates, I1λ  and 
III
1λ  including the market power effects are estimated at -
0.470 and -0.231 for regime I and III, respectively.13
                                                 
13 These values are computed by 
 These results provide evidence of "rockets 
and feathers" behavior. That is, market power seems to cause retail prices to increase quickly and 
decrease slowly in the U.S. coffee supply chain. 
t
kk L)(2
)(
1 ˆˆ ϕϕ −  where k=I and III. 
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 Our results for the German market are also reported in Table 3.7. We analyze the 
estimates results of the symmetric TECM, following the results from Table 3.6. Similar to the 
U.S. results, the parameter estimates on regime II are not significant, which supports the "no 
adjustment range" argument associated with the presence of price rigidities. However, our results 
show differences in pass-through behaviors between the United States and Germany. The 
estimated pass-through parameters ignoring the influence of market power indicate that the 
estimated pass-through rate in regime I is -0.257, but statistically insignificant in regime III. 
These results imply that the pass-through occurs only when international price are rising. This is 
indicative of "rockets and feathers" behavior in the German market, regardless of the influence of 
market power. Moreover, our results show that market power seems to accelerate the response of 
retail prices in regime I, whereas it has no impact on the pass-through rate in regime III. The 
overall pass-through rate incorporating the effect of the market power is -0.653 in regime I; 
whereas in regime III there is no significant pass-through behavior for a negative changes in 
international prices. These results imply that, in the German coffee industry, both market power 
and other factors seem to lead to the "rockets and feathers" phenomenon in retail pricing.   
 
3.5.2.4 Discussion 
Our findings on the market conduct parameters and the cost pass-through behaviors suggest that 
market power influences the pass-through rate only in regime I. These results indicate that when 
retail prices are below the equilibrium, the pass-through rate becomes faster by the exertion of 
market power. This is perhaps because the industry wants to avoid falling profits by quickly 
passing increases in coffee bean prices on to consumers (Ward 1982). In contrast, when retail 
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prices are above the equilibrium, the industry seems to maintain existing retail prices until 
demand conditions force a change (Peltzman 2000).  
 However, there are some differences in retail pricing behavior between the U.S. and the 
German roasted coffee industries. One difference is observed in terms of the magnitude of 
market power effects on the pass-through rates. The extent to which the pass-through rate is 
increased by the market power is higher in Germany than in the United States. In Germany, 
market power raises the pass-through rate by about 150 percent, whereas it leads to about 60 
percent faster rise of retail prices in the United States. These results are in part due to differences 
in market conduct given that the degree of oligopoly power measured by the Lerner Index is 
stronger in Germany than in the United States. Another difference between the two countries is 
the underlying ground of the "rockets and feathers" behaviors in the cost pass-through. In the 
U.S. roasted coffee industry, the exertion of market power seems to be a crucial factor causing 
the "rockets and feathers" phenomenon. Without the effect of market power on cost pass-through 
rates, the estimated coefficients of cost pass-through variable on regime I and II are similar (e.g.  
-0.296 for regime I; -0.231 for regime III). That is, retail prices seem to be accelerated mostly by 
the exertion of market power in the United States. In contrast, in the German roasted coffee 
industry, the estimated coefficient of cost pass-through variable, excluding the effect of market 
power, is -0.257 for regime I, but is insignificant for regime III. This indicates that, without the 
effect of market power, there is evidence on asymmetric cost pass-through rates showing the 
"rockets and feathers" principles. That is, in the German roasted coffee market, although the 
exertion of market power causes retail price respond faster for increases in international prices 
than for decreases, other factors different than market power also lead to this conventional 
phenomenon.  
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3.6 Concluding remarks 
 
In this study, we examine the links between non-competitive pricing behaviors and cost pass-
through patterns in the roasted coffee markets of the United States and Germany, the two largest 
coffee importing countries. Using aggregate monthly data from January 1992 to December 2009, 
we first evaluate pricing behaviors by estimating the price elasticities of demand and the 
conjectural variation elasticities in the two countries. Subsequently, we use these two measures 
to obtain a Lerner Index, and thereby to evaluate the degree of market power of the roasted 
coffee industry in the two countries. Second, we estimate the cost pass-through rates that 
incorporate the influence of market power.  
 We find that the roasted coffee markets in both countries are characterized by 
oligopolistic structures. The degree of market power is stronger in Germany than in the U.S., 
driven by the relatively higher conjectural variation elasticity in Germany. This result supports 
the market observation that the coffee supply chain in Germany is more concentrated than in the 
United States. Using our market conduct measures, we find evidence that market power leads to 
an increase of the pass-through rates when retail prices are below equilibrium. These results 
provide evidence of "rockets and feathers" behavior in retail pricing in both countries. The 
"rockets and feathers" phenomenon seems to be mainly caused by the exertion of market power 
in the United States. In contrast, other factors different than market power seem to also lead to 
this conventional phenomenon in Germany.   
 Our study makes valuable contributions to the literature by providing policy makers 
concerned with the performances of food supply chain with meaningful empirical tools for 
identifying underlying causes associated with imperfect cost pass-through. But our approach has 
 154 
 
some limitations that should be addressed in future research. First, our study aggregates coffee 
roasters and retailers in importing countries. Future studies should conduct firm-specific analyses 
and explore the strategic pricing behavior between the coffee processing and retailing sectors. 
Second, the homogeneity assumption of the good 'roasted coffee' is somehow restrictive. The 
national markets in both countries are characterized by extensive product differentiation with 
multiple brands and blends offering different qualities. Future research should thus develop 
models incorporating production differentiation.  
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CHAPTER 4 
DISSERTATION CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation studied three topics rooted in complex vertical and spatial relationships existing 
in supply chains for specialty crops: 1) impact of policies to control CO2 emissions on spatially- 
and temporally-disaggregated food supply chains; 2) vertical price transmission changes after 
elimination of an export cartel; and 3) the influence of market power on cost pass-through.  
 Chapter 1 investigated the impact of two alternative CO2 emission reduction policies, 
namely a carbon tax and a cap-and-trade system, on the economic performance of supply chain 
for fresh apples. The Chapter also considered the potential impact of incentivizing farm-level 
CO2 sequestration options. A spatially- and temporally-disaggregated price equilibrium model is 
constructed to evaluate potential tradeoffs between CO2 emission reduction initiatives and 
economic performance. The results show that all CO2 emission policies examined lead to modest 
reductions in CO2 emissions along the fresh apple supply chain when carbon price ranges 
between $25 and $200 per metric ton of CO2. The results also suggest that a cap-and-trade 
system is relatively more cost-effective for CO2 emission reduction than a carbon tax, regardless 
of the presence of CO2 sequestration options. The models and simulation results in this Chapter 
provide useful insights to decision makers promoting industry- or sector-specific initiatives 
intended to reduce carbon footprints. Furthermore, the model developed here can assist policy-
makers in the identification of socially acceptable carbon prices and tax levels that also satisfy 
both CO2 emission reductions and social welfare losses through the simulation of various policy 
scenarios. 
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 Chapter 2 examined how the end of the coffee export quota system (EQS) influenced 
international-to-retail price transmission behaviors in supply chains for roasted coffee in France, 
Germany and the United States. A threshold error correction model (TECM) was developed to 
measure price transmission behaviors, taking into account long-run threshold effects and short-
run price transmission asymmetries. The empirical findings suggest that the elimination of the 
EQS brought about fundamental differences in price transmission behaviors in each of these 
countries. Specifically, the results indicate that retail prices became more responsive to changes 
in international prices after the end of the EQS. Moreover, the results show differences in short-
run price transmission behaviors across countries in the post-EQS period. These differences were 
discussed in terms of country-specific market structures. The TECM employed in this Chapter 
improves the accuracy of impact assessments of policy changes on price transmission processes 
compared to approaches employed in earlier. Therefore, the methodology in this Chapter 
provides meaningful tools for private and public decision-makers who are concerned with 
policies that influence prices in the context of international trade for agricultural commodities. 
 Chapter 3 measured the influence of market power on cost pass-through rates (i.e. the 
extent to which changes in international prices of coffee beans are passed on to the end 
consumers of roasted coffee) in the U.S. and the German roasted coffee market. A structural 
supply and demand model was developed to establish a time-varying Lerner Index. The index 
measures the degree of market power, based on the parameter estimates of the structural model. 
Subsequently, a TECM was used to test the impacts of market power on cost pass-through 
behaviors in these countries. We find evidence that market power leads to an increase of the 
pass-through rates when retail prices are below the equilibrium price. These results provide 
evidence of "rockets and feathers" behavior in retail pricing in both countries. The "rockets and 
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feathers" phenomenon seems to be mainly caused by the exertion of market power in the United 
States. In contrast, other factors different than market power seem to also lead to this 
conventional phenomenon in Germany. The approach employed in Chapter 3 remedies some of 
the shortcomings of the methods used in Chapter 2, given that the empirical findings in Chapter 
2 were silent regarding the factors that trigger non-competitive price transmission behaviors. 
Therefore, the models and results presented in Chapter 3 provide private and public decision-
makers who are interested in monitoring anti-trust conduct in food supply chains with 
meaningful tools to identify anti-competitive pass-through behaviors.  
 Overall, this dissertation provides a toolkit of quantitative models (nonlinear optimization 
models and time series econometrics) that foster a better understanding of critical issues 
influencing the performance of  supply chains for specialty crops. Such issues include the impact 
of various policy interventions (CO2 emission reduction initiatives and trade liberalization) on 
prices and economic performance; and the implications of market power exertion on cost pass-
through. These models can be applied to other specialty crop supply chains and provide valuable 
information to private and public decision-makers in the design of interventions affecting the 
performance of food supply chains.    
 
